Foundations of Universal Tolerance in Stanislaus’ of Skarbimierz and Paul’s Wladimiri Writings

Summary

The considerations presented in the article focus primarily on presenting the original concepts of the representatives of the so-called Polish School of the Law of Nations – Stanislaw (Stanislas) of Skarbimierz and Pawel (Paul) Wlodkowic (Wladimiri). These thinkers published their works in the 14th and 15th centuries and were known in wide circles of European intellectuals. Their concept, which convincingly justifies the need for tolerance for all people, is based on the concept of *ius naturae* which is understood as something congruent to human nature, and since a man is a social creature, thus the law of nations – *ius gentium* – is an adequate manifestation of the human law of nature. This law should be equally referred to all human beings.

**Keywords:** Stanislas of Skarbimierz, Paul Wlodkowic, medieval politics, medieval ethics, law of nature, law of nations, tolerance.

The 15th century was the time of a substantial change in the philosophical approach to man. In those times, the representatives of the Polish School of the Law of Nations: Stanislas of Skarbimierz and Paul Wladimiri presented their original doctrine of tolerance. That century also saw the emergence of a clear naturalistic tendency presenting a fresh view on the problem of human spirituality and immortality of the soul. Some doctrines, concerning the immortality of the soul and the dignity of man, as well as his privileged position in the universe, developed at the end of the Middle Ages, were later adopted by Renaissance writers. What was of highest historical importance, i.e. the frank recognition of the positive side of man’s corporeal life and of his pleasures, gradually caused a great interest in humanist studies. At that time, the anthropological subjectivism became a characteristic feature for further development of philosophical views. In these circumstances, the world of human culture spread through many countries and a *regnum hominis* changed into *rationalis mundus* depending on man (Cf. Swieżawski 1983, 186).

The new concept of human dignity in the 15th century was – according to S. Swieżawski (Swieżawski 1983, 186) – strongly attached to theological and philosoph-

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1 The secondary literature on the subject is extensive. See, for example Swieżawski 1983; Verbeke 1976; Trinkaus 1970.
ical doctrines. In the theological aspect, human dignity appears as a consequence of two principal facts from the history of salvation: the creation and incarnation. On the one hand, the first man as a creation of God was perfect; on the other – such a perfection of human nature was a cause for unification with God. This point of view, presented by Scotus, was taken over by many of the 15th century philosophers. Thus, the problem of human dignity (dignitas hominis) acquired great importance.

Thinkers of the 15th century tried to justify dignitas hominis by presenting many arguments among which five were the most popular, namely: that the central position among creatures belongs to man; that man should be treated as a microcosm; that a human being has creative capabilities; that having a free will makes a man autonomous; and that human soul is immortal. None of these arguments was new, but their philosophical context was different and their importance crucial.

In the 15th century, many authors emphasized man's special position as the center of the universe (Cf. Świężawski 1983, 195; Garin 1947, 92). At the very beginning of the 15th century, Gerson wrote: anima humana.corpori conjuncta est et nervis certis ligata secundum Platonicos; propterea nexum duplicis mundi tam spiritualis quam corporalis operatur, quasi duas illas catenas causarum, auream et argenteam, nectens (Gerson 1969, 196). The second argument for human dignity, a man being a microcosm, was not new either. It can be found in many medieval doctrines. Nevertheless, in the 15th century it appeared in a different context. A man – Nicolas of Cusa says (Cusa 1927, 92) – is not a microcosm because his sensible-corporeal nature is joined with his intellect, but because in him are joined (compilatae sunt) the natures of all beings: Intrahumanitatis potentiam omnis suo existunt modo. Furthermore, many authors underline that man's attribute that gives him a privileged position in the world is his creative work. Human work is no longer treated as a punishment for original sin but as participation in God's creation. Thus work and creation have acquired a new moral or even mystic sense (Cf. Świężawski 1983, 198–202). The final argument for human dignity, i.e., immortality of the soul also changed its meaning in the 15th century. The philosophers strongly promoted the idea of a man, who is a mirror of God's infinity and not only the most excellent animal (Cf. Garin 1947, 227; Cassirer 1942, 123–144, 319–346).

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Polish philosophy and social thought corresponded with the contemporary European philosophy. However, the dominant attitude presented by the masters of Cracow University was utilitarism and practicism2. The strong reason for such an attitude of Polish thinkers was the critical moment in the history of Poland when the university was founded (Cf. Domański 1978, 3).

Cracow University, founded in 1364 by Kasimir the Great, did not continue any scientific educational tradition in Poland, and it was created not so much for scientific reasons but to meet the social and political needs of the Polish king, i.e. to codify the State law and educate lawyers who could represent the Polish side in the conflict between Polish King and the Teutonic Order, known under the name of the Order of the Crucifers

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(Domański 1978, 7). That is why masters of Cracow University not only took part in scientific life of the university but also represented Polish political interests outside (Dąbrowski 1964, 33; Kozłowska-Budkowa 1964, 37–38; Pieradzka 1964, 91–137).

Polish thinkers discussed various ethical, political and anthropological problems, but a detailed study of their works allows us to formulate a hypothesis about a common mode of thinking characteristic for the scientific attitude of Polish philosophers. This attitude can be characterized by the following qualities: 1) a strong separation of theological and philosophical way of thinking and, as a consequence, separation of faith and reason (Cf. Włodek 1972, 58–94; Rebeta 1970, 53; Belch 1965, 230, 217); 2) antispeculative attitude in the theory of political and social philosophy (Cf. Seńko 1970, 30–33; Kowalczyk 1960, 12–13); 3) utilitarianism and practicism which stressed the importance of practical philosophy (Cf. Bojarski 1968, 50–81; Czartoryski 1963, 183–186). Thus, the characteristic feature for the Cracow thinkers was the affirmation of the dominant role of practical sciences, namely: ethics, politics and economy, which played a crucial role in academic education.

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The most important source for ethical and political theories of the 15th century Polish thinkers is the theory of law, in which they saw a guarantee for a proper organization of State. In Poland, there were four systems of law: Polish, German, Canon and Roman. The first two had a particular and local character while the others were obliged for the whole Christian world. There were some philosophical and theological reasons arguing for the usefulness of each particular group of laws. The underlying concepts of those legal systems were the notions of “natural law” (ius naturae) and “divine law” (ius divinum), these notions systematized the discipline. The “divine law” was to serve as a basis for ecclesiastical law, the “natural law” for the regulation of social, civil life in Polish legislation (Seńko 1972, 30).

The main notion, i.e. “law of nature”, was not formulated by Polish thinkers, as it belongs to the common heritage of medieval philosophy. The 15th century Polish philosophers, theologians and lawyers, active at the University of Cracow, used this notion, although, in a specific way. Stanislas of Skarbimierz and Paul Wladimiri understood it in a way characteristic for the Polish legal school: they linked it with a notion recta ratio, understood as rational human activity and they associated it with the commandment of love of one’s neighbor. As a result, the basis of all legal and moral norms was not Natura – the stoic Cosmos, but human nature, which is the consequence of God’s creation. Thus human nature defined by all inborn rules and norms of behavior is common for all people. What is important here is the stress they put on the autonomy of human law, which is the same as the law of nature. Therefore the value of the law of nature, created by God, is of the human nature. This genuineness is confirmed by coincidence of some rules belonging to both: the law of nature and the Decalogue e.g.: “what thou wilt for thyself, do to the other”. Due to its autonomy, the law of nature can be treated separately from the Revelation and can be applied in every State, regardless of its Christian or pagan character. All social facts are thus based not on unchangeable natural order but on rational human ac-

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3 Recently it appeared an interesting study on Cracov practicism by Plotka 2016.
tivity and his recta ratio, which form the subject of ethics and law. The attributes of human nature are: rationality, equality, and freedom; they are as stable as the law of nature and thus form an appropriate basis for a legal system.

If ius naturae is not a cosmic force but something congruent to human nature, and a man – as Aristotle claims – is a social creature, thus the law of nations (ius gentium) is an adequate manifestation of the human law of nature. Individual and national freedom and equality for all humans should be the consequences of laws following from the natural law of nations (Seńko 1972, 32–33). The explanation of these dependences was the main subject of the works written by representatives of the Polish School of the Law of Nations: Stanislas of Skarbimierz and Paul Wladimiriri, and they both offered invaluable contributions to the field. The former brilliantly defined and elaborated rules of justice in international relations and the idea of universal tolerance; the latter applied the doctrine of the Law of Nations to many of his theories concerning the dispute between Poland and the Teutonic Order.

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Our knowledge about the life of Stanislas of Skarbimierz is meager. It is known that he studied at the Faculties of Arts and Law in Prague. In 1396 he became a doctor of philosophy. He was active in the restoration of Cracow University and in 1400 was elected its first rector. His activities were not limited to teaching at the Faculty of Law as he also took active part in the political life of the country as a diplomat – the leader of Polish delegation in the dispute between Poland and the Teutonic Order. He died in 14314.

Stanislas’ literary output consists of five hundred sermons on different subjects, written mostly for the academic community and clerks. The sermons are divided – most likely by the author – into a few groups. The most important group, called Sermones de sapientia Dei or Sermones sapientiales, consists of 113 sermons, written in 1409–1415, they are based on different passages (verba thematis) from the Scripture. They discuss various subjects from the fields of ethics, social and political life5. In his sermons, Stanislas deals with universal moral problems and discusses them with the help of the Scripture and numerous philosophical and theological works. The sermons make up a manual for moral life. The titles of his sermons alone give us adequate information of the subjects discussed, for example: “On the duties of rulers concerning their subjects”, “On libel and thoughtless loquacity”, “What should a ruler be like?”, “On the causes of discord among the people”, “On human free will”.

Stanislas’ believes on the State and the position of a citizen was based on the notions of the law of nature and the recta ratio. In his opinion, natural abilities and intellectual powers characteristic for human nature can be realized only in a society. That is the reason why equality of and freedom should be granted to all human beings. Each individual has the same capabilities as any other one and because of that it is unacceptable to impose laws upon him by force6. Love and friendship, understood not only as theological but also

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4 For more bibliographical details cf. Domański 1982, 72–73; Ehrlich 1954, 5–9; Chmielowska 1979, 9–11.
5 For detail information on the work of Stanislas of Skarbimierz cf.: Chmielowska 1979, 12–24; Zawadzki 1979.
6 Stanislas of Skarbimierz. “Sermo de varieteate ingratitudinis et quod mali multipliciter abuntur, Chmielowska (ed.) 1979, 302: “Dicant igitur unitatem et amorem cum aliis tenere, non gentem aliquam, in quan-
as political virtues can be practicing, because people are created the same. Therefore, the character of the State should depend only on the free choice of its citizens, and the first condition of its good functioning is a good law for all people. Stanislaw says: “Law should be rational, evident, useful for all, honest and it must stimulate the citizens’ activities” (Lex autem, per quam debet salubriter dirigi Respublica, debet esse rationalis, evidens, utilis et honesta). Equality of all citizens and public participation in governing are also conditions of a State’s good functioning.

The rules of functioning of a State, expressed by Stanislas of Skarbimierz, testify to his concept of tolerance based on the natural law of man and equality of all people as God’s creations. This point of view is presented in his best-known sermon: “On Just and Unjust War” (De bello iusto et iniusto). It begins with a quotation from the Scripture: Non contendas adversus hominem frustra, cum ipse tibi nihil mali facerit (see Luke 6, 37–38). Stanislas initially refers to an individual and then extends the scope of his interest to the whole nation. One individual cannot fight with another for no reason, because all people are equal and have the same rights. Stanislas repeats this point in many other sermons, although here, the injunction of individual fight is broadened, a minori ad maius, onto an invasion of a kingdom or its part. He states that every individual is the worthiest of creatures of the world (dignissima creaturum mundi), and if so, it is obvious that one should respect the dignity of all human beings including even the pagans. Quoting the words of Innocent IV that God gave the power over nature to every man for whom the world had been created, Stanislas claims that all people, without any exceptions, can use that right, and one of the legitimate uses of that right is creating their own states. Human dignity, which is founded on the privileged position of a man, allows both Christians and pagans to practice the cardinal virtues together and at the same time co-operate with one another. It also allows Christians to induce pagans to Christianity.

A community of individuals is a subject to common law of nature irrespective of the religion: Ius naturale idem est apud omnes; sed principes vim vi repellentes iure naturali tenentur, in quo cum paganis conveniunt (Cf. Chmielowska 1979, 336). And since one of the basic rules of the law of nature is that of self-defense, it can be exercised by each

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7 Quoted after Seńko 1972, 39.
9 This sermon is edited in: Chmielowska, 1979, 323–340. Edited and translated into polish by Ehrlich 1955, 90–145.
10 Stanislas of Skarbimierz, De bello iusto et in iusto, Chmielowska (ed.) 1979, 32: “Si non est iuxta Salomonis sententiam adversus singularem personam sine causa legitima contendendum, fortius contra totam politiam, regnum, principatum vel commune”.
11 Chmielowska (ed.) 1979, 337: “Ex quo patet, quod dominia et possessiones et iurisdictiones licite sine pecce cato possunt esse apud infideles secundum Innocentium, eo quod, ut ipse dicit, non tantum pro fidelibus, sed pro omni rationali creatura, facta sunt: Qui solem suum facit oriri super bonos et malos”.
12 Chmielowska (ed.) 1979, 336: “Item sicut in actibus virtutum moralium potest quis communicare paganum, et maxime si nittitur, ipsum ducere ad salutem (cum iustitia et magnanimitas sint virtutes cardinales communes fidelibus et infidelibus), in actibus ipsarum christianus et paganus convenire possunt, quod esse potest in iusto bello”.
nation, also by pagans. Still, a defensive war must be led in a just way, and it can be waged on some conditions only. The conditions of a just war are based on the law of nature, which states that, every individual and, hence, each nation has the same rights following from:

1. the divine law, given by God who created the world for all the people (creator omnium, universa subiecit dominio creature rationalis) (Chmielowska 1979, 335),
2. the law of nature concerning all individuals (ius naturale idem est apud omnes) (Chmielowska 1979, 335),
3. the law of nations, including the law of war (bella sunt de iure gentium) (Chmielowska 1979, 335),
4. human dignity (omnis homo est dignissima creaturarum mundi) (Chmielowska 1979, 335),
5. ability to practice the cardinal virtues (in actibus virtutum moralium potest quis communicare pagano [...] iustitia et magnanimitas sunt virtutes cardinales communes fidelibus et infidelibus) (Chmielowska 1979, 336).

Stanislas’ sermon on just and unjust war (de bello iusto et iniusto) was one of the earliest works in legal European tradition on international law. In order to justify his statements, he makes use of different authorities: the Holy Scripture, the works of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, Roman lawyers and philosophers: Cicero and Seneca. Stanislas stresses the exceptional role of man in the world. He accepts the commandment of love of one’s neighbor as the basis for respect of every individual, which in turn is the fundament for his concept of tolerance for all nations which have the same rights as they are subject to the same law of nature. Stanislas’ ideas were developed by another scholar from Cracow University – Paul Wladimiri.

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Paul Wladimiri was born in the early 1370s in Brudzen. Like many Poles of this time, Paul studied at the University of Prague, where he became a Master of Arts in 1393. In 1396 he became Bachelor of Decrees (i.e. of Canon Law). Then he studied in Italy (in Padua and Rome) where he was a student of Francis Zabarella. In 1414 and 1415 Paul was elected Rector of Cracow University. Toward the end of 1414 he left for Constance, where he arrived with other Polish Ambassadors on 29 January, 1415. At the Council there he represented Polish interests defending the politics of the Polish king, Jagiello. He died in Cracow by the end of 1435.

Paul Wladimiri was the author of many works composed in various circumstances and addressed to various readers. Their basic principle, however, was the same, i.e., to secure sincere and honest application of the most important commandment of Christian religion: the love of one’s neighbor. The obvious consequence of this commandment is the respect

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13 Stanislas repeats after Rajmund of Penjafort five conditions of just war. Chmielowska (ed.) 1979, 325: XXIII, q. I: “Iustum autem bellum quis esse intelligat, si est persona saeularis non ecclesiastica, cui prohibitum est humanum sanguinem effundere, Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi; Sententiam; si fiat pro rebus repetiendis vel causa sit legitima, ut, scilicet propter necessitatem, pugnetur, quatenus per pugnam pax turbata recuperetur aut acquiratur: Noli; si non fiat propter odium aut ulterior vel cupiditatem, sed propter zelum legis divinae, propter caritatem, iustitiam et obediendum, Quid culpatur; si fiat auctoritate ecclesiae, praesertim cum pugnatur pro fide aut auctoritatem principis”.

of each man and the freedom of his will, as well as a peaceful, preferably judicial settlement of international disputes, inadmissibility of war except the cases of real necessity of defense. On these foundations Paul Wladimiri constructs the whole system of views on political life and of the international relations. The forms of his works and the choice of his arguments depended on the conditions in which they were composed (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 21).

At the Council of Constance, where it was necessary to defend the policy and the rights of Poland against attacks of the Teutonic Order, Paul had to convince not only the members of the papal Curia, but also wide circles of the council participants that Poland’s stand was legally justified. He intended to influence the public opinion of various countries from which the Order was receiving help. He decided to choose the way of doctrinal dissuasion presenting three papers: 1) Saevientibus, where he discussed two fundamental questions of the validity of papal and imperial privileges on which the Teutonic Order claims relied, and of legality or illegality of attacking peaceful pagans just because they are pagans, 2) Opinio ostiensis, on a similar subject drafted in a different way, 3) Ad apperierendam, in two parts: the one from 1416 contains an exposition of Paul’s views on the nature and status of the Teutonic Order and the status of its holdings, the other part from 1417 contains an analysis of the privileges on which the Order relies (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 21–35). According to Ehrlich, Paul’s action at the Council of Constance was a spiritual crusade for the purpose of defending Christianity from actions purporting to have been undertaken in its name and alleged to be for its spread in ways contrary to the essence of Christian teaching and for purposes contradictory to it (Ehrlich 1968, 21). Three more papers: Oculi for Sigismund, Ad vivendum from 1421, and a letter from 1432 to Bishop Olesnicki also deal with the possible ways of settling the disputes between Poland and the Teutonic Order (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 21–22).

The writings of Paul Wladimiri are not theoretical expositions; nevertheless, they are written with scholarly precision and responsibility. They are juridical, but still contain many moral issues which appear by the way of the fundamental legal arguments. The starting point of Paul’s debate on the nature and limits of power is the principle of respect for human dignity. Man is free, which means that he acts by his own will, and can therefore be subject to another man by his own will only (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 35–38). The principle that man’s obligations must be derived from his own will was the basis of the doctrine of social contract, which was preserved in juridical tradition. On several occasions Paul repeats, after Cardinal Zabarella, that man’s authority is either granted by God, which applies to the authority of the Pope derived from Christ’s command: “Pasture my sheep”, or is derived from man’s will to submit himself to the authority of another man: both kinds of authority are legitimate. The third possible source of authority is force, such authority is, however, illegal. An important consequence following from the law of nature referred to the limitations of a monarch’s power. According to Paul, he may not dispose of any part of his land without the consent of the citizens.

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15 Paul Wladimiri, Saevientibus, in: Ehrlich 1968, I, 57: “Ad istorum evidenciam sciendum quod regnum in terris surgit tribus modis: primo per voluntatem Dei revelatum aliquo modo hominibus; secundo modo per consensum eorum qui reguntur.... Primo et secundo modo regnum est iustum”.

16 Ehrlich 1968, vol. I, 57: “Tertio modo per violentiam.... De terto modo non est opus prosequi cum sit de facto pocius quam de iure”.

17 Ehrlich 1968, vol. I, 57: “Cum igitur non constat Imperium super infideles predictos generaliter esse justificatum primo aut secundo modo non potest dici imperatorem aliquam potestatem hebere super dictos infi-
Paul Wladimiri has no doubt that divine law, comprising both Commandments and orders of Christ, is unconditionally binding, hence it is also binding for the Pope, whose power results from the order “Pasture my sheep”. Therefore, any order given by the Pope which would be contrary to the divine law would be invalid. Hence the Pope cannot surrender his sheep to become the prey of wolves. Likewise, the Pope’s order which would be contrary to the law of nature would not be valid, for the law of nature is an order established by God\(^{18}\).

The basis of Paul’s considerations on powers of authorities and divine and natural laws is the recognition of the dignity of the human being. Like Stanisłas of Skarbimierz, Paul Wladimiri, calls man “the worthiest of the creatures in the world” (dignissima creaturarum mundi). The recognition of the dignity of the human being leads to the recognition of the freedom of will in man, and by the same token, the recognition of the duty to love one’s neighbor. Such demands are not merely theoretical injunctions, but fundamental precepts concerning the life of man and of groups of people. Paul points out to the decretum of Gratian saying that one’s neighbor means each man, not just a Catholic and a Christian:

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\text{Ius naturale restitit, scilicet: “Quod tibi vis alteri fac” etc. ut in principio Decretorum. Ius divinum restitit, scilicet “Non occidas”, “Non futurum facias” in quo verbo “Non furtum facias” omnis recta, in verbo vero “Non occidas” omnis violentia prohibetur. […]} \text{Preterea talis inungnacio infidelum maxime sine iusta causa non companitur secum dileccionem proximi quia ingressus unius contrariori alterius operatur egressum, proximi autem nostri secundum veritatem sunt tam fideles quam infideles indistincte} \text{ (Ehrlich 1968, 59).}
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Paul’s theory of tolerance for all nations, either Christian or pagan, follows from his concept of an individual. He adopts the doctrine, which was formulated in the 13\(^{th}\) century, by Innocent IV, who stated that the world belongs to God, who has subjected it to the government of man, and that originally everything was common, but later things began to belong to those who first got possession of them, and therefore states that dominions and jurisdiction can, without sin, belong to infidels, because God has created them not only for the faithful, but for all men: “For God makes the sun rise and the rain fall for the infidels and the evil ones too”. Therefore, according to the doctrine of Innocent, infidels have states lawfully and without sin, and it is not permitted to attack them, unless there is a legitimate cause to start a just war (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 59). Paul Wladimiri, as Stanislas before, presented five conditions of a just war as well as his conditions for settling international disputes (Cf. Ehrlich 1968, 55–56).

Paul’s theory of tolerance, presented at the Council of Constance, was very original and he manifested great courage presenting it. It refers not only to the matters of religion but also to different attitudes and opinions, on condition that their consequences do not
deles sed tantum tertio modo: per violentiam et tiranidem ut supra dictum est’’. Paul Wladimiri, Ad viden-
dum, in: Ehrlich 1968, III, 142: “Quarto quia non appare de concensu civium sive incolarum qui concensus est necessarius ad hoc ut talis donatio teneat nam nec dominus civitatis potest ipsam civitatem alienare sine concensu populi’’.

\[^{18}\] Paul Wladimiri, Saevientibus, in: Ehrlich 1968, I, 12–13: “Ex quo patet quod ab inicio racionabilis creature non erat in bonis alicuius nisi Dei et ideo occupanti concedebantur […] Et lege naturali erat prohibitum ne quis alteri faciat quod sibi non vult. Ex quibus evidenter constat uod pro omni racionabilis creatura ista sunt ordinata a Deo qui solem oriri facit non solum super bonos sed eciam super malos et omnia volatile pascit et dat escam omni carni’’.\]
pose a threat to anybody. His Letter to Oleśnicki gives an insight into the fundamentals of Paul’s theory of tolerance, it is the commandment to love one’s neighbor, which should convince us to treat all men as equal in front of both – God and law.

Most of the opinions of Stanislas of Skarbimierz and Paul Wladimir, presented in this paper, are the very good examples of the penetration of the “humanist” way of thinking into “scholastic” methods of argumentation. Polish thinkers, the representatives of Polish School of the Law of Nations were the first to present such “humanist” attitude to the issues concerning the individual, the state, and the international co-operation. Their opinions were taken over by Spanish thinkers and served as decisive arguments in the disputes between Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries. The main doctrine of “international law”, however, i.e. the opinion that pagans also belong to human society, and that all the disputes and wars should be solved by international mediation was realized only in the 19th century, when Turkey was included in the international community (Cf. Tazbir 1986, 9–21; Seidler 1974, 362–372; Baszkiewicz 1980, 495–527).

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Podstawy dla uniwersalnej tolerancji w pismach Stanisława ze Skarbimierza i Pawła Włodkowica

Streszczenie

Rozważania przedstawione w artykule koncentrują się przede wszystkim na omówieniu oryginalnej koncepcji przedstawicieli tzw. Polskiej Szkoły Prawa Narodów – Stanisława ze Skarbimierza i Pawła Włodkowica. Ci myśliciele opublikowali swoje prace w XIV i XV wieku i byli znani w szerokich kręgach europejskich intelektualistów. Ich koncepcja, która przekonująco uzasadnia potrzebę tolerancji dla wszystkich ludzi, opiera się na koncepcji „prawa natury” (ius naturae), rozumianego jako coś istotnego dla ludzkiej natury, a ponieważ człowiekiem jest istotą społeczną, zatem właściwym przejawem ludzkiego prawa natury jest „prawo narodów” (ius gentium). Prawo to powinno odnosić się w równym stopniu do wszystkich ludzi.

Słowa klucze: Stanisław z Skarbimierza, Paweł Włodkowic, średniowieczna polityka, średniowieczna etyka, prawo natury, prawo narodów, tolerancja.