

<http://dx.doi.org/10.16926/zh.2019.18.01>

Łukasz RÓŻYCKI

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1536-3387>

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

The campaign of 586 and the relief of Adrianople in the context of roman military craft*

Summary

The purpose of the piece entitled *The campaign of 586 and the relief of Adrianople in the context of roman military craft* is an attempt to analyze Roman tactics during the campaign against the Avars in 586 and to compare it with military treatises, mainly *Strategikon*. Apart from analyzing the campaign against the nomads in 586 the author also presents the figure of Drokton, a Roman commander who normally operated in Italia against the Longobards, but in this campaign headed the wing of the army sent to relieve the besieged Adrianople.

Keywords: Strategikon, Roman art of war, Theophylact Simocatta, Balkans, Avars.

In the year 586 the Roman army started gaining advantage on the eastern front in the fight against its ancient adversary – Persia¹. At the Battle of Solachon the forces of the persian warlord Mebodes were routed and strategos Philippicus and his second-in-command – Heraclius (the father of the future emperor of the same name) later concluded a series of raids on enemy territory. Although Philippicus was forced to retreat and did not manage to seize control over major fortresses, fate clearly seemed to favor the Romans in this conflict. Successes in the war against Persia were partially due to Romans focusing their military efforts in the

* My first attempt at analyzing the campaign of 586 is available in Polish in a piece entitled: Łukasz RÓŻYCKI, *Kampania z 586 roku i odsiecz Adrianopola w świetle rzymskiej sztuki wojennej*, [in:] *Człowiek i wojna. Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, ed. Andrzej NIEWIŃSKI, Oświęcim 2013, p. 7–17.

¹ An overview of this period has been provided in: Franziska E. SHLOSSER, *The Reign of the Emperor Maurikios (582–602) A Reassessment*, Athens 1994, p. 40–70.

East at the cost of the European territories, especially the Balkans². This was possible thanks to a truce concluded by Emperor Maurice and the Avar khagan³ – Bayan II⁴ in 584⁵. Both sides agreed to cease all hostilities and the Avar ruler was also presented with a significant tribute in gold. The temporary armistice, because this is how it must have been treated by the nomads, was to give the Avars time to cement their rule over any captured territories and pacify the Slav population, which had not been completely subjugated yet⁶. The Romans likely intended to deal with Persia and then concentrate their military might on the European limes⁷. Both sides saw the truce as a transitory state and made preparations for a renewal of hostilities. The Romans in particular were fully aware of this fact, actually expecting the Avars to breach the armistice. This is best exemplified in a fragment of *Strategikon*, where the author describes the nomads as treacherous people, ready to break any concluded agreement⁸. Two years after the truce, in 586, a powerful nomad army crossed the Roman limes, exploiting the weakened con-

² Stanisław TURLEJ, *Upadek granicy cesarstwa na Dunaju*, [in:] *Barbarzyńcy u bram Imperium*, ed. S. TURLEJ, Kraków 2007, p. 185–246.

³ In this context the title of khagan (recently Jarosław DUDEK, *Chazarowie Polityka kultura religia VII–XI wiek*, Warszawa 2016, p. 252–282, provided an extensive comparative analysis of possible meanings of this title in the social systems of Turkish peoples from antiquity to late middle ages) should be understood as a ruler of “many dynasties/peoples and many parts of the world” (i.e. four corners of the world), see: Ivan DUJČEV, *Le sept tribus slaves de la Mésie*, “*Slavia Antiqua*” 6 (1957–1959), p. 100–108.

⁴ Thérèse OLAJOS, *La chronologie de la dynastie avare de Baïan*, “*Revue des études byzantines*” 34 (1976), p. 151–158.

⁵ Peace was concluded in 584 by the khagan and a Roman envoy Elpidius (Sym. 1. 6.4–6). Despite the peace with the Avars, imperial armies had to carry out military operations against the Slavs, although without the additional threat of the nomads the Roman army effectively neutralized any Slavic activity. This was proven by the victory at the Erginia river in 584 or the failed invasion of Ardagast. Simocatta suggested that the Slav raids were inspired by the khagan (Sym. 1. 6. 5).

⁶ A good introduction into the issue of Slav-Avar relations is available in: Lech A. TYSZKIEWICZ, *Słowianie i Awarowie. Organizacja plemienna Słowian*, Wrocław 2009, especially p. 19–34.

⁷ Although we do not know the exact plan of Emperor Maurice, the fact of dismissing Philipppicus, who failed to capitalize on the victory at Solachon, supports the presented theory.

⁸ See: *Strategikon* 11. 2. The following authors wrote extensively about the Avars: Alexander AVENARIUS, *Die Awaren in Europa*, Bratislava 1974; Walter POHL, *Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa 567–822 n. Chr.*, München 1988; Wolfgang H. FRITZE, *Zur Bedeutung der Awaren für die Slawische Ausdehnungsbewegung im frühen Mittelalter*, “*Zeitschrift f. Ostforschung*” 28 (1979), p. 498–545. Roman-Avar relations were presented in: Bohumila ZÁSTĚROVÁ, *Les Avars et les Slaves dans la Tactique de Maurice*, Praha 1971, p. 4–14; Γεώργιος ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ, *Οι βυζαντινοαβαρικές διενέξεις και η μεθόριος του Δούναβη, 558–626*, [in:] *Η μεθόριος του Δούναβη και ο κόσμος της στην εποχή της μετανάστευσης των λαών (4ος–7ος αι.)*, ed. Γ. ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ, Σ. ΠΑΤΟΥΡΑ-ΣΠΑΝΟΥ, Αθήνα 2008, p. 237–266. For sources in Polish, see: L.A. TYSZKIEWICZ, *Słowianie i ludy tureckie przed pojawieniem się Protobułgarów na Półwyspie Bałkańskim*, [in:] *Barbarzyńcy w Europie. Studia z późnego antyku I wczesnego średniowiecza*, Wrocław 2007, p. 19–30; idem, *Słowianie i Awarowie*, (collections of previously written pieces).

dition of border defense troops. This came as no surprise and the European provinces of the Empire were not left defenseless – there were still soldiers there, who clashed on a daily basis with small parties of Slavs crossing the Danube⁹. The Avars' initial strike was targeted towards key positions of the border defensive system, weakened by previous raids. According to Theophanes the Confessor, the khagan managed to take Ratiarna, Bononia, Akys, Dorostolon, Zadraba¹⁰ and Marcianopolis¹¹.

Romans did not remain passive in the face of this attack. The commander of the armies of the West at that time was Comentiolus, who did not have sufficient manpower to stop the Avars at the border. The limes was too difficult to hold in the event of a full-scale invasion; instead, Comentiolus decided to harass the invaders within Roman lands, being better familiarized with the terrain and having the additional advantage of fortified cities. Strategos divided his forces into 3 contingents – two consisting of cavalry and the main one that also included infantry units – possibly expecting the nomads to split their forces as well, since their main goal was looting. The leader of one detachment was Castonus, the other one – Martinos, and the main force was led by the strategos himself. Theophylact Simocatta gives information about the size of the whole army. It included 6 thousand¹² able-bodied soldiers and 4 thousand troops unfit for combat¹³, who were left with the wagon train¹⁴. It is worth emphasizing that leaving troops that were not field-ready out of action is consistent with the instructions given by the author of *Strategikon*. We should assume that Comentiolus wanted to be able to cover a wider area and that the detachments were supposed to operate in tight coordination, although Theophylact does not mention the strategic objectives of the campaign, focusing rather on the marching route and combat engagements¹⁵. From the fast marching pace of the above Roman contingents we can conclude that Castonus and Martinos were given command over cavalry units. The two mounted forces were to protect the main strength of the army, scout ahead and ensure that the Avars would stay in close formation. In the event that the invaders dispersed, it would also allow the Romans to engage the enemy cav-

⁹ On the subject of everyday life in militarized border communities, see more in: Andrzej B. BIERNACKI, Łukasz RÓŻYCKI, *Early Byzantine Arms and Weapons from the Episcopal Complex in Novae*, [in:] *Proceedings of the First International Roman and Late Antique Thrace Conference, National Archaeological Institute XLIV*, Sofia 2018, p. 453–466.

¹⁰ This is clearly an error made by Theophanes; the captured city he was referring to must have been Zaldapa.

¹¹ Theoph. Conf., AM 6079.

¹² Sym. 2. 10. 8–9.

¹³ According to Theophanes the number of men unfit for combat was not 4000 but 40 000! This is completely improbable and should be considered a misspelling (Theoph. Conf., AM 6079).

¹⁴ Sym. 2. 10. 8–10.

¹⁵ Any other option would assume that the strategos intended to challenge 10 000 Avars with a force of only 2000 Romans. So it stands to reason that success could only be achieved by planning on close cooperation between detachments.

alry. Comentiolus most likely commanded a mixed force with a majority of infantry units, which meant they moved at a slower pace. Initially, the situation seemed to favor the Romans. Castonus, leading a third of the whole army, ambushed the nomads at Zaldapa and destroyed them, taking rich spoils¹⁶. This may indicate that despite the Roman threat the khagan decided to divide his forces into smaller detachments, which could operate and plunder in a larger area. At the same time Martinos was nearing the heavily fortified city of Tomis, where he encountered a second Avar camp. In a surprise attack, the Romans were able to force the numerically superior barbarians to flee and according to Simocatta, the life of the khagan himself was threatened as a result¹⁷.

After a couple of days both victorious officers met in a place appointed by Comentiolus and joined forces¹⁸. The army strategos ordered them to advance before the main force and pursue the retreating Avars. This part of Simocatta's account is unclear. The chronicler accuses the strategos of remaining passive in the face of the enemy¹⁹. In reality, the army commander was faced with a difficult choice, as the officers in charge of cavalry detachments refused to follow orders and began retreating, afraid of the combined Avar strength. During that time Bayan must have already finished gathering all nomad raiding parties from around the province and so moved to clash with the main opposing army. The Romans joined their forces at Marcianopolis, clearly afraid of letting the nomads destroy their smaller cavalry detachments in separate engagements²⁰.

Strategos, judging by the course of events, intended to choose the most suitable location for a battle and either rout the weakened nomad force or at least halt their advance. The location he chose was the Valley of Roses (Sabulente Kanalion)²¹. Romans set up camp on the path of the enemy's marching route, on the side of a river, which separated them from the Avars. The fact that Romans made use of this natural obstacle and had more infantry units was supposed to give them tactical advantage and possibly make the Avars retreat without a fight. Comentiolus once again divided his army, ordering the victorious cavalry commanders to reconnoiter and operate on the other side of the river. These mounted detachments were to gather intelligence on the strength of the Avars and find out where the nomads intended to cross the current. This seemed like

¹⁶ Sym. 2. 10. 10.

¹⁷ Sym. 2. 10. 13.

¹⁸ Sym. 2. 10. 13.

¹⁹ Sym. 2. 11. 1-3.

²⁰ Theophanes's account is even less favorably disposed towards the commander. The chronicler accuses him of cowardice in the face of the enemy. According to Theophanes, Roman detachments apparently regrouped only after reaching the Haimos Pass, which Comentiolus blocked with his main force (Theoph. Conf., AM 6079). This was not an act of cowardice, but prudence. The strategos closed off the most convenient passage, forcing the Avar khagan to confront the Roman force.

²¹ Sym. 2. 11. 4.

a good solution. Scouting and skirmishing by the cavalry could buy time for the infantry to secure the crossing point. Comentiolus obviously wanted to stop the invaders from reaching the far side of the river and establish a blockade to drive them back. Although the plan was sound, it all hinged on how well the mounted units could fulfill their objectives on the far shore. The first tragedy befell Castonus and his force. Having defeated the enemy's advance guard, he was cut off from the point of crossing, which was a wooden bridge. The next morning the main strength of the Avars descended on the isolated detachment and forced it to flee in panic; and during the flight Castonus was captured²². Following this rout the strategos discarded his previous strategy of blocking the crossing and ordered a retreat²³. When the khagan realized this, he dispatched raiding parties all over Thracia. A portion of his force apparently continued pursuing the Romans, because the historical account also mentions a chaotic clash in the night, won by the Romans²⁴. Despite this success²⁵, the main Roman force did not manage to break the Avar army. Instead, it continued retreating towards the capital, allowing the invaders to besiege more cities and pillage the province unopposed²⁶.

News of the defeat, the capture of Castonus and the retreat of the army caused general dissent in Constantinople²⁷. Theophanes claims that the Avars advanced all the way to the Long Walls of Thrace, i.e. the capital's first line of defense²⁸. The city residents went as far in their discontent as to publicly insult Emperor Maurice²⁹. To quell these disturbances, the ruler paid a hefty ransom for the captured commander and began preparations for a counter-offensive. The Roman army was to relieve Adrianople besieged by the khagan's main forces³⁰. Choosing

²² Sym. 2. 11. 11–12. 4.

²³ Theophanes claims that the Roman forces retreated into fortresses guarding the mountain passes (Theoph. Conf., AM 6079).

²⁴ Sym. 2. 15. 1–13.

²⁵ Once the khagan, along with a portion of his men, had crossed the mountains, the main Roman forces attacked the nomad rear, causing serious casualties. The night engagement ended in widespread panic on both sides and both armies retreating (Theoph. Conf., AM 6079).

²⁶ It should be mentioned that Avars were not particularly skilled in siege warfare. Most cities blocked by the nomads managed to defend themselves. As an aside, Theophylact mentions a story about a Roman renegade, who supposedly taught the barbarians to construct siege engines. Failure to take any of the less significant cities or forts must have irritated the khagan, who was well aware that the best spoils were hidden behind city walls. See: Georgios KARDARAS, *The Episode of Bousas (586/7) and the Use of Siege Engines by the Avars*, "Byzantinoslavica" 63 (2005), p. 53–67.

²⁷ See: Małgorzata LESZKA, Mirosław LESZKA, *Ewolucja statusu Miasta. Idea Konstantynopola – Nowego Rzymu*, [in:] *Konstantynopol Nowy Rzym miasto i ludzie w okresie wczesnobizantyńskim*, ed. M.J. LESZKA, T. WOLIŃSKA, Warszawa 2011, p. 38–42.

²⁸ Theoph. Conf., AM 6079.

²⁹ Sym. 2. 16. 5–6.

³⁰ Theophanes the Confessor makes no mention of this fact. His account of the events of 586 ends with Castonus being taken prisoner. The Roman relief of Adrianople is not mentioned either,

such an objective gives clear indication that the emperor wanted to fight a pitched battle and scatter the enemy found within Roman borders.

This new army underwent significant personnel changes. Comentiolus was dismissed³¹ and command was given to John Mystacon³² and a Suebi in service to the Empire named Droktulf³³. The situation had to be serious indeed, since Droktulf had been dispatched quickly from around Ravenna, probably with a portion of his own soldiers. This was possible because at that time a short armistice was in effect in Italia between the Empire and the Longobards³⁴. An army was gathered in haste, most likely strengthened with units that fought in the first stage of the campaign³⁵, and moved towards Adrianople³⁶. Apparently the goal

although Theophanes does notice that barbarians learned how to besiege cities, which caused a lot of problems for the Romans (Theoph. Conf., AM 6079). This reference to a new skill being possessed by the Avars must have been influenced by the work of Simocatta and his story of the Roman renegade. Theophanes based his account of the events from the end of the 6th century primarily on the work of Theophylact. It is worth noting the significance of the city itself. Adrianople was an important location within the whole Roman defensive system, blocking the access to Constantinople from the north. The importance of cities and military encampments in the Balkans for the Roman system of defense was excellently explained by Сергѣй Аркадьевич ИВАНОВ, *Оборона балканских провинций Византии и проникновение “варваров” на Балканах в первой половине VI века*, “Византийский временник”, vol. 45: 1984, p. 35–53.

³¹ It is possible that this was a consequence of the strategos being too passive on the offensive. The two successful engagements from the beginning of the campaign were not sufficiently capitalized upon.

³² The moniker “Mystacon” was due to his mustache. In the years 582–583 he was the main officer in charge of Roman armies in the East, being replaced by Philippicus in 583. This replacement was due to lack of results in the fight against Persia. In 587 Mystacon assumed command over Roman forces in Thrace, replacing Castonus, who had been captured by the Avars. After 589, he once again served as *magister militum* in Armenia (PLRE, p. 680). John was not one of the most prominent Roman commanders. His greatest success was the victory at Adrianople, although in that engagement we also need to remember about Droktion’s contribution.

³³ The sources provide two forms for his name. Paulus Diaconus calls him “Droktulf”, whereas Simocatta uses the form “Droktion”. The variation used by Paul the Deacon seems to be the correct one. Droktulf was a Suebe, but probably spent his childhood among the Longobards as an honorary hostage. For his achievements he was awarded the title of *dux*, but as soon as an opportunity presented itself, he defected to the Romans and devoted his life to fighting the Longobards, who took away his childhood and forced him to serve in their ranks (Paul. Diac., 3. 18). His presence in Thracia was the result of a temporary armistice between the Romans and Longobards (PLRE, p. 425–426). When quoting the epitaph found on Droktulf’s tombstone, Paul the Deacon left the Greek version of the name (“Clauditur hoc tumulo, tantum sed corpore, Droktion” – Paul. Diac. 3. 19) and emphasized his significant contribution to the victory against the Avars.

³⁴ PLRE, p. 425–426.

³⁵ We do not know the exact size of John’s army. We also have no information on the losses suffered by strategos Comentiolus. We can safely assume around two thousand dead, since that was roughly how many soldiers were in Castonus’s unit.

³⁶ A short description of the battle can be found in: Ilkka SYVÄNNE, *The Age of Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491–636)*, Tampere 2004, p. 448.

was to force the Avars to abandon the siege and to give battle if the conditions were favorable. Simocatta did not report on any of the events preceding the battle before the city walls. We don't know the route taken by John's troops, nor do we have any info on smaller skirmishes with raiding parties that surely took place. It is also difficult to determine if Droktulf joined the army later on – and if so, when – or if his force was present from the moment of raising this second army³⁷. Obviously, lack of any information does not mean that the road to Adrianople was uneventful. Simocatta limits his account to the clash between the main Roman force with the khagan's army. But the Roman chronicler focused his attention on the maneuvering of troops under Droktulf, failing to present even a basic plan of the battle or the deployment of individual units. Still, Simocatta's account is quite interesting:

Romans proved victorious in the clash with the barbarians, turning the tide of battle in their favor thanks to a maneuver by hypostrategos Drokton. The army wing under his command showed their backs to the enemy in mock-retreat, making it seem as though the Romans feared their opponents. He then turned around, dispatched the pursuing force and, making his way to the rear of the barbarian formation, slew anyone in his path. At noon, the Avars soured their retreat and scattered in all directions. The strategos did not give chase, since he was a firm believer in moderation in success. Because fate is fickle and unreliable, and “victory goes back and forth between men”, if I may quote Homer's words in my narrative³⁸.

Although the Roman chronicler did not describe the road to Adrianople, his account of these events suggests that the Avars were prepared for the coming army. The nomads did not let themselves be surprised before the walls of the city. This would have been ideal for the Romans and the khagan's army – caught between Adrianople's defenses and a hostile force – would have been annihilated. The barbarians were well aware of this fact, so on the first day they outmaneuvered the Romans and took position allowing for an easy retreat. This was possible thanks to the great mobility of the Avar army, whose main strength was its cavalry. Despite avoiding being pressed against the city walls, the Avars were still blocking Adrianople. The fact that they maintained the siege is rather surprising. Why did the khagan continue to block the city if he knew about the approaching relief force, and did he actually believe that despite previous failures

³⁷ The second option seems highly improbable, unless Droktulf was there alone, without his soldiers from Italia.

³⁸ Κατεστρατήγει γάρ τῶν πολεμίων ὁ ὑποστράτηγος Δρόκτων. ἐπιπλάστῳ γάρ φυγῇ τὸ ἐκείνου κέρας ἔδοξε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὰ νῶτα παρέχεσθαι, ὡς οἶα δεδουκότος τοῦ Ῥωμαϊκοῦ τὸ ἀντίπαλον· εἶτα τοῦμπαλιν ἀντεδίωξε καὶ μετόπισθε τῶν βαρβάρων γενόμενον τοῖς συντυχόντας διώλεσεν. ἀπήεισαν τοιγαροῦν μεσημβρίας ὥρα οἱ Ἄβαροι, ἄλλος ἄλλη διεσπαρμένοι καὶ ὡς ἂν τύχοι φερόμενοι μετὰ συντόνου τινὸς ἀποδράσεως. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς οὐ κατεδίωξε τὸ ἀντίπαλον· ἐφιλοσόφει γάρ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὸ μέτρον τὰς ἐπ' ἄκρον εὐεξίας, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εὐλαβοῦμενος. φιλυπόστροφον γάρ ἡ τύχη καὶ ἄπιστον, νίκη δ' ἐπαμείβεται ἄνδρα, ἵνα καὶ τι τῆς Ὀμήρου δέλτου ἐπισπεῖρω τοῖς ἀφηγήμασιν. Sym. 2. 17. 11–13.

in siege warfare his army would this time successfully overcome the Roman fortifications?

In Theophylact's short account it is worth focusing on the maneuvers of the Roman army and compare them to *Strategikon*, a military treatise written at the end of the 6th century. *Strategikon* is a work comprising two overlapping spheres – an erudite layer, modelled on the works of ancient tacticians and an observatory layer, containing personal deliberations of the author, who was likely an experienced military leader, familiar with the European front and deeply knowledgeable about the nomads and Slavs³⁹. The section of the treatise devoted to tactics (mainly for cavalry) demonstrates the reality of how war was waged in the 6th century. It grants insight into certain standards of behavior of field commanders. Proving that the maneuvers undertaken by strategos John and his subordinates are consistent with those described in *Strategikon* can serve as a valuable argument in the discussion regarding the applicability of the treatise.

The first maneuver from Simocatta's work employed by the Romans was a variation of a tactic used by the nomads, who rarely chose direct confrontation. Rather, they would normally stage a controlled retreat and when the opponent broke formation during pursuit, the barbarians would turn around and scatter the pursuing force⁴⁰. The Romans were familiar with this stratagem and although they did not often use it in combat, they trained in its execution⁴¹. Simulating a retreat during an engagement was a rare solution, which required soldiers to be tactically disciplined. While executing the maneuver there was a high risk that actual panic would occur and that pretend flight from the battlefield would turn into a real one. Adopting this nomad trick demanded that the Romans be highly disciplined, tactical, experienced and mentally resilient. In this particular case, the person assigned to carry out the task was Droktulf, who probably based his actions on past experiences. It is very likely that the units Droktulf led in this campaign were the same ones he commanded every day in Italia. It is difficult to imagine such a risky maneuver, which could lead to the men panicking, being executed by a recently formed detachment, which did not have any experience in joint operations. All this seems to indicate that Droktulf would have had under his command units that were transferred from Italia, i.e. units he could rely on and knew their worth. The Romans, according to their tactical principles, would position the infantry in the

³⁹ Aussaresses believed that the author of *Strategikon* was Emperor Maurice, claiming that although it is impossible to unequivocally identify the author, most clues point to it being the emperor. Despite the passage of years, the ideas of this French scholar remain relevant: François AUSSARESSES, *L'auteur du Stratégikon*, "Revue des études anciennes", vol. 8: 1906, p. 23–40.

⁴⁰ Strat. 11. 2.

⁴¹ The same exercises were conducted by the Roman army: Strat. 6. 2. On the subject of the nomads, see: Strat. 11. 2. More in: B. ZÁSTĚROVÁ, *Les Avars et les Slaves dans la Tactique de Maurice*, Praha 1971. John WITA, *The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises*, University of Minnesota 1977. Γ. ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ, *Το σχήμα των Αβάρων στο Στρατηγικόν του Μαυροκίου. Μια κριτική προσέγγιση*, "Βυζαντινός δομος" 16 (2007–2008), p. 151–167.

center, and the cavalry, which normally would have two ranks of spearmen followed by ranks of bowmen⁴², was probably left on the flanks, waiting for an opportunity of rolling the enemy's flank.

The army of Bayan II must have been mostly mounted units, as evidenced by its previous progress during the campaign and its ability to swiftly disperse and reform if a threat presented itself⁴³. Such a force was challenging to fight against; despite suffering a number of defeats previously in the campaign, the Avars were still able to engage in another pitched battle. This was due to the nomads' mobility; even after losing a clash they knew how to disengage from the enemy and avoid pursuit, which was when most casualties would be suffered. The Romans were in a hurry to reach the besieged Adrianople, but we should not assume that their forces were all cavalry, especially since this was an army raised in haste, most likely partially from city garrisons. The fact that Droktulf along with his soldiers were recalled from Italia speaks volumes about how serious the situation seemed to the Romans.

Droktulf⁴⁴ employed a modified nomad tactic combined with a flanking maneuver that the Roman army was well-known for. The author of *Strategikon* suggested deploying special flanking units, which had very particular tasks during a battle:

Initially hyperkerastes should be positioned on the right flank, obscured by the first line of our troops, or be deployed among the horsemen of the first line. Whatever the case may be, once the time comes for their flanking maneuver, they should move right and advance as far as necessary. Next, maintaining a tight formation, they should roll up the enemy's flank, moving as though they were trying to get back to their own lines through the enemy's units⁴⁵.

The cavalry flank led by Droktulf executed the Avar-style mock retreat. This tactic has either met with no reaction from the enemy, or possibly only a portion of the opposing army was lured into pursuit⁴⁶. Regardless, the nomad

⁴² Strat. 1.2. 12–13. This type of a mounted warrior was nothing new in the army of Justinian the Great. Michael O'ROURKE, *Arrow-Storms and Cavalry Pikes Warfare In the Age of Justinian I, AD 527–565 The Armies of Belisarius and Narses*, Canberra 2007, p. 6. and Pat SOUTHERN, Karen Ramsey DIXON, *The Late Roman Army*, New York 2009, p. 116–117.

⁴³ See more in: Florin CURTA, *Avar Blitzkrieg, Slavic and Bulgar raiders, and Roman special ops: mobile warriors in the 6th-century Balkans*, [in:] *Central Eurasia in the Middle Ages Studies in Honour of Peter B. Golden*, ed. I. ZIMONYI, O. KARATAY, Wiesbaden 2016, p. 69–89.

⁴⁴ Droktulf's role in the battle was also noted by Paul the Deacon in an epitaph in his name: *He was the one who, in eastern lands, crushed the savage Avars, bringing a great victory to his masters*. Paulus Diaconus, 3. 19. "Eastern lands" obviously refers to the Balkans, where Droktulf fought under Roman banners.

⁴⁵ Strat. 6. 5.

⁴⁶ If the whole wing of the Avar cavalry had given chase after Droktulf's unit simulating its retreat, the Romans would not have been able to carry out the second part of their plan.

army as a whole did not break formation and concentrated on the remaining Roman forces, including the center, where most of the infantry units were positioned. Roman plans for the battle likely only assumed employing the basic tactic for the right and left wing, which was to make the enemy soldiers scatter in pursuit and dispatch them with a counter-charge⁴⁷. The barbarians may have seen through the Roman ruse, recognizing a trap that they themselves have successfully executed numerous times. When ὑποστράτηγος Droktulf realized that the Avars are not following him, he was forced to improvise. The cavalry under his command⁴⁸ encircled the enemy force and attacked it from behind⁴⁹. Lack of reaction from the Avars means that they were not expecting these Roman units to return to the battlefield. It may indicate that the leader of the nomad flank assumed that Droktulf's troops were actually retreating and decided to engage the infantry in the center rather than execute a difficult pursuit of the fleeing cavalry. This turn of events must have taken the barbarians completely by surprise, causing a panic which led to the disintegration of the Avar army.

We also shouldn't exclude the possibility that Droktulf made a more complicated tactical move. Perhaps the simulated retreat of the Roman flank was in fact merely a "smoke screen" for the ambushing drungos⁵⁰ – a cavalry formation operating as an extension of the flank, whose task was precisely to move around the opposing force in a wide arc, and to strike at the rear of the enemy formation. If that was the case, it would be consistent with the diagrams⁵¹ from *Strategikon* shown below⁵²:

⁴⁷ A counter-charge was one of the few cavalry maneuvers that was executed at full speed. Strat. 3.5. 26-36. It is impossible to accurately determine the speed. Intermediate trot (250 m/min.) is faster than collected gallop (225 m/min.), but slower than intermediate gallop (300 m/min.). Vide: Ewa HORDYŃSKA, *O koniu i jeździe konnej*, Zbroslawice 1995, p. 42-47. The author of *Strategikon* provides too little information to decide on how fast the charging soldiers moved. According to Gyftopoulou most of the maneuver was executed at a rather slow pace, with the horse accelerating to gallop immediately before the charge: Sophia GYFTOPOULOU, *Riding and reserving equii in the late antique/middle Byzantine army*, "βγζαντινός δρομος" 16 (2007-2008), p. 389-410.


⁴⁸ In the second half of the 6th century there were at least two other engagements, apart from the Battle of Adrianople, which were decided by cavalry operating on the flanks: the Battle of Solachon: Sym. 2. 4.1-8. and the Battle of Colchida: Sym. 3.7.10-12.

⁴⁹ We cannot exclude the possibility that this was the Roman plan all along, although it does seem less likely.


⁵⁰ The author of *Strategikon* reiterates a number of times the importance of choosing the correct moment for the ambushing drungos to strike. See: Strat. 1. 5. and Book IV: Strat. 4.

⁵¹ For more on the subject of diagrams, see: Carlo Maria MAZZUCCHI, *Le "katagraphai" dello "Strategikon" di Maurizio e lo schieramento di battaglia dell'esercito romano nel VI/VII secolo*, "Aevum", vol. 55/1: 1981, p. 111-138.

⁵² Strat. 3.X. 50-52.



Consequently, in the final stages of the battle the situation would perfectly mirror another diagram included in *Strategikon*:



The Avar forces converged on the Roman center, where infantry units (*meroi*) were stationed. Drotulf's horsemen returned and assaulted the Avar's exposed flank, while the ambushing drungos executed its assigned maneuver and charged from behind, completely surrounding the flank and compounding the chaos among the nomads⁵³. The author of *Strategikon* instructs to execute an encircling cavalry maneuver and strike at the enemy's flank or rear whenever possible⁵⁴. It was the most effective and least costly method of winning – the appearance of enemy cavalry on the flanks or behind own lines usually resulted in panic. This,

⁵³ It is not certain if the ambushing drungos engaged the enemy together with hyperkerastes. Possibly, the archon leading the ambush waited for other Roman forces to roll the flanks and only then decided to attack the Avar center from the rear. Such an action would have been crushing for the enemy's morale, but it required deep trust in one's own forces and a commander who could correctly assess the situation. It is very likely that during the Battle for Adrianople exactly such a situation occurred.

⁵⁴ Compare: Strat. 3. 10. 31–38; Strat. 3. 10. 50–52; and Strat. 3. 10. 39–43. In each of these instances, even if the enemy line was longer than the Roman one, the author of *Strategikon* instructed the readers to have detachments operating on the flanks in order to force the enemy to flee the battlefield.

in turn, would normally cause the surrounded force to retreat, thus ensuring victory for the Romans.

In the case of Drottulf's maneuver it is inaccurate to say that he simply copied nomad tactics. Roman military doctrine assumes that in a pitched battle the commander will always appoint a detachment to work its way around the enemy formation and attack from the flank or from behind⁵⁵. According to the manuals, this flanking attack should be carried out by several *bandons*⁵⁶ of *hyperkerastes*⁵⁷. In the Battle of Adrianople the maneuver was executed by the whole Roman flank⁵⁸, most likely supported by the ambushing *drugos*. Theophylact, who wrote the account of the battle studied here, was not overly familiar with Roman military doctrine, so he fails to provide crucial details, which can be deduced from analyzing *Strategikon*. By cross-referencing the two sources we can reconstruct quite a sophisticated tactical plan for the battle with the Avars.

Simocatta notes with some surprise that Romans stopped fighting and began retreating. This behavior was necessary to lure the enemy into a trap and must have been planned⁵⁹. We could say that Roman troops acted in a textbook fashion, with their tactics being slightly modified by a competent commander due to the actions of the enemy or an opportunity that presented itself. And if the ambushing *drugos* had been prepared beforehand, then this was a perfectly "by-the-book" tactic, which yielded excellent results. Once again Simocatta goes beyond the established literary topos of how a battle should be described⁶⁰ and includes certain details in his narrative that – in his opinion – were crucial to Roman success.

⁵⁵ Strat. 2. 4. Strat. 6. 5., especially the sub-chapter describing the maneuvers of *ὕπερκεραστής* in the case when the enemy battle line is either longer or shorter than the Roman one (Strat. 3. 14).

⁵⁶ Usually 1 or 2 *bandons* (Strat. 3. 8), which would be 500–600 horsemen.

⁵⁷ This disposition of forces on the flanks seem to have been an innovative approach in the 6th century. *Hyperkerastes* were a new unit type altogether, whereas *plagiofilakses*, stationed on the other wing, have been mentioned in the work of Asclepiodotus as the archons tasked with maintaining discipline on the sides of cavalry formations. Asclepiodotus, 7. 2. See also: Ł. RÓŻYCKI, *Hyperkerastes oraz plagiofilakses a działania na skrzydłach rzymskiej formacji bitewnej*, [in:] *"Mieczem i Szczytem" broń na polu walki Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, ed. A. Niewiński, Lublin 2016, p. 23–43. Similar tasks were assigned to *plagiofilakses* and *hyperkerastes* in the times of Nicephorus Phocas. See: *Praecepta militaria*, 61. 12. Although at the beginning of the engagement their tasks were consistent with those described in *Strategikon*. *Praecepta militaria*, 61. 8.

⁵⁸ Unless Drottulf was not the leader of the Roman flank but rather the ambushing *drugos*. Simocatta might not necessarily have known the difference between these two formations, and could have mistaken one for the other.

⁵⁹ In this particular maneuver it was the sudden turn before engaging the enemy that was adapted from barbarian tactics. It is difficult to determine if the Romans expected to trick the enemy wing into pursuit and destroy it with a counter-charge or if they assumed that the enemy would attack the main body of the army, ignoring the fleeing troops and giving them the opportunity to turn back and strike at the enemy's rear.

⁶⁰ See: Anna KOTŁOWSKA, Łukasz RÓŻYCKI, *The Battle of Solachon of 586 in light of the works of Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes Confessor (Homologetes)*, "Travaux et Mémoires", vol. 19: 2015, p. 315–327.

The maneuver executed by Roman cavalry at the Battle of Adrianople was a tactic taken straight out of a military manual. Although the officer in command utilized a nomad stratagem, it was well known to the Romans. Evident similarities with modified versions of this maneuver practiced by Roman flanking units suggest that Drottulf was well versed in the tactics of the imperial army. Through clever adoption of enemy tricks, the Romans were able to defeat the main army of the Avar khagan and have it retreat. Yet, despite this victory, the enemy army had not been destroyed. The Avars were forced to flee the battlefield, but they did not suffer heavy losses. Assuming that there was a strong infantry force in the center of the Roman formation, then the army could not effectively pursue the fleeing nomads. The barbarians had already disengaged from the main body of the opposing army and giving chase with just the cavalry would disrupt the Roman's tight tactical formation⁶¹ and expose them to an Avar counter-charge, which could still turn the tide of the battle. The risk was too high to take, since the major strategic objectives of the campaign had already been achieved: the siege of Adrianople was lifted and the army of Bayan II forced to retreat. Heavy Avar activity in the following years only goes to show that even after the defeat at Adrianople the barbarian army remained an effective fighting force.

Looking at the events of 586 from a broader perspective, we arrive at several conclusions. The Roman army basically did not lose a single battle – the defeat of Castonus's detachment was caused by bad planning and an overenthusiastic commander⁶². No major city was taken by the enemy⁶³. Several times, Avar parties were scattered by smaller Roman forces. And it should be pointed out that these were not elite Roman soldiers from mobile armies – the best imperial troops were still assigned to the war with Persia. Undoubtedly, the invasion was disastrous for the countryside population. It is difficult to determine how far the barbarian raiding parties reached and, consequently, what area of the province was plundered. It is possible that only those farms located directly along the marching route of the khagan's army were targeted. The Romans managed to repel the enemy without having to redeploy any of the units engaged in fighting on the eastern

⁶¹ *Strategikon* has a passage that emphasizes this fact: *Sive pugnas sive seques inimicum sive aequalis facies, nom forte minaret ut ne sparges tu suum ordinem. During combat and pursuit after the enemy, or if you are in the first line of troops, do not charge ahead too swiftly so as not to break formation.* Strat. 3.V. 3–9. This Latin text was written in Greek alphabet and was probably part of Roman army regulations or of another treatise. Rance suggests that the author of *Strategikon* translated whole passages from Latin and compiled them in his own treatise. Vide: Philip RANCE, *Simulacra Pugnae: The Literary and Historical tradition of Mock Battles in the Roman and Early Byzantine Army*, “Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies”, vol. 41/3: 2000, p. 233.

⁶² However, the Romans stopped retreating and everything points to the fact that they were readying themselves for a pitched battle against khagan's forces.

⁶³ The following cities did not surrender, despite being besieged: Beroe, Diocletianopolis, Philippopolis and Adrianople.

front, although they likely used some of the forces from Italia, which after this operation returned to their staging grounds around Ravenna⁶⁴. The end result of the campaign might have cemented Emperor Maurice's conviction that the European front was secondary in importance and did not require the involvement of a significant military force and that the Avars, despite being a constant nuisance, were inferior to Romans in warfare. For the next couple of years the majority of imperial armies were fighting over control of the Arzanene province, leaving the Balkans under the protection of local commanders, who were unable to handle things as well as in 586. The fact that victory in the campaign, which concluded with the Battle of Adrianople, was achieved at a relatively low cost and that the Avars were willing to receive gifts in exchange for peace⁶⁵ may have led Emperor Maurice to neglect matters in European provinces. This would bear bitter fruits in the future. During successive Avar raids the Empire's rulers would adopt the same strategy as in the campaign of 586, intervening directly only in the event of a major crisis. European armies were slowly bleeding out in numerous small skirmishes with the Slavs and during Avar raids, gradually losing their combat effectiveness⁶⁶.

Studying the similarities in the handling of a number of topics between *Strategikon* and the *History* of Theophylact Simocatta leads to two observations. The first is that the tactics described by the author of *Strategikon* were actually in use during the reign of Emperor Maurice. Although we cannot draw too far-reaching conclusions based on a single example, we are still dealing with a representative sample here. A similar study was carried out by I. Syväne⁶⁷, who shortly analyzed a bigger number of clashes and battles, and reached similar conclusions.

The second benefit from analyzing the engagement at Adrianople⁶⁸ is determining how schematic the descriptions of battles were in the work of Theophylact Simocatta. Some of the historians of antiquity avoided describing combat, or included descriptions that were nothing more than literary *topoi*, based on ancient traditions⁶⁹,

⁶⁴ Although before setting off to Adrianople Roman forces were probably reinforced with the imperial guard and freshly drafted troops (Sym. 2. 16. 8).

⁶⁵ The author of *Strategikon* considered Avars to be untrustworthy and treacherous (Strat. 11. 2).

⁶⁶ It was only once Persia had been defeated that the Empire focused its military efforts on the West. This has resulted in spectacular successes. In the final two years of Maurice's reign the barbarians were pushed back completely beyond the Danube limes and the army was to continue the offensive in enemy territory. The murder of Maurice in 602 put a halt to that and under the rule of Phocas the Danube limes disintegrated completely, leading the Roman Balkans to ruin.

⁶⁷ I. SYVÄNNE, op. cit., p. 435–484.

⁶⁸ A similar plan was followed in the Battle of Solachon. Although Theophylact talks about three formations in the Roman army, he lists four commander, not mentioning Philippicus who probably held command over the second line. This would mean that one of the listed archons (Elifredas or Apsich the Hun) was in charge of the flanking units and the ambushing drungos. Sym. 2. 3.1–3.

⁶⁹ On the subject of literary *topoi* in Early Byzantine geographical descriptions, see: Anthony KALDELLIS, *Ethnography after Empire. Foreign Lands and Peoples in Byzantine Literature*, Pennsylvania 2013.

having little to do with the realities of the battlefield. Theophylact wrote differently, but we do not have any comparative sources⁷⁰ that would allow us to verify his descriptions. However, it is very likely that the author had access to imperial archives and to people who participated in the described events, which makes his work unique⁷¹. By confronting Theophylact's work with *Strategikon*, we can at least partially answer if Simocatta's descriptions were stylized passages mirroring ancient sources, or if he actually collected accounts from eyewitnesses and participants of events and included these in his *opus magnum*. Although, once again, it should be emphasized that the research methodology is not perfect and the studied material is selective, the results of the analysis indicate that despite his deficiencies in military and geographical knowledge⁷², Theophylact managed to give a competent account of the Battle of Adrianople.

Bibliography

Mauricii Strategicon

MAURICIUS, *Arta militară*, ed., transl. H. MIHĂESCU, București 1970.

Das Strategikon des Maurikios, ed. G.T. DENNIS, transl. E. GAMILLSCHEG, Wien 1981.

Maurice's Strategikon Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, transl. G.T. DENNIS, Philadelphia 1984.

Стратегикон Маврикия, transl. В.В. КУЧМА, Санкт-Петербург 2004.

Paulus Diaconus

Pauli Historia Langobardorum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae Historicis recusa, ed. L. BETHMANN, G. WAITZ, Hannoverae 1878.

Paweł DIAKON, *Historia rzymska. Historia Longobardów*, transl. I. LEWANDOWSKI, Warszawa 1995.

Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus

Flavii Vegeti RENATI, *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, ed. C. LANG, Lipsae 1869.

Flawiusz WEGECJUSZ, *Zarys wojskowości*, transl. A. KOMORNICKA, Meander vol. 28: 1973, vol. 29: 1974.

⁷⁰ Descriptions of military clashes in the work of Evagrius Scholasticus are very schematic, and the author did not focus his attention on the struggles of the Empire, but rather continued his narrative about the history of the Church. For a military historian, the situation is slightly better in the work of Theophanes Confessor. Unfortunately, the latter author used the work of Theophylact Simocatta as a source, so similarities between the two are extensive.

⁷¹ T. OLAJOS, *Les sources de Théophylacte Simocatta historien*, Leiden 1988.

⁷² The author of *Historia* often digressed and when writing about the Avar front would suddenly switch his narrative to the Persian one. Detailing the chronology and geography of this work is extremely difficult. See: Gerard LABUDA, *La Chronologie des guerres de Byzance contre les Avars et les Slaves à la fin du VI^e siècle*, "Byzantinoslavica" 11 (1954), p. 167–173; Michael WHITBY, *The Emperor Maurice and his Historian Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare*, Oxford 1988.

Theophylactus Simocatta

Theophylacti Simocattae Historiarum, ed. I. BEKKERUS, Bonnae 1834.

Theophylacti Simocattae Historiae, ed. C. de BOOR, Lipsiae 1887.

The History of Theophylact Simocatta an English Translation with Introduction and Notes, transl. Michael i Mary WHITBY, Oxford 1986.

Teofilakt Simokatta, Historia powszechna, transl. A. KOTŁOWSKA, Ł. RÓŻYCKI, Poznań 2016.

Works

AUSSARESSES François, *L'auteur du Stratégicon*, "Revue des études anciennes" 8 (1906), p. 23–40.

AVENARIUS Alexander, *Die Awaren in Europa*, Bratislava: A.M. Hakkert, 1974.

BIERNACKI B. Andrzej, RÓŻYCKI Łukasz, *Early Byzantine Arms and Weapons from the Episcopal Complex in Novae*, [in:] *Proceedings of the First International Roman and Late Antique Thrace Conference, National Archaeological Institute XLIV*, Sofia: National Archaeological Institute, 2018, p. 453–466.

CURTA Florin, *Avar Blitzkrieg, Slavic and Bulgar raiders, and Roman special ops: mobile warriors in the 6th-century Balkans*, [in:] *Central Eurasia in the Middle Ages Studies in Honour of Peter B. Golden*, ed. István ZIMONYI, Osman KARATAY, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2016, p. 69–89.

DUDEK Jarosław, *Chazarowie Polityka kultura religia VII–XI wiek*, Warszawa: PWN, 2016.

DUJČEV Ivan, *Le sept tribus slaves de la Mésie*, "Slavia Antiqua" 6 (1957–1959), p. 100–108.

FRITZE H. Wolfgang, *Zur Bedeutung der Awaren für die Slawische Ausdehnungsbewegung im frühen Mittelalter*, "Zeitschrift f. Ostforschung" 28 (1979), p. 498–545.

GYFTOPOULOU Sophia, *Riding and reserving equii in the late antique/middle Byzantine army*, "Byzantinische Zeitschrift" 16 (2007–2008), p. 389–410.

HORDYŃSKA Ewa, *O koniu i jeździe konnej*, Zbroslawice: Zakład Treningowy Koni w Zbroslawicach, 1995.

KALDELLIS Anthony, *Ethnography after Empire. Foreign Lands and Peoples in Byzantine Literature*, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

KARDARAS Georgios, *The Episode of Bousas (586/7) and the Use of Siege Engines by the Avars*, "Byzantinoslavica" 63 (2005), p. 53–67.

KOTŁOWSKA Anna, RÓŻYCKI Łukasz, *The Battle of Solachon of 586 in light of the works of Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes Confessor (Homologetes)*, "Travaux et Mémoires" 19 (2015), p. 315–327.

ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ Γεώργιος, *Οι βυζαντινοαβαρικές διενέξεις και η μεθόριος του Δούναβη, 558–626*, [in:] *Η μεθόριος του Δούναβη και ο κόσμος της στην εποχή της μετανάστευσης των λαών (4ος-7ος αι.)*, ed. Γεώργιος ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ, Σ. ΠΑΤΟΥΡΑ-ΣΠΑΝΟΥ, Αθήνα: Εθνικό Ίδρυμα Ερευνών (E.I.E.), Ινστιτούτο Βυζαντινών Ερευνών, 2008, p. 237–266.

ΚΑΡΔΑΡΑΣ Γεώργιος, *Το σχήμα των Αβάρων στο Στρατηγικόν του Μαυροκίου. Μια κριτική προσέγγιση*, "Byzantinische Zeitschrift" 16 (2007–2008), p. 151–167.

LABUDA Gerard, *La Chronologie des guerres de Byzance contre les Avars et les Slaves à la fin du VI^e siècle*, "Byzantinoslavica" 11 (1954), p. 167–173.

LESZKA Mirosław, LESZKA Małgorzata, *Ewolucja statusu Miasta. Idea Konstantynopola – Nowego Rzymu*, [in:] *Konstantynopol Nowy Rzym miasto i ludzie w okresie wczesnobizantyńskim*, ed. Mirosław LESZKA, Teresa WOLIŃSKA, Warszawa: PWN, 2011, p. 38–42.

MAZZUCCHI Carlo Maria, *Le "katagraphai" dello "Strategicon" di Maurizio e lo schieramento di battaglia dell'esercito romano nel VI/VII secolo*, "Aevum" 55/1 (1981), p. 111–138.

O'Rourke Michael, *Arrow-Storms and Cavalry Pikes Warfare In the Age of Justinian I, AD 527–565 The Armies of Belisarius and Narses*, Canberra 2007.

- OLAJOS Thérèse, *La chronologie de la dynastie avare de Baïan*, "Revue des études byzantines" 34 (1976), p. 151–158.
- OLAJOS Thérèse, *Les sources de Théophylacte Simocatta historien*, Leiden: Brill, 1988.
- POHL Walter, *Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa 567–822 n. Chr.*, München: C.H. Beck, 1988.
- RANCE Philip, *Simulacra Pugnae: The Literary and Historical tradition of Mock Battles in the Roman and Early Byzantine Army*, "Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies" 41/3 (2000), p. 223–275.
- RÓŻYCKI Łukasz, *Kampania z 586 roku i odsiecz Adrianopola w świetle rzymskiej sztuki wojennej*, [in:] *Człowiek i wojna Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, ed. Andrzej NIEWIŃSKI, Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2013, p. 7–17.
- RÓŻYCKI Łukasz, *Hyperkerastes oraz plagiofilakses a działania na skrzydłach rzymskiej formacji bitewnej*, [in:] *"Mieczem i Szczytem" broń na polu walki Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, ed. Andrzej NIEWIŃSKI, Lublin: Napoleon V, 2016, p. 23–43.
- SHLOSSER E. Franziska, *The Reign of the Emperor Maurikios (582–602) A Reassessment*, Athens: Basilopoulos Historical Publications, 1994.
- SOUTHERN Pat, DIXON Karen Ramsey, *The Late Roman Army*, New York: Yale University Press, 2009.
- SYVÄNNE Ilkka, *The Age of Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491–636)*, Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2004.
- TURLEJ Stanisław, *Upadek granicy cesarstwa na Dunaju*, [in:] *Barbarzyńcy u bram Imperium*, ed. Stanisław TURLEJ, Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2007, p. 185–246.
- TYSZKIEWICZ A. Lech, *Słowianie i Awarowie. Organizacja plemienna Słowian*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2009.
- TYSZKIEWICZ A. Lech, *Słowianie i ludy tureckie przed pojawieniem się Protobułgarów na Półwyspie Bałkańskim*, [in:] *Barbarzyńcy w Europie. Studia z późnego antyku I wczesnego średniowiecza*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2007.
- WHITBY Michael, *The Emperor Maurice and his Historian Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
- WITA John, *The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises*, University of Minesota 1977.
- ZÁSTĚROVÁ Bohumila, *Les Avars et les Slaves dans la Tactique de Maurice*, Praha: Academia, 1971.
- АРКАДЬЕВИЧ Иванов Сергѣй, *Оборона балканских провинций Византии и проникновение „варваров” на Балканах в первой половине VI века*, „Византийский временник”, vol. 45: 1984, p. 35–53.

Kampania roku 586 oraz odsiecz Adrianopola w świetle rzymskiej sztuki wojennej

Streszczenie

Celem tekstu zatytułowanego *The campaign of 586 and the relief of Adrianople in the context of roman military craft* jest próba analizy rzymskiej taktyki w czasie walk z Awarami w 586 r. i zestawienie jej z traktatami wojskowymi, głównie ze *Strategikonem*. Poza analizą kampanii przeciwko koczownikom w 586 r. autor przedstawił również sylwetkę Droktona, rzymskiego dowódcy na co dzień operującego w Italii przeciwko Longobardom, tym razem dowodzącego skrzydłem armii idącej z odsieczą oblężonemu Adrianopolowi.

Słowa kluczowe: Strategikon, rzymska sztuka wojenna, Teofilakt Symokatta, Bałkany, Awarowie.