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JOLANTA MAZURKIEWICZ-SOKOŁOWSKA

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0699-5518>

(Institute of Linguistics

University of Szczecin)

e-mail: jolanta.mazurkiewicz-sokolowska@usz.edu.pl

‘IMAGE SCHEMA’, ‘DOMAIN’, ‘FRAME’ AND ‘MENTAL SPACE’ – TAXONOMY OR AN INTERTWINING NETWORK?

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Abstract

This paper deals with the question of whether the conceptual structures: ‘image schema’, ‘domain’, ‘frame’ and ‘mental space’ constitute a taxonomy with ‘image schema’ at the top (as the highly schematic item) and ‘mental space’ at the bottom (as the highly specific one) or if they rather defy such classification creating an intertwining network of constructs. It is shown here that depending on contents: (i) ‘domain’, ‘frame’ and ‘mental space’ may fulfil the restrictions of such taxonomy, (ii) only ‘two of them may meet the restrictions, (iii) ‘domain’, ‘frame’ and ‘mental space’ may present the same level of schematicity/specificity, (iv) only two of them may present such equal level. It is argued for a dual nature of the ‘image schema’ which as autonomous and separate structures at the same time, are capable of being incorporated in every domain, frame and mental space as their background, rather than a construct containing them. This theoretical issue is discussed in relation to the concept SUCCESS and processes of mental integration involving image schemas like OBJECT, CONTAINER, PATH, LINK, PART-WHOLE.

Keywords: image schema, domain, frame, mental space, taxonomy, network.

Introduction

The starting point for discussing the titular question is the fact that, in the subject literature, all four conceptual structures: ‘image schema’, ‘do-

main', 'frame' and 'mental space' tend to be used interchangeably, although apart from some common conceptual content, they significantly differ in meaning. 'Image schemas' refer to preconceptual, highly schematic gestalts (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Talmy, 1988), 'domains' to areas of knowledge necessary for characterising/understanding semantic units (Langacker, 1987, 2008), 'frames' to "specific unified frameworks of knowledge" and "coherent schematizations of experience" (Fillmore, 1985, p. 223) and 'mental spaces' to cognitive constructs, partial assemblies appearing during discourse enabling local understanding and acting (Fauconnier, 1985; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002). What becomes even more interesting in this context is the taxonomy of the aforementioned structures proposed by Kövecses (2020), which is another reason to consider the mutual relations between them. Both views on the structures in issue, in terms of their synonymity on the one hand and hierarchical organisation on the other, reveal the procedural character of concepts¹ (and conceptual structures), their status as dispositions, undergoing changes and being dynamic in nature as pointed by Bartsch (2002).

As processing "occurs simultaneously in various dimensions and at multiple levels of organisation" (Langacker, 2008, p. 501), it will be argued that conceptual structures in issue are rather a dynamic network of constructs (Langacker, 1987, 2008), and their taxonomic arrangement (Kövecses, 2020, p. 52) appears as only one of the possible constellations in this network.

In the taxonomy (Kövecses, 2020, p. 52) 'image schema' is viewed as the most schematic conceptual structure and 'mental space' as the least schematic one. Schematicity is discussed in terms of "a series of inclusions" where the 'mental space' is included in the 'frame', 'frame' in the 'domain' and 'domain' in the 'image schema' (Sullivan, 2013, in Kövecses, 2020, p. 54).

While the highest schematicity of image schemas is undisputable, the assumptions concerning the all-encompassing role of image schemas (including domains, frames and mental spaces) and the hierarchical relation between them is debatable. Therefore, in this paper it is argued that 'image schemas' as preconceptual structures serving as a foundation for the conceptual ones (domains, frames and mental spaces) are dual in nature, autonomous and separate, and at the same time incorporated in them. In connection with this, the hierarchical relation of the analysed structures (gradually decreasing schematicity of the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces', respectively) is discussed as well. 'Domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' are shown as structures creating an intertwined network, and 'image schemas' as structures functioning both outside of and inside this network. While discussing the mutual relations between all four structures the role of concep-

¹ mental units that organise and store knowledge about the world (Schwarz, 1992, p. 87).

tualisation² (e.g. Langacker, 1987, 2008; Noordzij et al., 2005) is taken into consideration.

The research material is related to the concept SUCCESS including a ChatGPT creation of the domain matrix of SUCCESS and the frame SUCCESS, entries excerpted from Sketch engine to the question of what the SUCCESS is, as well as historical and psychological insights. The choice of the concept SUCCESS is related to a story quoted often during Kamala Harris' 2024 presidential campaign involving Kamala Harris herself and pertaining to SUCCESS. This story also constitutes a part of the research material discussed in this paper.

Section 1 deals with the status of 'image schemas' viewing them both as autonomous, separate constructs and as integrated parts of the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces'. Section 2 focuses on the conceptual structures 'domain', 'frame' and 'mental space', their mutual relation and their relation to 'image schema'. Section 3 deepens theoretical considerations explaining the relations between the structures in issue on the example of the concept SUCCESS. Section 4 is specifically devoted to the 'image schemas' elaborating on the image schemas OBJECT, CONTAINER, PATH, LINK and PART-WHOLE and showing how they underly the processes of mental integration on example of the concept COCONUT leading to the conceptualisation of SUCCESS.

1 A separate status of 'image schemas'

'Image schemas' as experiential/embodied preconceptual gestalts (Hampe 2005), among them SURFACE, CONTAINER, PATH, PART-WHOLE, LINK, NEAR-FAR, CONTACT, OBJECT, CENTER-PERIPHERY, UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, FORCE, BALANCE, CYCLE, PROCESS, SCALE (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987), are viewed as the basis for organising and structuring of knowledge and experience from various areas, modalities and levels of abstraction.

Considering the question of the relation between 'image schemas' and the remaining structures in issue in terms of the all-encompassing role of the former ones as proposed by Kövecses (2020), according to which conceptual structures are included into the 'image schemas', an opposing view is proposed below. In this conception 'image schemas' are assumed to be dual in

² Conceptualisations are "(1) both novel and established conceptions; (2) not just "intellectual" notions, but sensory, motor, and emotive experience as well; (3) apprehension of the physical, linguistic, social, and cultural context; and (4) conceptions that develop and unfold through processing time (rather than being simultaneously manifested)" (Langacker 2008: 30). Conceptualisations are dynamic, interactive, imaginative, include metaphors, blends, mental space constructions (Langacker, 2008, p. 43).

nature, being both, autonomous and separate from the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces', and also incorporated into them as given image schemas become the foundation of given domains, frames and mental spaces.

To illustrate the above, domains like [SURFACES], [CONTAINERS], [PATHS], [PART-WHOLE RELATIONS] and others, instead of being included in the respective image schemas SURFACE, CONTAINER, PATH, PART-WHOLE, arise on the basis of the particular autonomous image schemas that become their foundation and integral part. Diverse surfaces, containers, paths, part-whole relations and so on can be understood on the basis of the respective image schema capable to function separately as well as an inherent part of them. The presented assumption about the dual nature of image schemas can be supported by the following fact demonstrating their ability to function outside of and inside a given conceptual structure. The same image schemas, e.g. OBJECT, CONTAINER, VERTICALITY, can serve for understanding different concepts like BODY and BUILDING, at the same time more than one image schema serve for understanding of one concept (like BODY or BUILDING), and, as mentioned by Langacker (1987), various image schemas apply to different aspects or dimensions of a domain matrix. Thus, as follows from the above, although 'domains' are less schematic than 'image schemas' (Kövecses, 2020, p. 53), they are rather not included in them. On the contrary, 'image schemas' (as the experiential/embodied basis for concepts and experiences, and highly schematic gestalts) are immanent parts of the 'domains' being present in the background of them, most often as unconscious knowledge that can become conscious at any time. Language users do not necessary activate the image schemas underlying meanings while processing concepts (e.g. BODY or BUILDING). They may, however, recall them, especially when pointed to, while considering individual domains of the domain matrix from which the meaning emerges.

For example, the meaning of the concept BUILDING³ emerges from the domain matrix including [ARCHITECTURE], [ENVIRONMENT], [BUILDING MATERIALS], [MEASUREMENT], [SECURITY], [APPEARANCE], [SHAPE], [SIZE], [TYPE], [APPLICATION], [ECONOMY] and so on resting not only on the image schemas OBJECT, CONTAINER, VERTICALITY but FORCE, BALANCE, FRONT-BACK, UP-DOWN as well.

The ideas of OBJECT, CONTAINER, VERTICALITY, FORCE, BALANCE, FRONT-BACK, UP-DOWN and so on can be conceptualised as domains, individual entries in the particular domains and as image schemas underlying

³ The choice of the concept BUILDING as example used for the considerations is related to the fact that BUILDING STRUCTURE is one of the conceptions underlying conceptualisations of SUCCESS, see section 3. What is more, both BUILDING and SUCCESS are based (among others) on the image schema OBJECT. This fact explains the choice of the concept OBJECT for the considerations too.

them. Figure 1 illustrates the status of 'image schema' as background knowledge in relation to the 'domain' in the case of a domain that arises from the corresponding image schema on example of OBJECT. The dashed line symbolises the image schema involved.




Fig. 1
Image schema OBJECT as background knowledge included in the domain [OBJECT]

Figure 2 illustrates the status of the 'image schemas' as background knowledge in relation to the 'domain' matrix when the domain matrix bases on various image schemas on example of BUILDING. The solid line symbolises all domains of the matrix and the dashed line all image schemas involved.




Fig. 2
Image schemas OBJECT, CONTAINER, VERTICALITY, FORCE, BALANCE, FRONT-BACK, UP-DOWN as background knowledge included in the domain [BUILDING]

While one could accept as plausible that domains which correspond to the particular image schemas like in Figure 1 could be viewed as included in the image schemas, such assumption could hardly be applied to domains which are based on more than one image schema like in Figure 2. Just the idea that a domain matrix like BUILDING should be included in all the image schemas which the domains of the matrix involve seems to be implausible and contrary to the psychological reality, going beyond the capacities of human mind.

2 'Domain', 'frame', 'mental space', their relation to each other and to 'image schema'

As mentioned in the Introduction, terms like 'domain', 'frame', 'mental space' are often used interchangeably although they are not equal. 'Domains' are coherent areas of knowledge and experience that, when recalled during

the processing of an expression, create sets of domains called domain matrix enabling the understanding of the expression. Domains are characterised by a varying degree of schematicity/specifity and conceptual complexity. Thus, any conceptualisation or conception⁴ can create a (nonbasic)⁵ domain. Domains of a domain matrix differ in the degree of reference to the entity they characterise. Central domains are those that are invariably called to mind by a given expression while peripheral domains are invoked only in specific contexts. The domains of a domain matrix are open-ended sets (Langacker, 2008, pp. 44–48). ‘Frames’ are defined as “any system[s] of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available” (Fillmore, 1982, p. 111). ‘Frame’ as a general term refers to “the set of concepts variously known, in the literature on natural language understanding, as ‘schema’, ‘script’, ‘scenario’, ‘ideational scaffolding’, ‘cognitive model’, or ‘folk theory’” (Fillmore, 1982, p. 111).

‘Mental spaces’ as “small conceptual packets constructed when we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action [...] [undergoing modifications] as thought and discourse unfold” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 40), “partial structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structures” (Langacker, 2008, pp. 50–51) can be “structured by frames” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 40) or “incorporated as part of a matrix” (Langacker, 2008, p. 51). In the first case, ‘mental spaces’ can be viewed as more specific than ‘frames’ and included in them. The last case, however, indicates that the degree of specificity of ‘mental spaces’ can be different according to different degrees of schematicity/specifity of the particular domains in the matrix. Thus, mental spaces, being elaborated on by the information from the unfolding discourse, incorporating “the current discourse space” (Langacker, 2008, p. 59), may “borrow their structure from frames” (Kövecses, 2020, p. 54). But, they can also be viewed as parts of bigger conceptualisations considering that they [mental spaces, JMS] “compris[e] everything presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for discourse at a given moment” (Langacker, 2008, p. 59) or emerge in the mind of one of them during the discourse. In contrast to the ‘domains’ ‘mental spaces’ are conceptual discontinuous, partial, fragmentary appearing dynamic during discourse for the purpose of local understanding (Fauconnier, 1985; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Langacker, 2008, p. 51).

⁴ The terms: ‘concept’, ‘conception’ and ‘conceptualization’ differ due to their dynamics, both first are more or less static and the last is dynamic, however the last “is also employed as a fully general term” (Langacker, 2008, p. 46).

⁵ Basic domains are „cognitively irreducible, neither derivable from nor analyzable into other conceptions [...] space, time [...] color space [...], pitch [...], temperature, taste and smell, and so on” (Langacker, 2008, p. 44).

Regarding the mutual relationship between 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces', the phenomenon of conceptualisation comes to the fore and becomes even more important, because as mentioned above, every conceptualisation can function as a domain (Langacker, 2008). Bearing the nature of conceptualisation in mind, it becomes apparent that domains of a lower degree of schematicity can be equal to frames, and more specific domains can be less schematic than frames. This fact contrasts with the generalisation that frames "are less schematic" and "involve more conceptually specific information than domains" (Kövecses, 2020, p. 52, 54). Thus, the inclusion of the frames in the domains as in the quote "[t]he frames elaborating a domain consists of roles and relations between the roles and the roles can be filled by particular values" (Kövecses, 2020, p. 54), appears as only one of the possible relations between both conceptual structures.

Summing up, 'domains' emerge not only as the most general conceptual structures if compared with 'frames' and other ones, but as very flexible as well. This is visible in the varying conceptual complexity of the domains, the various degrees of their schematicity/specification, and their ability to cross and overlap each other.

It should be mentioned that depending on the conceptualisation not only a 'domain' may meet 'frame' but both may meet a 'mental space' if presenting the same level of specificity.

Therefore, assuming that 'image schemas' are immanent parts of 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces', bearing in mind the conceptualisation processes and taking into consideration again the taxonomy proposed by Kövecses (2020), it is to be stated that the restrictions of such taxonomy may but do not have to be fulfilled, depending on the conceptualisation of the schematicity/specification and conceptual complexity of the domain, frame and mental space. What is more, the restrictions can be fulfilled by (i) 'domain', 'frame' and 'mental space', (ii) 'domain' and 'frame' or (iii) 'domain' and 'mental space' only. At the same time, however, any or none of them have to fulfil these restrictions when 'domain', 'frame' and 'mental space', 'domain' and 'frame' or 'domain' and 'mental space' present equal level of schematicity/specification and complexity.

Some possible relations between 'domains', 'frames', 'mental spaces' and 'image schemas' are discussed below in regard to the aforementioned example of the BUILDING.

Focusing on the relation between the 'image schemas' and 'frames' on the example of the frame BUILDING "contain[ing] words which name permanent fixed structures forming an enclosure and providing protection from the elements" (FrameNet)⁶, the relation between 'image schemas' and 'frame' can be like illustrated above by Figure 2.

⁶ Related lexical units are: "acropolis.n, airport.n, arena.n, auditorium.n, bar.n, barn.n, barracks.n, basilica.n, blockhouse.n, building.n, bungalow.n, bunker.n, cabin.n, campanile.n, car-

The relationships between 'image schema(s)', 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' when domains, frames and mental spaces reveal the same level of schematicity/specificity and complexity are illustrated by Figure 3.

The solid line symbolises schematically domains or frames or mental spaces, and the dashed line the image schema(s) which are immanent parts of domains, frames and mental spaces present in background of them.




Fig. 3

Relationship between domains, frames, mental spaces of equal status and the image schema(s)

The relationships between image schema(s), domains, frames and mental spaces when mental spaces are included in frames and frames in the domains illustrates Figure 4. The dashed lines symbolise the image schema(s) as preconceptual gestalt(s) in the background of the conceptual structures.




Fig. 4

Relationships between domains, frames, mental spaces (hierarchical relation) and the image schema(s)

avan.n, caravanserai.n, castle.n, chalet.n, chateau.n, church.n, citadel.n, city hall.n, condominium.n, conservatory.n, cottage.n, dacha.n, disco.n, discotheque.n, dormitory.n, dwelling.n, farmhouse.n, fort.n, fortification.n, fortress.n, garage.n, gazebo.n, greenhouse.n, hacienda.n, hall.n, hangar.n, high-rise.n, hippodrome.n, home.n, homestead.n, hospital.n, hostel.n, hotel.n, house.n, houseboat.n, housing.n, hovel.n, igloo.n, inn.n, kennel.n, kiosk.n, library.n, light-house.n, lodge.n, maisonette.n, mall.n, manor.n, manse.n, mansion.n, monastery.n, mosque.n, motel.n, outbuilding.n, outhouse.n, pagoda.n, palace.n, palazzo.n, pavilion.n, pension.n, penthouse.n, pub.n, pueblo.n, pyramid.n, quarters.n, residence.n, rotunda.n, shack.n, shanty.n, shebang.n, shed.n, shelter.n, skyscraper.n, stable.n, stadium.n, structure.n, supermarket.n, synagogue.n, tabernacle.n, tavern.n, temple.n, tenement.n, tent.n, tepee.n, terminal.n, theater.n, tower.n, triplex.n, villa.n, warehouse.n, wigwam.n" (FrameNet 27.01.2025).

The varying degrees of schematicity/specificity of the domains and mental spaces are shown in Figure 5. The solid lines symbolise domains and mental spaces (the thin solid line symbolises bigger degree of schematicity, thick solid line bigger degree of specificity). Dashed lines symbolise the image schema(s) in background.



Fig. 5

Various degrees of schematicity/specificity of the domains and mental spaces (image schemas in background)

Thus, regardless of the relation constituted by 'domain', 'frame' and 'mental space', 'image schemas' are present in each of them. Figure 6 shows the dual nature of 'image schema' as an autonomous and separate construct and incorporated in a conceptual structure (domain, frame, mental space) as their foundation.




Fig. 6

The dual nature of image schemas

3 'Domain', 'frame', 'mental space' and the concept SUCCESS

The theoretical considerations presented above are explained below on the example of the concept SUCCESS.

First, the differences between 'domains' and 'frames' are discussed with the example of the domain matrix of SUCCESS and the frame SUCCESS created by ChatGPT. In this regard, the differences concerning the flexibility of both, their schematicity/specificity and conceptual complexity are highlighted. The dynamic variability of the schematicity/specificity and complex-

ity depending on the conceptualisation is addressed further to the relation between 'domains' and 'mental spaces'.

The domain set constituting the domain matrix of SUCCESS includes i. a.: [PERSONAL GROWTH], [CAREER and FINANCE], [HEALTH and WELLBEING], [RELATIONSHIP and SOCIAL], [SPIRITUAL and PURPOSE], [IMPACT and LEGACY] (ChatGPT).⁷ The conceptual content of these domains is shown in Table 1. Viewed separately, every entry in Tab. 1 can be seen as 'domain' or 'frame'. Viewing these entries integrally, columns: Definitions, Key Indicators and Examples of success appear as subdomains of lower and lower levels.

Tab. 1

Domain matrix related to SUCCESS (ChatGPT)⁸

Domain	Definition	Key Indicators	Examples of Success
Personal Growth	Self-improvement, learning, and emotional intelligence	Skills, mindset, self-awareness	Mastering a new skill, overcoming fears
Career & Finance	Professional achievements and financial stability	Income, job, satisfaction, recognition	Getting promoted, achieving financial independence
Health & Wellbeing	Physical and mental wellbeing	Fitness, mental clarity, work-life balance	Maintaining a healthy lifestyle, managing stress
Relationships & Social	Strong personal and professional relationships	Family bonds, friendships, networking	Building a happy family, having strong support system
Spiritual & Purpose	A sense of meaning, values, and inner peace	Fulfilment, values alignment	Practicing gratitude, contributing to society
Impact & Legacy	Contributions to society and long-term influence	Community service, mentorship	Philanthropy, inspiring others

The frame SUCCESS involves:

- Agent (The individual or group striving for success, e.g. *she*),
- Goal or Desired State (The objective or standard that defines success, e.g. *winning the championship*),
- Obstacle or Challenge (The difficulties or barriers that must be overcome, e.g. *financial struggles*),
- Effort or Strategy (The actions taken to achieve success, e.g. *hard work*),
- Outcome or Achievement (The final result recognized as success, e.g. *success in the tech industry*),

⁷ access: 02.02.2025

⁸ access: 02.02.2025.

- Recognition or Evaluation (Social or personal validation of success, e.g. being celebrated),
- Temporal Aspect (Success can be short-term or long-term, e.g. *early success* vs. *long-term sustainability*) (ChatGPT).⁹

The frame SUCCESS appears as a GOAL that an Agent aims to achieve when the outcome of their action matches their intent. It includes Circumstances, Containing event, Explanation, Place, Means, Time and Re-encoding (presenting the SUCCESS as an “integral part of a larger conceptualisation expressed by another frame” (FrameNet).¹⁰

The comparison of the domain matrix and the frame of SUCCESS mentioned above, reveals (illustrated by the listed domains of higher and lower level in the domain matrix) the generality of the domains and, at the same time, their varying degree of schematicity/specificity. The flexibility of the ‘domains’ also concerns ‘mental spaces’ and explains why ‘domains’ and ‘mental spaces’ can be equal to ‘frames’ that while referring to systems of concepts, roles and relationships strictly necessary for understanding meaning, are less flexible and more stable.

Below, conceptions related to SUCCESS, regarding the question of what the success is in the historical and psychological perspective, as well as based on the corpus analysis are presented. They are listed in the hierarchical order, divided into domains, subdomains and mental spaces, where the mental spaces are included in the subdomains and subdomains in the domains, in line with the idea proposed by Kövecses (2020).

Considering the concept SUCCESS from the historical point of view the domains [MATERIAL PROSPERITY] and [HIGH SOCIAL STATUS] appear as the central ones through centuries until the late 20th century. As the ways to achieve this kind of success have changed over time in different periods different subdomains emerged and came to the fore, e.g. [[BELOGNING TO THE ARISTOCRACY]], [[POSSESSING TITLES]], [[OWNING LAND]] in the Middle Ages, [[BECOMING RICH]] in the 16th-17th centuries, [[WORKING HARD]] in the 19th century, [[BELOGNING TO THE CONSUMER SOCIETY]] in the 20th century. In the 21st century material prosperity and high social status are perceived as success too evoking the subdomain [[CAREER ACHIEVEMENT]]. Parallelly [HEALTH] becomes one of the central domains (if not the most central one) bringing subdomains [[CAREER, HEALTHY AND BALANCED LIFESTYLE]], [[DEVELOPMENT OF AWARENESS]] and [[PERSONAL GROWTH]] to the forefront. This tendency is consistent with the psychological perspective on success highlighting the domain [NEEDS] with three sub-domains: [[AUTONOMY]], [[COMPETENCE]], [[FEELING CONNECTED WITH OTHERS]] (Beishenova et al., 2024, pp. 2-5).

⁹ access: 02.02.2025.

¹⁰ access: 02.02.2025.

Additionally, corpus research conducted using the software Sketch engine¹¹ reveals the reference to the following domains: [ACTIONS] (e.g. success is performance, participation, accomplishment, engagement), [SOCIAL INTERACTION] (e.g. success is team work, team effort, revenge, support, communication), [EVENTS] (e.g. journey), [CREATIVITY] (e.g. success is innovation, reflection, creation, inspiration, strategy), [GOALS and RESULTS] (e.g. success is medal, victory, proof, reward, outcome, product), [PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCES] (e.g. success is ability, attitude, willingness, determination, passion), [EMOTIONAL WELLBEING] (e.g. success is happiness, confidence, balance), [STATISTICS and PROBABILITY] (e.g. success is measure) as well as [BUILDING STRUCTURE] (e.g. success is function of, combination of, integration of) evoking the concept of a whole composed of parts. Bearing the hierarchical order in mind, conceptions in round brackets are supposed to be treated as 'mental spaces'.

However, as argued above, the taxonomic, hierarchical order of the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' is only one of the possible relations between them. As shown above, depending on conceptualisation of the schematicity/specificity and complexity of a given conception, 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' may exhibit equal status.

4 The image schemas underlying SUCCESS, and the concept COCONUT

Conceptions mentioned above reveal the following image schemas underlying SUCCESS: SOURCE-PATH-GOAL considering e.g. career achievement, becoming rich, personal growth, journey; FORCE, LINK, BALANCE, GOAL – actions, interactions, CONTAINER – emotions, OBJECTS – results, CONTAINER, LINK, CENTER-PERIPHERY, BALANCE –competences, PART-WHOLE, CONTAINER – building structure, SCALE – measure.

The following considerations focus on the 'image schemas' (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Hampe, 2005) exemplifying their role in the process of mental integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002) as autonomous and separate constructs. The analysis is related to the expression often invoked during presidential campaign in the year 2024:

"You think you just fell out of a coconut tree? You exist in the context of all in which you live and what came before you"¹²,

¹¹ access, 08.07.2025.

¹² a story, told by Kamala Harris (May 2023), the vice president of the USA, after being nominated to run for president, at a swearing-in ceremony of commissioners for the White House Initiative on Advancing Educational Equity, Excellence, and Economic Opportunity

leading to the conceptualisation of SUCCESS and its further evaluation.

Considering (1) *to fall out of a coconut tree*, a three-dimensional object as conceptualisation of the LM_P, *a coconut tree*, emerges on the basis of the embodied experience related to the image schema CONTAINER evoked by the verb *fall out* due to the particle *out* enhanced by the preposition *of*. In an individual conceptualisation this three-dimensional object (*out of* which someone/something can *fall*) may take the form of a BUILDING and more specifically the metaphorical image of a SHELTER. It is worth mentioning that such conceptualisation can be motivated by the symbolics of the 'coconut'.

'Coconut' symbolizes God, good fortune and prosperity (Ahuja et al., 2014, p. 239), and 'coconut palm' – the tree that provides all the necessities of life (India, Malaysia) (each part of the tree is useful to sustain the life: household utensils, baskets, cooking oil, furniture, cosmetics are made from the coconut palm, Ahuja et al., 2014, p. 222), the tree of life or heaven (Philippines), of abundance or three generations tree (Indonesia).

In a conceptualisation of the *coconut tree* based on the aforementioned symbolics the *coconut tree* is imagined as a perfect environment which provides everyone who comes from it with luck, good fortune and prosperity. In this case, the expression *someone falls out of a coconut tree* means a person who lost good fortune and prosperity because of lost LINK to the environment guaranteeing it.

Considering (2) *You think you just fell out of a coconut tree?* that sounds like an allegation due to the initial part *You think you just ...* enhanced by the comment *You exist in the context of all in which you live and what came before you* that sounds like a reproach on what the person to whom the allegation is addressed does not notice but should, the LM_P, *coconut tree*, receives the metaphorical meaning of a 'SPACE NOWHERE', resulting in the metaphorical BUILDING/SHELTER losing its function of a perfect environment, and the image schema of CONTAINER losing boundaries. Because of that, the conceptualisation appears to be of a person who thinks they owe everything (position and success) to themselves only, without any support (contribution of earlier generations, closer and further surroundings, roots and so on).

Examples (1) and (2) are based on the image schemas OBJECT, CONTAINER, PATH and LINK. In (1), however, additionally, the PART-WHOLE image schema is active too.

The implicit Trajector of the verb (TR_V), *someone/something who/what falls out of something*, is a part of the LM_P, *a coconut tree*, perceived on the

for Hispanics. <https://www.today.com/popculture/news/kamala-harris-coconut-tree-meme-rcna163005>, 24.07.2024. Kamala's mother used to say it to remind her daughter in the childhood that she should remember to be the product of her surroundings and people who came before her. <https://www.today.com/parents/kamala-harris-parents-rcna162641?search=kamala%20harris>, access: 24.07.2024.

basis of the image schema of CONTAINER conceptualised as the environment including people, circumstances and opportunities.

The unique colour (black) in Figure 6 symbolises the integrity of the TR_V as a PART and the LM_P as the WHOLE.

Both objects, the TR_V and the LM_P, are related to each other by the PATH based on the corresponding PATH image schema (underlying the meaning of the verb, *fall out*, and the preposition *of*) symbolised by the dashed line. The LINK between both objects becomes broken (following the action of *falling out*) which is symbolised by the broken thick line (Fig. 7).




Fig. 7

Image schemas underlying the meaning of the expression (example 1)

In (2), the TR_V, *you*, and the LM_P, *a coconut tree*, are related by the PATH as well (the dashed line, Fig. 8). However, there is no LINK between them. Due to the context, contained in the comment *You exist in the context of all in which you live and what came before you*, the symbolic content of 'coconut' remains inactive, the LM_P loses its function of a perfect environment, the LINK becomes backgrounded and both objects remain delinked. Bringing in relation practically unrelated objects (the TR_V, a person and the LM_P, a coconut tree) with no LINK emerging between them, contributes to the conceptualisation of the allegation that the TR_V does not appreciate the role of its (her) surroundings in its (her) position and success. Different colours (black and white) of the objects in Figure 8 symbolise the autonomy of the objects.




Fig. 8

Image schemas underlying the meaning of the expression (example 2)

However, despite the lack of the symbolic content of the 'coconut' and the lack of LINK between the TR_V and the LM_P, the reproach contained in the comment *You exist in the context of all in which you live and what came before you* to the allegation *You think you just fell out of a coconut tree?* contributes to the conceptualisation of the TR_V as a successful person. Furthermore, the foregrounded PATH image schema underlying the relation between the TR_V and the LM_P and the backgrounded LINK image schema (no connection between the TR_V and the LM_P) contribute to the meaning of the whole expression the allegation against the TR_V to become successful and thinking that it happened without any support or help. Still, this meaning undergoes (in line with the theory of conceptual integration, Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002) further elaboration resulting in mental spaces of 'being independent', 'being on your own' appearing together with mental spaces of 'good wishes'. And, the mental space SUCCESS starts becoming active too, often together with good wishes for the election, incorporated in the 'coconut', well seen in many memes at that time.

As stated by Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 47) "[b]lends arise in networks of mental spaces".¹³

Conceptualisation of 'coconut' in terms of 'enthusiasm' and 'success' and of the 'coconut tree' as the 'space nowhere' is to trace back to a multistage process of conceptual integration with two input spaces: (1) KAMALA HARRIS' STORY AND HER RUN FOR PRESIDENT (incorporating time and space related to the content of the story and to the story), (2) ALLEGATION AND REPROACH (incorporating the relation of intentionality). The allegation concerns the conceptualisation of coming from nowhere, and the reproach concerns dissatisfaction that the TR_V doesn't appreciate the role of its (her) surroundings (Fig. 9).

Both input spaces are connected by the relation of property. The notion of 'success' is implicitly present in the allegation, indirectly confirming TR_V as being successful. The mapping of the generic space (with concepts related to 'body language', 'appearance', 'voice' and 'tone') onto both input spaces causes the emergence of the blend in which (i) 'coconut' contributes conceptualisations of 'enthusiasm' and 'success', (ii) 'coconut tree' conceptualisation of a 'space nowhere' and (iii) 'ignoring of the surrounding' (combined

¹³ There are at least two input spaces with a partial matching between them. "At any moment in the construction of the network, the structure that inputs seem to share is captured in a generic space, which, in turn, maps onto each of the inputs. A given element in the generic space maps onto paired counterparts in the two input spaces. (...) In blending, structure from two input mental spaces is projected to a new space, the blend. Generic spaces and blended spaces are related: Blends contain generic structure captured in the generic space but also contain more specific structure, and they can contain structure that is impossible for the inputs (...)" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 47).

with (i) and (ii)) brings up the conceptualisation of 'independence' and 'being on one's own' and its further elaboration including 'support' and 'wish for success' (Fig. 10).




Fig. 9

The input spaces and relations working inside them in the network related to example (2)




Fig. 10

The network of conceptual integration related to example (2)

Conclusions

In relation to the research question of whether the structures in issue should be viewed as a taxonomy or a network, first of all the following differences are to be taken into account:

- (i) the difference related to the flexibility: 'image schemas' as gestalts are stable, and 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' are dynamically changeable,
- (ii) the difference related to the impact of conceptualisations: 'image schemas' remain unaffected while 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' differ in their schematicity/specificity and conceptual complexity depending on conceptualisation,
- (iii) the difference related to the dual nature of the image schemas: 'image schemas' are autonomous and separate constructs, at the same time incorporated in the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' constituting the foundation for them.

Because of these differences establishing one unique taxonomy is difficult due to the dual nature of 'image schemas' as well as to the rather relational than gradable organisation of the 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces'.

Thus, a taxonomy as discussed above inspired by Kövecses (2020) appears as an option, but as shown, it is only one possible arrangement among other constellations 'image schemas', 'domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' may form in the network. 'Domains', 'frames' and 'mental spaces' create an intertwined dynamic network, where particular structures can be larger, smaller or equal if compare to each other, and 'image schemas' function both outside of and inside the network.

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