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**Multilingualism in Ukraine from a
transdisciplinary perspective**

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Preface

The topic of this dissertation was chosen when the Russian language maintained a dominant position in Ukraine. At that time, the status of Ukrainian was comparatively limited, and questions of its promotion and functional expansion were of considerable importance. Issues such as the presence of Ukrainian in publishing, cultural production, audiovisual media, and digital environments were widely discussed in both academic and public discourse.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 substantially altered the sociolinguistic landscape of the country. Processes that had previously been gradual accelerated: the Ukrainian language expanded its presence in public life, while Russian began to decline in usage. Ukrainian also acquired increased symbolic value, becoming strongly associated with statehood and national identity.

At present, Ukrainian is recognized not only as the state language but also as a central factor of societal cohesion. Although a significant share of the population continues to speak Russian, there is a marked trend toward the adoption of Ukrainian across multiple domains. Survey data and recent sociolinguistic studies demonstrate that many families no longer prioritize intergenerational transmission of Russian, instead choosing Ukrainian as the primary language of education and everyday communication.

The aim of this dissertation is to analyze these processes systematically and to assess how the population understands the role of Ukrainian as the state language. The study investigates the dynamics of bilingualism and language attitudes, with the goal of establishing to what extent language is perceived as a crucial element of national identity in contemporary Ukraine.

List of Abbreviations

- ELF – English as a *lingua franca*
- EU – European Union
- L1 – First Language
- L2 – Second Language
- NAWA – Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange
- NANU – National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
- PROM – International academic mobility program funded by NAWA
- RLF – Russian as a *lingua franca*
- SLA – Second Language Acquisition
- TSN – Television News Service (Ukrainian TV channel)
- UJD – Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa
- UN – United Nations
- UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

Ukraine's linguistic landscape is characterized by a complex interplay between Ukrainian, Russian and other languages. Since the independence in 1991, the status and use of the Ukrainian language have remained subjects of heated political and scholarly debate. On the one hand, the constitution designates Ukrainian as the sole state language. On the other hand, historical legacies of Russification and persistent bilingualism mean that Russian continues to be widely used in many domains of public and private life. The long-term absence of a clear, consistent language policy has led to profound uncertainty regarding the place of Ukrainian and Russian in post-Soviet nation building.

This dissertation is motivated by a pressing need to understand how bilingualism, diglossia and multilingualism manifest in contemporary Ukraine and how sociolinguistic attitudes are shifting in response to unprecedented historical events. Existing research has documented the prevalence of bilingualism and the political instrumentalisation of language, yet few studies have approached the topic from a transdisciplinary perspective that integrates linguistics, history, politics, sociology and psychology. Moreover, the phenomenon of *Russian as a lingua franca* (RLF) in the post-Soviet space has rarely been explored, even though it plays a central role in the daily interactions of millions of Ukrainians. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 has accelerated sociolinguistic change, triggering a mass shift from Russian to Ukrainian in many spheres. Understanding these processes requires both empirical data and a holistic theoretical framework.

The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze the phenomena of bilingualism and diglossia in Ukraine, to investigate the language behavior and attitudes of Ukrainian citizens in the context of war and social transformation, and to examine the role of English as the most studied foreign language in Ukraine.

Specifically, this research has the following goals:

- to systematize the conceptual framework related to bilingualism, diglossia and code-switching;

- to analyze the historical formation of Ukraine's language situation;
- to describe the current sociolinguistic landscape and its regional variation;
- to evaluate the factors that influence speakers' language choices;
- to explain how Russian war crimes have motivated a shift from Russian to Ukrainian;
- to assess the status of English during wartime.

To accomplish these tasks, I have formulated the following research questions and hypotheses listed in (1):

(1) Research questions and hypotheses

- a. What is the role of Russian as a *lingua franca* (RLF) in post-Soviet Ukraine, and how has its function and perception changed in the context of the 2022–2025 war?
- b. What are the key classifications of bilingualism and diglossia, and how can they be applied to the Ukrainian context?
- c. How did historical policies of Russification shape the current language situation?
- d. How widespread are bilingualism and diglossia in Kyiv today?
- e. Have the events of 2022–2025 led to a statistically significant increase in the everyday use of Ukrainian among formerly Russian-speaking citizens?
- f. What role does English play in Ukraine's linguistic ecology, and has its status changed because of the war?

This study adopts a mixed-methods approach. Theoretical chapters synthesize linguistic and sociological literature, while the empirical chapter presents data from an anonymous survey conducted among residents of Kyiv in 2023. The survey collected information about respondents' demographic background, self-reported language competence, usage patterns in formal and informal contexts and attitudes towards Ukrainian, Russian and English. Statistical analysis was used to test the hypotheses and identify correlations between language behavior and factors such as age, education and wartime experience.

In addition to presenting a theoretical overview, this dissertation contributes original empirical evidence. The 2023 Kyiv survey (N = 300) is used not only to document present-day practices but also to generate comparative insights against earlier nationally representative surveys (2006; 2017).

This comparative perspective enables a cautious longitudinal reading of changes in language attitudes and everyday choices. Throughout, the literature review is treated as a critical synthesis that establishes conceptual anchors (bilingualism, diglossia, code-switching, language ideology) and motivates the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. The aim is thus not a mere summary, but an argumentative framework that directly informs the empirical analysis.

In this dissertation, I adopt a *transdisciplinary* perspective. It is important to clarify this term and distinguish it from the notion of *interdisciplinarity*. An interdisciplinary approach involves the cooperation of several disciplines while each of them largely retains its own concepts and methods (Repko & Szostak, 2021). In contrast, a transdisciplinary approach creates an integrative conceptual framework that transcends disciplinary boundaries and enables a holistic analysis of a complex phenomenon (Nicolescu, 2014; Max-Neef, 2005).

For the study of multilingualism in Ukraine, a transdisciplinary perspective is indispensable, since the linguistic situation cannot be understood without taking into account its historical development, sociopolitical context, and psychological as well as cultural dimensions. This integrative approach allows me to link sociolinguistic data with historical legacies and current political realities, thereby providing a comprehensive analysis of language practices and attitudes in wartime Ukraine.

The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the definitions, classifications and psychological aspects of bilingualism and diglossia. Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of the language situation in Ukraine, from the medieval Kyiv to the post-independence period. Chapter 3 describes the current language situation, drawing on sociolinguistic surveys and highlighting the spread of the Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism, regional differences and the impact of the 2022 invasion. Chapter 4 presents the methodology, results and discussion of the empirical study. The Conclusion summarizes the main findings, discusses their implications for language policy and suggests directions for future research.

Chapter 1: The concept of bilingualism and diglossia in a modern sociolinguistic research

The goal of this chapter is to provide the necessary background related to the main topic of this dissertation. Section 1.1 retraces the historical development of bilingualism research and presents an overview of the literature that by now has become classic in the field. Section 1.2 clarifies the core definitions of bilingualism and related phenomena. Section 1.3 presents prominent classifications of bilingualism and its working definition adopted in this study. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 then discuss diglossia and code-switching as special cases of bilingual practice. Finally, Section 1.6 examines translanguaging and language ideologies, setting the stage for the empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.

1.1 History of studying the phenomenon of bilingualism

The peculiarities of the Ukrainian language situation, the lack of an adequate language policy, insufficient public awareness of language issues, and a misunderstanding of the concept of bilingualism necessitate an analysis of the phenomena of bilingualism and diglossia.

The tradition of studying bilingualism in foreign linguistics has evolved over a long period. Notable contributions to the field were made by scholars such as Weinreich (1979), Baker (2001), Grosjean (1984), Haugen (1953), Schuchardt (1950), Ferguson (1971), Fishman (2016), Bell (1980), Lambert (2003), and others. These linguists analyzed the phenomena of bilingualism and diglossia, classified them, and examined issues such as linguistic interference, the linguistic behavior of bilinguals, the influence of bilingualism on intellectual development, and the psychology of the linguistic personality.

In Soviet linguistics, the foundations of bilingualism studies were established in the works of Baudouin de Courtenay (1963), Scherba (1974), Fortunatov, Shakhmatov, Bogoroditsky, and others. However, systematic sociolinguistic research emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, Soviet scholars such as Aurorin (1972), Desheriev (1976), Nikolsky (1978), Vereshchagin (2014), Akhmanova (1969), Zhluktenko (1974), and Semchynski (1974) focused primarily on the theoretical issues of sociolinguistics, developing its conceptual framework and analyzing

bilingualism from a purely theoretical perspective, often based on foreign research or the linguistic situations in other countries.

However, in Soviet sociolinguistics, the issue of bilingualism was largely politically motivated. In the USSR, the bilingualism of non-Russian people was treated as a positive phenomenon. It was believed that two languages could coexist in the same environment without conflict. Furthermore, there was a prevailing notion that it was possible to have more than one native language, which could change over a person's lifetime. This view was convenient in light of the policy of Russification, as it portrayed bilingualism as a harmonious and resolved issue.

In addition to linguistics, psychologists also study bilingualism. Russian psychologists such as Vygotsky (1934), Luria (1979), and Leontiev (1978) explored the psychological aspects of bilingual language behavior. Their work continues to contribute to our understanding of mechanisms like code-switching and the motivations behind language choice in bilinguals.

Several Ukrainian linguists have also contributed to the study of bilingualism, including Masenko (2010), Tkachenko (2004), Shumarova (2000), Radevych-Vynnytsky (2011), Cherednichenko (2002), Taranenko (2010), Yavorskaya (2000), Trub (2000), Sokolova (2012), Burda (2001), Ruda (2012), Danylevska (2019), Panasyuk (2013), and others.

Modern Ukrainian sociolinguistic studies are primarily characterized by their applied orientation, addressing concrete issues such as lexicography, language policy, and the analysis of bilingual practices. Scholars compile dictionaries of socially marked vocabulary (Stavytska, 2005), investigate the language of the Ukrainian diaspora (Azhnyuk, 1999), provide practical recommendations for effective language policy (Masenko, 1999), describe the language situation in Ukraine and its individual regions through various sociolinguistic surveys (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002; Sokolova, 2012; Tkachuk, 2013), explore bilingualism in connection with the conceptual worldview (Cherednichenko, 2002), analyze the phenomenon of *surzhyk*, a mixed Ukrainian–Russian vernacular (Trub, 2000; Masenko, 2011), and examine the linguistic competence of individuals (Shumarova, 2000).

In recent decades, several large-scale sociological studies have been conducted that have enabled linguists to describe the language situation in Ukraine. Notably, in 2000, the Center for Sociological Research “Public Opinion” of the Research Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of

Kyiv conducted a sociolinguistic analysis of the language situation in the capital, where a mass survey identified trends in the use of the Ukrainian language. Between 2006 and 2008, the study of the language situation was carried out within the project “Language Policy in Ukraine: Anthropological, Linguistic Aspects and Future Perspectives”, led by Professor Besters-Dilger, who provided a detailed description of the language situation in Ukraine (Besters-Dilger, 2010). In 2017, a major sociolinguistic study was conducted with support from the Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project “Bi- and multilingualism between intensification and resolution of the language conflict. Ethnolinguistic conflicts, language policy and contact situations in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia”. The survey materials provided valuable insights into the prevalence of Ukrainian, Russian, and other languages in different regions of Ukraine, the communicative power of Ukrainian and Russian, the level of linguistic conflict, the evaluative characteristics of both languages, and more.

1.2 The analysis of the category of bilingualism

As a scientific phenomenon, the term “bilingualism” has long been used in linguistics, although there are significant discrepancies in its interpretation. Apart from subjective reasons related to the language policies of individual countries, there are several objective factors that influence the definition of this concept. Therefore, bilingualism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that interests not only linguists but also sociologists, psychologists, and others, and it is studied from linguistic, sociolinguistic, and psychological perspectives. Since each of these fields has its own views on the issues of bilingualism, this topic requires some generalizations.

There are several definitions of bilingualism. In particular, the definition by the American linguist Weinreich (1979), who referred to it as “the practice of alternation between two languages”, is widely accepted. Foreign scholars have also paid significant attention to the issue of bilingualism. For example, Grosjean (1984) argued that bilingual individuals are those who use two or more languages in everyday life. Bloomfield (1933) defined bilingualism as the ability to speak two languages at a native speaker level. Haugen (1953) described it as the ability to form complete and meaningful expressions in another language. Baker (2001) stated that the term “bilingualism” is used to describe two languages coexisting in the mind of an individual.

The analysis of bilingualism in Soviet linguistics is important. For example, Desheriev (1976) understood bilingualism as the possession of two languages. Aurorin (1972) emphasized that

bilingualism begins when the proficiency in the second language approaches the level of the first language. Akhmanova (1969) considered bilingualism to be the same as mastery of two languages. Daurova (1964) noted that bilingualism involves the free mastery of two languages, one of which is native and passed down through generations, while the other is foreign. Ushakov (1996) interpreted bilingualism as the presence of two equal languages within a country or region, as well as their free use in daily life. Bondaletov (1987) described bilingualism as the coexistence of two languages in the consciousness of individuals or an entire nation, where one is native, and the other is acquired. In the dictionary of sociolinguistic terms and the “Language and Society” encyclopedia (2006), bilingualism is defined as the ability to speak an additional language alongside the native language at a level that allows communication with members of another ethnic group in one or more spheres of communication and the use of both languages within one linguistic community. Thus, the understanding of bilingualism in all of these definitions is based on the level of proficiency in both languages—the native and the foreign.

Another interpretation of bilingualism is its portrayal as the alternation of two languages within a single linguistic environment. For instance, Brytsyn (2004) defines bilingualism as “the practice of individual or collective use of two languages within one state or social community in specific communicative spheres”. Schweizer and Nikolsky (1978) emphasized that bilingualism is the coexistence of two languages within a group of people, who use these languages in various communicative contexts depending on the social situation and other parameters of the communicative act. Kudukhov (1979) viewed bilingualism as the interaction of two languages within one linguistic group. Thus, in numerous definitions, bilingualism is conceptualized not primarily as a level of linguistic competence in two codes, but as the actual alternation of these codes within communicative practice.

Another controversial issue in sociolinguistics concerns how many internal lexicons bilingual individuals possess. Some researchers argue that all linguistic information is stored in a single semantic system: words of both languages in the minds of bilingual individuals are organized into one large lexicon, with each word linked to a specific language. Others believe that bilinguals have two lexicons, meaning that information received in one language is accessed through a translation process. A third view is that bilinguals possess three lexicons. The first is conceptual, associated

with the general knowledge of the bilingual person about the world around them, while the other two are specific to each language (Grosjean, 2017).

Thus, the variety of opinions regarding the basis of bilingualism, as well as differing views on the linguistic identity of bilinguals and their linguistic consciousness, reflects the significant interest researchers have in this phenomenon. However, despite the large number of works on these issues, many contradictions remain regarding the concept of bilingualism.

It is important to emphasize that in the scientific literature the term “bilingualism” is generally considered in two aspects: as a social phenomenon and as an individual characteristic. Individual bilingualism represents the concrete manifestation of social bilingualism. Thus, bilingualism in a group necessarily implies bilingualism among its members. However, not every country where two languages are in use can be considered bilingual. For example, a country where different languages coexist but individual bilingualism is absent merely indicates that the population is divided into several monolingual groups with their own social and communicative systems. Similarly, individual bilingualism alone does not imply that society as a whole is bilingual (Schweizer & Nikolsky, 1978).

The existence of bilingualism is influenced by various psychological and sociocultural factors, a point emphasized by Weinreich (1953), Haugen (1956), and Grosjean (2010). In particular, researchers argue that the choice of a language code in a bilingual situation is conditioned by extralinguistic factors such those in (2) below:

(2) Extralinguistic factors in bilingualism

- a. Age and gender of bilingual individuals
- b. Duration of bilingual perception
- c. Communication situation
- d. Psychological comfort
- e. Neurological factors (children learning a second language formally tend to store it in a different brain region than those who acquire it naturally, where it is processed alongside the native language)
- f. A bipolar national worldview

Grosjean (2017) identifies other factors that determine the use of a particular language. These include participants in the interaction (their usual language of communication, language competence, language preferences, socio-economic status, age, gender, profession, education), the situation of interaction (place, level of formality and privacy), the content of the conversation (topic, vocabulary used), and the functions of communication (transmitting communicative information, creating distance between interlocutors, etc.). This makes it clear that the choice of language in a bilingual environment is an individual process that shapes the linguistic behavior of speakers and depends on numerous psychological and sociolinguistic aspects.

Overall, bilingualism is an extremely widespread phenomenon in the world. Interestingly, this is not dependent on the level of education of the speakers, as even non-literate people can be bilingual. According to many estimates, a substantial share of the world's population is bilingual, and in numerous contexts, bilinguals even outnumber monolinguals (Grosjean, 2010). In Polish linguistics, Lipińska (2003) and Miodunka (1997, 1999) emphasize bilingualism in diaspora contexts, which parallels Ukrainian experiences.

Approximately 56% of Europeans are bilingual, and this trend continues to grow: every five years, the number of bilinguals increases by 9% (Language and Society, 2016). Multilingualism is generally regarded as a positive phenomenon, as it broadens the worldview of speakers and enhances their intellectual experience. However, there are languages at risk of extinction due to their limited competitiveness in bilingual settings. UNESCO reports concerning statistics in this regard: more than 50% of the world's 6,700 languages are on the brink of extinction (UNESCO, 2023).

Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that while individual bilingualism is a positive phenomenon, mass bilingualism can pose a threat to national identity. Bilingualism often results from a country's colonial past, where the second language gradually takes over the functions of the first, potentially leading to the extinction of the latter. Most foreign sociolinguists define mass bilingualism, experienced by certain national communities, as a transitional stage in the assimilation process, where one language supplants another. Azarova (2015) argues that one of the consequences of bilingualism is the loss of national identity and the fragmentation of the speaker's inner world.

Thus, I can conclude that the concept of bilingualism is understood both broadly and narrowly. In its broad sense, bilingualism refers to fluency in two languages (native and acquired). The speaker possesses some level of proficiency in both languages and can use them, regardless of their language competence. In its narrow sense, bilingualism is the practice of alternating between two languages within a single communicative environment. This duality is also reflected in sociolinguistic essays on the role of Ukrainian in school education at the beginning of the 21st century (Danilevskaya, 2019).

1.3 Classifications of bilingualism

Given the significant interest among scholars in the phenomenon of bilingualism, many classifications have emerged, each based on various factors that influence bilingualism in distinct ways. One key factor in classification is the distinction between bilingualism as an individual trait versus as a feature of a group, community, or country. This leads to the differentiation between individual and mass bilingualism. Individual bilingualism refers to the fluency and use of two languages by individuals within a primarily monolingual community (Masenko, 1999). Mass or total bilingualism, on the other hand, can apply to the population of a specific region or an entire country. If bilingualism is widespread across all socio-cultural groups, it is termed complete or continuous bilingualism. However, if it is prevalent only among specific social strata, it is referred to as partial or group bilingualism (Bondaletov, 1987).

Another classification is based on the psycholinguistic aspect of how two language systems interact within the consciousness of a bilingual person. Views differ among scholars on whether these two language systems function as a unified whole or remain separate. Weinreich (1953), followed by Belikov and Krysin (2001), and Zagnitko (2007), propose three types of bilingualism, as in (3):

(3) Types of bilingualism according to Weinreich (1953)

- a. Coordinative bilingualism: In this case, the two language systems are separate, with independent semantic bases and grammatical categories for each language.
- b. Mixed bilingualism: Here, the two languages merge into one system, with a single semantic base, and the languages differ only at the surface structure level.
- c. Subordinate bilingualism: In this case, the second language system is completely built on the structure of the first language.

Alternatively, Bondaletov (1987) distinguishes only two types of bilingualism: mixed and pure, suggesting that pure bilingualism is likely an exception.

Semchynski (1974), in turn, distinguishes the following types of bilingualism listed in (4):

(4) Types of bilingualism according to Semchynski (1974)

- a. Pure or ideal bilingualism: In this type, the language mechanisms in the mind of the bilingual individual exist independently without any interconnection.
- b. Coordinative bilingualism: Two different languages are used by the bilingual in distinct situations, establishing correspondences between them, leading to possible interference in both directions under favorable conditions.
- c. Subordinate bilingualism: In this type, the bilingual's knowledge of the two language systems differs, and social factors contribute to the predominant use of one language

Weinreich (1979) offers classifications that are noteworthy as they differentiate bilingualism based on several factors. One such factor is the sequence in which language codes are learned. Based on this criterion, languages are classified into the first, second, third, and subsequent languages. Another common criterion for classifying bilingualism is the age at which an individual acquires the second language. Some researchers distinguish early, adolescent, and youthful bilingualism (Language and Society, 2016). Others categorize bilingualism as either child or adult bilingualism, with clear differences between the two forms. The child form is characterized by the simultaneous acquisition of the national language and another language prevalent in a particular group, resulting in a conditional gradation between the two. The adult form, by contrast, involves the conscious assimilation of language rules, typically through formal study, which produces a more obvious gradation between the two languages (Istomina, 2012). Ellis (1994) provides a detailed overview of the processes and factors influencing second language acquisition, further highlighting the differences between natural and classroom-based learning.

In addition to the structural classification into coordinate, compound and subordinate types, Weinreich (1953) also proposed another criterion based on the method of acquisition. According to this criterion, bilingualism can be divided into *natural bilingualism* (when a person acquires a second language through immersion) and *artificial bilingualism* (when a second language is learned formally, e.g. through schooling or textbooks). The latter group includes those who learn

a foreign language within their native linguistic environment, such as students who study foreign languages in school. These forms are often referred to as *specifically studied* and *spontaneously acquired bilingualism* (Istomina, 2012; Uzunov, 2014).

Bilingualism can also be classified based on the importance of the languages to the individual. This criterion distinguishes *primary* and *auxiliary* languages (Uzunov, 2014). Additionally, bilingualism can be divided into *full* and *partial* types. Full bilingualism refers to the use of two languages equally well, while partial bilingualism involves fluency in one language as native while the other undergoes phonetic, grammatical, and lexical interference (Uzunov, 2014). Some scholars further distinguish between *symmetrical* and *asymmetrical* bilingualism, with symmetrical bilingualism referring to individuals who are equally competent in both languages. However, not all scholars agree with this distinction. Masenko (2010), for instance, argues that achieving equal proficiency in two languages is impossible, suggesting that bilingualism tends to involve unequal command of the two languages.

In the context of bilingualism, Baker's (2001) book is notable for outlining various classifications based on previous research. Among these, Baker distinguishes between *elective* and *circumstantial bilingualism*. Elective bilingualism refers to individuals who learn a second language by choice, such as students selecting a language to study in school, without losing proficiency in their first language. In contrast, circumstantial bilingualism is often seen in immigrants who, due to migration, use a foreign language for most communication but continue speaking their native language in informal contexts to avoid its extinction. Baker notes that elective bilingualism is associated with choice, whereas circumstantial bilingualism is often a survival mechanism in a new environment (Baker, 2001).

Baker also identifies *minimum* and *maximum* bilingualism, based on Diebold's classification. *Maximum bilingualism* refers to individuals who are proficient in both languages, while *minimum bilingualism* (also called incipient or initial bilingualism by Diebold) applies to those with basic knowledge of a second language, such as tourists who can communicate using simple phrases. These individuals may not have full proficiency but can manage basic interactions in a foreign country (Diebold, 1961).

Additionally, some scholars distinguish between *balanced* and *unbalanced bilingualism*, based on linguistic competence. *Balanced bilingualism* is an idealized concept, referring to individuals

who are equally proficient in both languages. In practice, many bilinguals use each language for different purposes, resulting in *unbalanced bilingualism*, where one language is dominant. Fishman (1971) emphasizes that bilinguals often use their languages for different needs, making true balanced bilingualism rare.

A special case of bilingualism is *passive (receptive) bilingualism*, where an individual can understand a second language but does not produce it. *Two-way passive bilingualism* occurs when each person in a conversation uses their own language, yet both participants understand each other's language. This is sometimes called *duolinguism* (Belikov, 2001). In contrast, *active bilingualism* refers to the ability to actively communicate in a second language. In American sociolinguistics, *active* and *passive* bilingualism are referred to as *receptive* and *productive* bilingualism, respectively (Bhatia & Ritchie, 2013). Some researchers (Vereshchagin, Selivanova) introduce a third category, *reproductive bilingualism*, which involves reproducing what is heard in a foreign language without being able to speak it fluently (Language and Society, 2016).

Interestingly, some sociolinguists use active and passive bilingualism to refer to the frequency with which languages are used. In this sense, active bilingualism means regular use of both languages, while passive bilingualism refers to a situation where one language is used more frequently than the other (Language and Society, 2016).

There are also other less common classifications of bilingualism. For example, Istomina divides bilingualism into *oral* (fluency in spoken language), *written* (knowledge of writing systems, grammar rules, and vocabulary), and *dual* bilingualism (proficiency in both oral and written forms) (Istomina, 2012).

Regarding the nature of bilingualism, some researchers distinguish between *unilateral* and *bilateral* types. Unilateral bilingualism occurs when one person speaks two languages while the other speaks only one, often in situations where one language is dominant. An example is national bilingualism, such as Tatar-Russian or Yakut-Russian bilingualism. In bilateral bilingualism, both communicants speak both languages and choose which one to use based on the situation (Istomina, 2012).

Another classification based on the degree of second language proficiency is made by Bertagaev, who distinguishes between *normalized*, *unilateral normalized*, and *non-normalized*

bilingualism. Normalized bilingualism follows the grammatical, lexical, and phonetic norms of both languages. Unilateral normalized bilingualism involves adhering to the norms of only one language, usually the native language. Non-normalized bilingualism occurs when the second language is used with errors in its norms, either partially or entirely (Bertagayev, 1972).

Finally, bilingualism can be classified by the nature of the languages involved, such as *homogeneous* (languages from the same family, e.g., Ukrainian-Russian) and *heterogeneous* (languages from different families, e.g., Russian-Tatar) *bilingualism* (Istomina, 2012).

Psychological aspects of bilingualism are often key to its classification. The order in which languages are acquired is important: *simultaneous bilingualism* (acquiring both languages from birth or early childhood) versus *sequential bilingualism* (learning one language after the other).

Bilingualism can be classified in various ways depending on the criteria used. Each classification serves to highlight different aspects of how bilingualism functions in individuals and societies, offering valuable insights into language acquisition, usage, and its psychological impact.

Lambert proposed a classification of bilingualism that distinguishes between two types: *additive* and *subtractive*. The essence of this classification lies in how the acquisition of a second language affects the first language. In some cases, learning another language expands the individual's linguistic repertoire, while in others, it leads to changes in the first language. In other words, when the first language remains dominant and the knowledge of the second language does not replace it, bilingualism is considered additive, often accompanied by a positive cognitive effect. Conversely, when the second language displaces the first, leading to a reduction in proficiency or use of the first language, bilingualism is subtractive, which has a negative impact (Lambert, 1956).

Special attention should be given to Bell's classification, which is based on an individual's attitude towards each of the cultures. According to Bell, there are three types of bilingualism. The first is *monocultural-coordinative bilingualism*, which occurs when an individual learns a second language for a specific utilitarian purpose, such as acquiring necessary information or addressing theoretical problems. In this case, the individual's focus is on linguistic knowledge alone, without an interest in the cultural aspects of the language. The second type is *bicultural-coordinative bilingualism*, where the individual learns not only the linguistic features of another language but also its cultural elements. This type of bilingualism arises when the purpose is cultural and

cognitive, such as traveling or getting to know a particular people, thus making the individual both linguistically and culturally competent. The third type is *mixed-bicultural bilingualism*, which typically applies to immigrants who have mastered both the language and culture of their home and the foreign society they have integrated into. These individuals are carriers of two linguistic and cultural codes (Bell, 1980).

Burda, a Ukrainian researcher, offers a classification that also takes cultural values into account but differs slightly from Bell's. Burda distinguishes between *monocultural* and *bicultural bilingualism*. Monocultural bilingualism, which combines the first two types from Bell's classification, occurs when an individual learns a second language for a specific purpose. This type typically involves limited proficiency in the second language, often only receptive knowledge, and is generally associated with individual bilingualism. In contrast, bicultural bilingualism is found in people who must learn a second language that is dominant in a given society for various reasons, often to integrate into a new cultural and linguistic environment. This aligns with Bell's concept of mixed-bicultural bilingualism. In this case, there is a high level of proficiency in the second language (productive bilingualism), and it can be linked to both individual and mass bilingualism (Burda, 2001).

1.4 Diglossia as a type of bilingualism

The concept of diglossia remains subject to differing interpretations among scholars, and there is no single consensus on its definition. The reason for this divergence lies in the varied understandings of what the term entails.

The term “diglossia” (from the Greek *δία* - bilingual, and *γλωσσά* - language; literally “bilingualism”) was introduced in 1959 by the American linguist Ferguson, who defined it as the use of two or more varieties of the same language by speakers in different circumstances (Ferguson, 1959). According to Ferguson, diglossia is a diachronically stable variant of bilingualism. He analyzed this phenomenon with reference to the functional distribution of language variants in Arabic, German in Switzerland, and French and Creole in Haiti. In these cases, different varieties of one language, rather than entirely distinct languages, are used in various contexts.

Fishman made a significant contribution to the development of the concept by expanding it. He argued that diglossia not only involves the use of different forms of a single language but can also

include the use of different languages. According to Fishman, diglossia exists both in multilingual societies that officially recognize multiple languages and in those that are multilingual in terms of dialects, registers, or functionally differentiated varieties of any language (Fishman, 2016).

Subsequent studies of diglossia have followed different theoretical approaches. Some scholars interpret diglossia as the use of entirely different languages, while others see it as the use of different varieties of one language. For instance, Paul describes diglossia as vertical bilingualism, which occurs within the dialects of a single language rather than across different languages (The Linguistics Encyclopedia, 1995). Schweizer and Nikolsky (1978) define it as the use of two types of language within a single group, depending on the communicative sphere, social situation, and other parameters of the communicative act. Bondaletov (1987) also adheres to this view. Scholars have also distinguished various types of diglossia based on the richness of social and territorial language varieties, such as codified literary language and colloquial language, literary language and koine, literary language and vernacular, literary language and pidgin, literary language and Creole, dialects of one language, dialect and local koine, territorial dialect and literary language, and other varieties (Bondaletov, 1987). These definitions show that diglossia often refers to the existence of multiple forms of a language.

However, most sociolinguists argue that the situation where both literary language and its dialects coexist does not qualify as diglossia. In light of this, the American linguist Kloss proposed distinguishing between internal and external diglossia. He refers to the situation described by Ferguson as internal diglossia, whereas interactions between unrelated languages or very distantly related languages are considered external diglossia (Kloss, 1966). Russian linguists Belikov and Krysin (2001) support this distinction, as do the authors of the Dictionary of Sociolinguistic Terms, who define fluency in different languages as diglossia, and fluency in different subsystems of a single national language as intralinguistic diglossia (Dictionary of Sociolinguistic Terms, 2006).

Despite extensive studies of the diglossia phenomenon, no consensus has emerged regarding its definition in Ukrainian linguistics. Most definitions combine different variants of the same language (narrow understanding) with entirely different languages (broad understanding). For example, the Ukrainian Language Encyclopedia defines diglossia as “a linguistic situation in which two languages or two forms of one language perform different functions within a society. The concept of diglossia as a sociolinguistic phenomenon implies, in contrast to bilingualism or

multilingualism, an evaluative opposition between two functional types of language in society: high (including solemn, literary) and low (simple, colloquial)” (Ukrainian Language Encyclopedia, 2004).

Ferguson (1959) also made a significant contribution to the theory of diglossia by listing nine features that characterize a diglossic situation, as in (5):

(5) Features of diglossia according to Ferguson (1959)

- a. Two language codes specialized for specific functions.
- b. The more widely used language is always more prestigious.
- c. The prestigious language has a rich literary heritage.
- d. The language code with less prestige is often the first language learned.
- e. The prestigious code is supported by formal study and standardization.
- f. The use and functions of both languages are diachronically stable.
- g. The prestigious code has a more developed grammatical structure.
- h. The lexical composition of both codes is similar, but the prestigious code is richer.
- i. The phonology of the prestigious code was originally a subsystem of the secondary code.

Belarusian researcher Mechkovskaya (2001) identifies similar reasons characteristic of diglossia, as in (6):

(6) Characteristic of diglossia according to Mechkovskaya (2001)

- a. The functional distribution of languages, where one is used in “high” spheres, and the other in everyday communication;
- b. The prestige of the high literary language;
- c. The supra-ethnic nature of the prestigious language;
- d. The artificial (school-based) nature of the study of the prestigious language.

Burda offers a similar perspective, analyzing the functional distribution of languages in a diglossic situation. She notes that the dominant language typically covers a broader range of functions, while the secondary language is used only in specific areas. According to Burda, the dominant language has a high level of prestige and communicative significance, which leads to a

positive image and a focus on mandatory learning. The distribution of language functions between the two codes is influenced primarily by external factors (political, socio-economic, and cultural), diglossic policies, and ideologies, which shape social stereotypes about the languages involved (Burda, 2001).

Given the above, it is clear that the core features of diglossia include a conscious attitude toward each language, with each one being assigned to a specific communicative sphere. In a diglossic situation, the two languages are subject to evaluative opposition in the speaker's mind, with clear distinctions between official and informal, prestigious and non-prestigious, high and low registers. In contrast, bilingualism implies the equal use of two languages in different communicative contexts without a conscious differentiation between them. Thus, if bilingualism is viewed as the practice of switching between language codes in a single language environment, diglossia involves the deliberate choice of a specific language to achieve communicative success in a particular situation.

It is important to note that diglossia rarely exists in its pure form; more often, its features are combined with non-diglossic monolingual situations or bilingualism. Fishman identifies four possible language situations where bilingualism and diglossia can coexist or occur separately. The first situation is one where both individual bilingualism and diglossia coexist, with languages clearly demarcated in terms of their functions (for instance, the high language is used in education and the judiciary, while the low language is used in home and family settings). The second situation, according to Fishman, is characterized solely by diglossia without bilingualism, where one group of speakers uses one language, while another group uses a different language, and the two do not intersect. The third situation is bilingualism without diglossia, where both languages are used equally, without functional distinctions. This is an unstable state, as speakers alternate between languages, leading to the potential extinction of the weaker language. The fourth situation occurs in a monolingual society, where neither bilingualism nor diglossia is present (Fishman, 2016).

On this basis, Burda distinguishes between different types of bilingualism: full diglossic bilingualism, partial diglossic bilingualism, and non-diglossic bilingualism. Burda explains that when one language completely displaces another in certain spheres of public life, this is referred to as complete diglossic bilingualism. Partial diglossic bilingualism occurs when one language

dominates in certain areas but does not completely eliminate the other. Non-diglossic bilingualism refers to situations where both languages perform the same functions. It follows that not all forms of bilingualism are diglossic. However, non-diglossic bilingualism is rare, as there are clear tendencies toward functional language distribution and the development of diglossic bilingualism (Burda, 2001).

There are instances where bilingualism exists independently of diglossia, as bilingualism does not necessarily involve a functional distribution of languages. However, it is common for both bilingualism and diglossia to coexist, as speakers often choose a particular language code to meet their specific communicative needs.

In conclusion, bilingualism is the result of an individual or society using two language codes, while diglossia reflects the evaluation of this distribution according to prevailing standards, assigning each language a specific position in the individual's scale of values, as well as to specific communicative spheres. Thus, both phenomena often complement each other and coexist within the same communicative environment.

1.5 Processes of switching language codes under bilingual conditions

In communication, bilingual individuals can easily switch language codes to optimize understanding and improve mutual communication. In sociolinguistics, a code is defined as any form of language (natural or artificial, including sign languages or Morse code) that serves as a means of communication (Braha, 2012). Language code-switching refers to the transition of a speaker from one language (or dialect or style) to another depending on the communication context. This phenomenon, called code-switching, began to attract systematic scholarly attention in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Labov, 1972; Fishman, 1967; Gumperz, 1964, 1982). Jacobson (1977) is credited as one of the first to compile a detailed volume devoted entirely to the study of code-switching.

In a bilingual setting, individuals speak two or more languages (or codes) and alternate between them. The frequency of code-switching largely depends on the intensity of language contacts, which occur during the linguistic and cultural integration of the communicators. The goal of code-switching is for the speaker to achieve the most effective communication.

One important aspect in this context is the reasons behind changing the language code. This topic is of significant interest to many scholars. For instance, Bright (1975) argues that the social status of the speaker and their interlocutor, as well as the communication situation, are the primary factors influencing the choice of language. Belikov and Krysin (2001) agree with these factors, adding that code-switching is often influenced by changes in the addressee, the speaker's role, and the topic of communication.

Bell (1980) and other scholars explain code-switching by noting that each individual is simultaneously a member of multiple groups, each with a distinct social status. Each status comes with specific roles, and each role has its own rules of conduct, including linguistic rules. These rules must be followed according to the situation. Thus, each person carries multiple group characteristics (such as gender, economic, socio-cultural, and professional identities), with the primary factor, according to Edwards (2004), being membership in a particular ethno-cultural community. In other words, individuals play different roles in various social contexts, adhering to the norms of behavior that apply in each situation. The speaker possesses a range of codes, each corresponding to a particular relational role. To communicate effectively, the speaker must select the code that best serves their communicative goals. A change in social roles often entails a shift in the language code, which helps define the diglossic situation, as the speaker mentally associates a specific language with each area of communication (Bell, 1980).

It is important to note that the phenomenon of code-switching and the reasons behind it are often understood ambiguously. Therefore, sociolinguists classify the processes of changing language codes. There are two main classifications. Fishman (1967), Gumperz (1964, 1982), and others distinguish between situational code-switching, where the choice of code or subcode is defined by the situation, and metaphorical code-switching, which is not tied to a comprehensive social situation change but instead reflects a shift in one component (e.g., topic), or attitudes aimed at overcoming social and communicative barriers.

Myers-Scotton (1998) proposes a different classification, considering the varying social statuses of languages and the speaker's chosen social position. Based on this, she differentiates between unmarked and marked code-switching. Unmarked code-switching occurs when the speaker follows established speech behaviors within the language community and switches according to the listener's expectations. Marked code-switching, on the other hand, happens when the speaker

consciously violates the norms of speech behavior and deliberately switches in a way that the interlocutor perceives as a deviation. However, despite evolving interpretations of code-switching processes, the central criterion for their classification remains the communication context.

It is crucial to distinguish between code-switching and code-mixing. While switching refers to changing the language code, code-mixing involves the interweaving of different linguistic elements (such as morphemes, words, or phrases) from two grammatical systems within a single sentence. Some scholars question the relevance of distinguishing between the two. For instance, Gumperz (1964, 1982), and Pakir (1992) argue that there is no real difference between code-switching and code-mixing, as both processes are triggered by situational changes during communication and stem from the interaction of two languages. In contrast, scholars like Bokamba (1989) and Kachru (1978) consider such differentiation valuable and useful. Belikov and Krysin (2001) also stress the need to differentiate between language code-switching and the borrowing of foreign language elements into speech.

Interestingly, code-mixing often precedes code-switching. In young children (under the age of two), code-switching is often driven by lexical gaps in one language, which are filled by borrowing terms from the other language (Baker, 2001). As bilingual children grow, they become more adept at distinguishing which language to use in various situations. Therefore, code-mixing tends to decrease as the child matures. Volterra and Taeschner (1978) examined this process and identified three stages of language acquisition. In the first stage, the child has a single lexical system that incorporates both languages. In the second stage, the child can distinguish between language codes but applies the same grammatical rules to both languages. By the third stage, the child speaks both languages fluently, recognizing their distinct lexical and grammatical structures, and uses each language with specific communicative partners (Bhatia & Ritchie, 2013). The age at which a child can fully differentiate languages varies depending on the level of socialization.

Children's code-switching is strongly influenced by their parents' language behavior. If parents consistently communicate in two languages, children are likely to imitate them. Conversely, if parents discourage the simultaneous use of both languages, code-switching is less frequent. Thus, factors affecting bilingual children's language behavior include the use of two languages in different contexts, the parents' attitudes toward each language, their language mixing, and the child's metalinguistic abilities (Baker, 2001). Overall, the systematic switching of language codes

leads to the formation of particular language behavior stereotypes. The youth's linguistic behavior is also shaped by peer environments, where conformism and tolerance play a significant role (Fedorchuk, 2007). Similar tendencies in the linguistic behavior of Kyiv students were also identified in sociolinguistic research (Danilevskaya, 2013).

Due to various influencing factors, speakers gradually shift to the language of the environment, even in situations where their native language once predominated. The transition from one language to another can occur either immediately or via an intermediate stage, such as the use of surzhyk. This phenomenon resonates with early observations by Schuchardt (1950) on linguistic mixing. However, in bilingual settings, even though speakers may initially appear competent in both languages, their use of both languages often prevents them from further developing their linguistic abilities. Bilingual individuals tend to have limited vocabulary expansion in both languages, leading to a neglect of both languages. Additionally, the speaker's linguistic consciousness is often divided. These observations align with contemporary perspectives on Ukrainian multilingualism and surzhyk as described by Kassen (2016). Given the importance of studying the psychology of linguistic personality in bilingual conditions, bilingualism remains a significant area of interest for psycholinguists.

1.6 Translanguaging and language ideologies

Recent scholarship has expanded the study of bilingualism beyond static categories to explore the dynamic processes through which speakers draw on their entire linguistic repertoire. The concept of translanguaging emphasizes that bilinguals and multilinguals do not simply alternate between separate languages; rather, they strategically employ elements from different codes to negotiate meaning and social relationships. This perspective was developed in the most influential way by García & Wei (2014), who conceptualized translanguaging as a pedagogical and sociolinguistic framework for understanding bilingual practices. Translanguaging acknowledges hybrid and fluid practices such as surzhyk and code-mixing as legitimate forms of communication, challenging ideologies that privilege monolingual purity. This corresponds to Kassen's (2016) discussion of Ukrainian multilingualism as an everyday practice.

Language ideologies are the beliefs and assumptions that speakers hold about languages and their proper use. In Ukraine, these ideologies have shifted markedly in response to political events. Survey data collected after 2022 show that the proportion of citizens who report using only or

mainly Ukrainian has increased across all regions, while the share of those speaking only Russian has declined. Even in the eastern and southern regions, use of Ukrainian now equals or exceeds that of Russian. Civic initiatives, such as free language courses and community programs, have further supported a shift towards the ‘one nation – one language’ ideology. These developments illustrate how language attitudes are shaped by broader social and political forces and provide a useful lens for interpreting the empirical data presented in later chapters.

1.7 Interim summary

The wide range of classifications reviewed above demonstrates the complexity of bilingualism as both an individual and a social phenomenon. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it is necessary to specify which definitions are most relevant for analyzing the Ukrainian case.

First, the Ukrainian context should primarily be understood in terms of mass or societal bilingualism, since the coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian concerns the majority of the population and entire social groups rather than only individual speakers (Bondaletov, 1987; Masenko, 1999).

Second, this bilingualism is largely asymmetrical, as one language (historically Russian) has long dominated in many functional domains, while Ukrainian is in the process of strengthening its position, especially since 2022 (Masenko, 2010; Fishman, 1971).

Third, in terms of actual language use, both active and passive bilingualism must be taken into account. A substantial proportion of speakers actively use both Ukrainian and Russian, but there is also a large group who understand Russian passively while predominantly speaking Ukrainian, or vice versa (Bhatia & Ritchie, 2013; Belikov, 2001).

Finally, the Ukrainian–Russian situation also reveals clear features of diglossia, as the two languages have historically been assigned different functions and values in society: Ukrainian associated with high-prestige and official domains, Russian with everyday informal communication (Ferguson, 1959; Fishman, 2016).

In light of these considerations, this dissertation adopts a working definition of bilingualism as asymmetrical mass bilingualism with diglossic features, combining both active and passive forms of competence. This framework reflects the specific sociolinguistic realities of Ukraine and will be consistently applied in the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4. It should also be noted that

the ideal of “balanced bilingualism” is rarely encountered in contemporary Ukraine and will therefore not serve as an analytical category here (Masenko, 2010).

In summary, Chapter 1 provided a comprehensive review of the theoretical foundations of bilingualism, diglossia and code-switching. I have defined here key terms, outlined typologies and classifications, and examined the sociocultural factors that shape linguistic behavior. The discussion showed that bilingualism and diglossia are not mutually exclusive, but rather represent different dimensions of multilingual practice.

This conceptual framework establishes the analytic lens for the rest of the dissertation. The following chapter applies these concepts to the Ukrainian context by tracing the historical formation of bilingualism from Kyivan Rus’ to the present. By examining how policies, ideologies and social change have shaped patterns of language use, Chapter 2 provides the historical backdrop for understanding the contemporary sociolinguistic landscape.

Chapter 2: History of the formation of the bilingual situation in Ukraine

Building on the theoretical concepts from Chapter 1, Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of Ukraine's linguistic situation. Section 2.1 examines the diglossic context of medieval Kyiv; Section 2.2 discusses tsarist and Soviet policies aimed at weakening Ukrainian identity; Section 2.3 analyses the revival of Ukrainian consciousness in the early twentieth century; Section 2.4 covers linguistic assimilation under Soviet rule; and Section 2.5 reviews language policy during independence. This chronology contextualizes the sociolinguistic patterns analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.1 Diglossic language situation of Kyiv in the XI - XVI centuries

The study of the modern language situation is incomplete without an analysis of the history of the Ukrainian language, as the fate of each language is inextricably linked to the destiny of its nation. Herder once called language the most important component of nationality, emphasizing its role as an expression of the mentality and soul of a particular ethnic group: “Does a nation have anything more precious than the language of its ancestors? The language embodies all the heritage of its thoughts, traditions, history, religion, and way of life—its heart and soul. To deprive a people of its language is to deprive them of their most enduring treasure” (Herder, 1772).

When researching the linguistic environment in Ukraine, special attention must be given to Kyiv, as the capital city is always a key reference point. Kyiv plays a significant role in the normalization of a country's language situation, with decisions made in the capital influencing the entire nation (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002). From its inception, Kyiv has been a land that other nations sought to conquer, aided by its strategic geographical location. Situated in the middle reaches of the Dnipro River, Kyiv became a vital transit hub within the vast territory, positioned at the crossroads of two geographical and cultural zones—the forested plains of the North and the open southern steppes. This strategic positioning determined the city's importance throughout history (Subtelnyi, 1991).

In the early stages of its development, Kyiv was the center of powerful princely rule. Sources indicate that in the XI century, multiple languages were in use, signaling the presence of

bilingualism even at that time. Old Church Slavonic served as the literary language, while Old Ukrainian and its variants were spoken in everyday communication. As both languages served different functions, the language situation in Kyivan Rus' is characterized as diglossia.

Given Kyiv's expansive territory, researchers distinguish between three main territorial units, each representing a different social aspect of the city. The Old City was the center of state power, where the princes and the social elite resided; Podil served as the commercial and craft hub; and Pechersk was the spiritual heart, the monastic center of the state. This division largely influenced the language situation in Kyiv, as different ethnic groups lived in various parts of the capital, each using their own language. However, according to Ukrainian historian Gyrych, even with the presence of various ethnic communities, Kyiv remained ethnically Ukrainian until the pre-Cossack era (Gyrych, 2017).

In the early XIII century, Kyiv continued to serve as the political center of Rus', with all members of the Rurik dynasty vying for the Kyiv throne. However, radical changes followed the Mongol invasion of 1240. With the fall of Kyiv to the Mongols, it ceased to be the capital of the ancient state and the residence of the prince (Rusyna, 2005). From then on, despite its loss of political importance, Kyiv remained the spiritual capital of Rus'. The city's spiritual significance has always been emphasized, with the national myth of "Kyiv as the second Jerusalem" becoming particularly prominent (Gyrych, 2017). By the XIV century, when Kyiv's role was primarily religious, it became an easy target for Lithuanian forces, who controlled the city for two hundred years (Rusyna, 2005).

Thus, from the XIV century onward, the Lithuanian era in Ukrainian history began, which proved favorable for the development of Ukrainian culture. During this period, Orthodoxy thrived, and the ancient Ukrainian language remained in active use. It is also important to note that during Lithuanian rule, Kyiv was granted the Magdeburg rights, which played a significant role in the city's development. The exact date of their introduction is uncertain, but Shcherbyna (1926) attributes the granting of the Magdeburg rights to the early XV century. The earliest surviving document regarding these rights is dated 1494, though it does not specifically mention the Magdeburg law. Hrushevsky (1905) suggests that the rights were granted at the end of the 15th century, referencing a 1499 charter from Lithuanian prince Alexander, which explicitly grants

“German law” to Kyiv. This law greatly benefited the city, allowing it to be placed on equal footing with other European cities.

The next significant stage in Ukrainian history came with the Union of Lublin in 1569. The Polish era in Ukrainian history greatly differed from the Lithuanian period, as Polish policy sought to impose its ideology, promote Catholicism, and polonize Ukrainian society. However, despite the efforts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to subjugate the Ukrainian people, the majority of the population remained steadfast in their cultural and spiritual identity. In Kyiv, the struggle for national and spiritual autonomy was particularly fierce, as evidenced by the establishment of the Epiphany Brotherhood in the early seventeenth century and the success of the Kyiv Brotherhood School (Shcherbyna, 1926).

Regarding the linguistic behavior of Ukrainians during the Polish period, it is essential to highlight that despite efforts at Polonization, the Polish language did not become widely spoken among the people. Most Ukrainians remained Ukrainian-speaking, with Old Church Slavonic dominating written literature. As a result, diglossia persisted: the literary and spoken languages served distinct functions, with ancient Ukrainian and Church Slavonic each fulfilling specific roles in the society.

2.2. Moscow policy in the context of the destruction of Ukrainian identity

The conquest of Ukrainian territories and the processes of linguistic assimilation began in the 17th century, a period when the Moscow state took control of most of Ukraine. This marked the beginning of a prolonged era of linguistic oppression, aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian culture and national identity. The language policy pursued first by tsarist Russia and later by the USSR is commonly referred to as *linguocide*, a form of *ethnocide*. Radevych-Vynnytsky provides a precise definition of this concept, describing linguocide as a “conscious, purposeful policy and social practice of the dominant nation (its state, religious, socio-political structures, etc.) aimed at eliminating the language of the subordinate nation in order to facilitate its denationalization and assimilation” (Radevych-Vynnytsky, 1997).

The primary objective of all these policies was the destruction of the Ukrainian language, beginning with Tsar Alexei’s decree banning the distribution of books published by Ukrainian printing houses (Virchenko, 2017). A qualitatively new phase in Ukraine's history and linguistic

development was ushered in by Peter I's reign. While he and his successors traditionally respected Kyiv as the oldest center of religious and political life, the centralist structure of the empire clashed with the city's long-standing rights and freedoms, which were systematically violated by the government until they were ultimately abolished (Shcherbyna, 1926).

In 1713, Peter I decreed that the Moscow state would adopt the ethnonym “Rus”, a term historically associated with Ukraine. The first Muscovite tsars claimed to be the heirs of the Kyiv-based Rurik dynasty, and as a result, Ukrainians were compelled to abandon their original ethnonym. Over time, the term “Ukraine” gradually replaced “Rus”, and the Ukrainian language began to diverge from the language of Rus’ (Tkachenko, 2004).

In addition to appropriating the name “Rus”, Russia adopted Church Slavonic as a cornerstone of its literary language. Consequently, the Ukrainian language, historically rich and distinct, began to decline, replaced by Russian in most spheres of life. Masenko explains: “Thus, the development of Ukrainian and Russian literary languages diverged. Russian literature, which grew out of the written language of Kyivan Rus’, was nurtured among the upper classes with the support of the imperial state. In contrast, the Ukrainian language, historically marginalized and reduced to the status of a spoken dialect, began its revival from the grassroots, facing resistance not only from the autocratic state but also from the Russian-educated elite and Russified nobility” (Masenko, 2004).

The claim that Muscovy was the rightful heir of Kyivan Rus' was even reinforced by Soviet linguists. Russian philologist Shakhmatov (2017) proposed a theory that Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian were originally part of a single “common Russian language”, which he argued had only diverged into separate languages after the collapse of Kyivan Rus’ in the 12th to 14th centuries. This theory was later challenged by Shevelyov (2002), who in his work *Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* refuted the idea of a “common Russian language”, asserting that the Ukrainian language emerged independently from Proto-Slavic and developed from the 6th to the 16th century. This theory made Shevelyov a persona non grata in the Soviet Union, and the Russian state continues to deny it, maintaining that the languages of the three nations originated from a single “common Russian language” (Masenko, 2016).

Catherine II continued the aggressive assimilation policies initiated by Peter I, seeking to erase the Ukrainian nation's language and culture. In 1765, she banned the teaching of Ukrainian at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and by 1783, Russian was mandated in all Ukrainian educational

institutions. This was done to eradicate the “erroneous belief” among Ukrainians that they were a distinct people, separate from Russians (Lyzanchuk, 2008). During her reign, the concept of “national unity” between Ukrainians and Russians was promoted, an idea still emphasized by Russian authorities today.

Under Catherine II, Kyiv's role as an autonomous center diminished. The city's governance, once dominated by Ukrainian institutions, increasingly came under Russian control, culminating in the decline of its autonomy (Shcherbyna, 1926). By the late 18th century, the number of Russians in Kyiv had risen substantially. A Russian garrison was stationed in the city, further accelerating the Russification of Kyiv. The abolition of the Magdeburg Law in 1785 and its final dissolution in 1834 significantly contributed to the Russification process, with Ukrainian becoming a language heard only in the city's outskirts (Gyrych, 2017).

Thus, the policies of the tsarist empire in the 18th century affected every aspect of public life in Ukraine: the city administration, church, education, and publishing. Key measures included in (7):

(7) Key measures of the tsarist empire policies

- a. The liquidation of the Magdeburg Law (1785, 1834);
- b. The Russification of church life, as evidenced by the 1784 Synod decree requiring prayers in Russian dialects;
- c. The complete Russification of education, formalized by the 1783 law mandating Russian in all Ukrainian schools;
- d. The destruction of Ukrainian publishing, demonstrated by Catherine II's 1786 decree banning non-approved books, which led to the collapse of the Ukrainian publishing industry until the mid-19th century.

Despite these measures, the new Ukrainian literary language began to emerge, primarily through the works of figures like Ivan Kotlyarevsky and, most notably, Taras Shevchenko. Shevchenko's combination of Ukrainian folklore with elements of Church Slavonic established a literary language that could unite the country. However, his writings were seen as subversive by the Russian government, which banned them for containing “outrageous” content in the “Little

Russian” language (Boryak, 2013). Other Ukrainian authors, including Yevhen Hrebinka, Petro Hulak-Artemovsky, and Marko Vovchok, also faced censorship.

By the mid-19th century, the Russian authorities not only banned the use of the Ukrainian language but even prohibited references to “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian”. “Little Russia” was replaced with terms like “South Russia” or “South Russian” (Smal-Stotsky, 1969). Ukrainian literature was severely controlled to ensure that it did not promote loyalty to Ukraine over Russia (Holubenko, 1993).

The Valuev and Emsky decrees are particularly significant examples of linguocide. The Valuev Circular of 1863 denied the existence of the Ukrainian language and banned the publication of religious and educational works in it, marking a severe blow to Ukrainian cultural identity. The Emsky Decree (1876), which lasted for nearly 30 years, further suppressed Ukrainian language and culture, leading to what is known as the “dead years”. Detailed studies of schooling (Vaskovich, 1969) and the implementation of the Ems decree (Vaskovich, 1976) provide further evidence of restrictions on Ukrainian. A broader analysis of these mechanisms of regulation and their impact on Ukrainian identity is provided by Gritsenko (Gritsenko, 2013). By the end of the 19th century, Kyiv had become a prominent center for Russian culture, and the Russian language dominated the city’s newspapers, theaters, and even scientific communities.

Thus, the Russian authorities succeeded in halting the development of the Ukrainian national spirit. Ukrainian was relegated to the language of uneducated peasants, while the intelligentsia predominantly used Russian in scientific work, journalism, and even daily communication. At the same time, broader analyses of the emergence of the Ukrainian modern nation emphasize that language suppression was closely tied to the shaping of Ukrainian national identity (Hrytsak, 1996).

2.3. Manifestation of national consciousness of Ukrainians in the first decades of the twentieth century

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the language situation in Ukraine underwent significant transformations. One of the key factors contributing to the rise of Ukrainian national consciousness was the abolition of censorship, which allowed Ukrainian-language periodicals to flourish. A landmark event in this development was the publication of the daily Ukrainian-language newspaper

Rada in 1906 in Kyiv. The emergence of this newspaper was a crucial step toward national revival, as it represented a powerful tool for promoting Ukrainian language and culture, which had been suppressed under the Russian Empire. *Rada* existed intermittently until 1919, and its importance cannot be overstated. The demand for a Ukrainian-language newspaper was evident, as Ukrainians were seeking to consolidate their identity and assert their independence from Russia. In the face of ongoing restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language, the population had grown accustomed to its absence, making the mission of such a publication even more relevant.

The role of the Ukrainian press in the national restoration of the state was critical, as it created a platform that united conscious citizens around the idea of Ukrainian independence. In the capital city of Kyiv, the national movement gained momentum, despite the Moscow government's efforts to suppress it. The government recognized the significance of this movement and sought to curtail the activities of Ukrainian activists. As a result, the celebrations of Shevchenko's centenary in 1914 led to mass student demonstrations in Kyiv, an event that symbolized the growing desire for Ukrainian autonomy. More than 1,800 people gathered at the building of the Commercial Institute (now the National Pedagogical University named after Mykhailo Drahomanov), singing the song "*Eternal Memory*" and distributing proclamations. This event, despite being repressed by authorities, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Ukrainian national movement.

The fall of the tsarist regime in 1917 triggered a wave of national revival. The period of liberation struggles from 1917 to 1921 represented a powerful Ukrainian outburst, culminating in the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The newly formed Ukrainian Central Rada declared that Ukrainian would be the sole official language of the Republic, marking a turning point in the struggle for linguistic and national identity. This shift in policy was further solidified when the Russian Provisional Government allowed the teaching of the Ukrainian language in schools in Kyiv. In 1917, Ukrainian was introduced as a mandatory subject in primary schools, and Russian became a compulsory subject starting in the second grade. The establishment of departments of Ukrainian language, literature, history, and law at universities further solidified the place of the Ukrainian language in the educational system. Moreover, the General Secretariat issued a resolution declaring that "the official language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language", and that "office work in the Secretariat is conducted in the Ukrainian language".

These developments signaled a profound change in the national and linguistic consciousness of the Ukrainian population. The revolution not only reshaped the worldview of Ukrainians but also forced other nations to reconsider their perceptions of Ukraine. In this context, census data on the ethnic composition of Kyiv at the time provides important insights into the linguistic preferences of its inhabitants. According to the 1917 census, Russians were the dominant ethnic group in the capital, with 500 out of every 1,000 residents identifying as Russian, while Ukrainians accounted for 164, Jews for 186, Poles for 91, and other nationalities for 60. However, by 1923, the situation had changed dramatically, with the number of Ukrainians rising to 254 per 1,000, compared to 362 Russians per 1,000. This shift was not due to an increase in the Ukrainian population but rather the result of citizens identifying more strongly as Ukrainians. These changes were significant not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of the political and social climate in the capital, where the Ukrainian language began to take on a more prominent role.

The revolution and the subsequent developments played a pivotal role in the national revival of Ukraine. During this period, numerous new publishers and bookstores emerged, and Ukrainian schools proliferated, alongside the resurgence of Ukrainian theater and other cultural institutions. The 1926 census marked the first time that Ukrainians outnumbered Russians in Kyiv, with 41.6% of the population identifying as Ukrainian, 25.5% as Russian, 26.3% as Jewish, 3.3% as Polish, and 3.3% as other nationalities. This shift in the ethnic composition of Kyiv reflects the broader national revival that was taking place across Ukraine, further solidifying the role of the Ukrainian language in daily life and governance (Borovsky, 1926).

In 1929, the Soviet Union adopted its second constitution, which officially recognized the equality of all national languages in Ukraine. According to the constitution, “the languages of all nationalities in Ukraine were declared equal”, and every citizen, regardless of their nationality, was given the opportunity to communicate in their native language. This marked the first time that language issues were specifically addressed in the constitution, with particular attention to the languages of both indigenous peoples and national minorities. However, the policy of “indigenization” pursued by the Soviet authorities in the 1920s was not genuinely aimed at fostering national cultures; rather, it was part of a broader effort to integrate the peoples of the former Russian Empire into the communist ideology. As noted by historian Masenko, the goal of this policy was to create a “worldview unification of society”, with a focus on the spread of a single

communist ideology that could be more effectively promoted in the national languages of the people (Masenko, 2004).

The ultimate goal of the Soviet approach was to merge the various national cultures into one unified Soviet culture, with a common language for all. In his work *The National Question and Leninism*, Joseph Stalin outlined a three-stage process for achieving this goal. In the first stage, oppressed nations were encouraged to develop linguistically and culturally. The second stage called for the adoption of a common international language, in addition to national languages. The third stage envisaged the eventual disappearance of national languages and their replacement by a common language for all (Stalin, 1951). This vision of a linguistically homogenous Soviet Union, however, was at odds with the aspirations of many Ukrainians, who continued to assert their linguistic and cultural identity in the face of Soviet efforts to suppress them.

The early twentieth century was thus a period of profound transformation for the Ukrainian people, as their national consciousness became increasingly intertwined with the struggle for linguistic and cultural autonomy. This link between national consciousness and the formation of a modern Ukrainian nation has been comprehensively explored in Hrytsak's (1996) essays. The developments of this era, from the rise of Ukrainian-language publications to the events surrounding the 1917 revolution and the subsequent adoption of policies recognizing the Ukrainian language, played a pivotal role in the shaping of modern Ukrainian identity.

2.4. Linguistic assimilation of the Ukrainian people in the Soviet era

It is widely acknowledged that, despite the Soviet Union's declarations of the "free development of national cultures and their flourishing", Soviet language policy aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian language, seeking to reduce it to the status of a Russian dialect (Masenko, 2005). Consequently, the process of Ukrainization, which began as an initial stage in Bolshevik ideology, was eventually replaced in the 1930s by a policy focused on forming an ideologically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous Soviet population devoid of freedom of expression (Masenko, 2004).

In the 1930s, the Ukrainian language lost its status as the principal means of modernization, and Ukraine itself was threatened with the prospect of reverting to a mere province of Russia once again (Hrytsak, 1996). Despite the earlier successes of Ukrainization, this transformation was not

easily achieved, prompting the Soviet regime to employ more severe measures. The Holodomor, which in reality was a genocide of Ukrainians, was marked by exceptional ruthlessness. The physical destruction of the mass Ukrainian-speaking population and the trauma suffered by the survivors facilitated the success of subsequent linguicide (Masenko, 2001). Alongside the Holodomor, the cessation of Ukrainization led to a purge among the Ukrainian intellectual elite, resulting in the imprisonment of tens of thousands of unjustly accused individuals. Arrests and executions extended across all strata of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, with some groups subjected to near-fatal beatings (Shevelyov, 1987).

The artificially induced famine and the repression of the intelligentsia significantly weakened the national spirit of the Ukrainian people and paved the way for continued linguistic assimilation. Ukrainian-language instruction in secondary, specialized, and higher education was gradually reduced. Ukrainian was eventually discontinued in all higher educational institutions, except for the Ukrainian departments of philological faculties and pedagogical institutes. Additionally, Ukrainian-language office work was curtailed, and Russian became dominant in scientific spheres (Rusanivsky, 2004).

At the same time, the Bolsheviks endeavored to impose the thesis promoted by Shakhmatov and other Soviet linguists, asserting the existence of a “common Russian language” as a fundamental dogma in all the humanities. This became another effective tool for the Russification of Ukrainians, with the ultimate aim of their dissolution into the Russian ethnic community. The ruling elite insisted that Ukrainian and Russian arose from the same linguistic roots, deeming them “brother languages”. As the older sibling, Russian was granted several advantages, including the status of a second native language and the language of interethnic communication within the USSR. Furthermore, Russian was portrayed as the language of global significance, spoken by the leaders of the world proletariat, Lenin and Stalin. These factors further elevated the prestige of the Russian language. Consequently, the widespread notion of a “great Russian language” and “great Russian culture” reinforced the idea that all other peoples of the USSR were merely “little brothers”, with their cultures existing and developing solely through the “friendly” support and “charitable” influence of the “great Russian people” (Masenko, 2017).

Thus, the political course of the 1930s had a profound impact on the position of the Ukrainian language. In addition to external restrictions on its use, the idea of rapprochement with the Russian

people, as the “older brothers”, and with their language was propagated from above. By the time of World War II, Ukrainian had been severely devalued, and the language situation began to shift across the country, moving toward Russian monolingualism rather than maintaining the state of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism.

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, the movement to protect the Ukrainian language gained momentum. During the Khrushchev thaw—a period marked by a slight liberalization of the political regime—the situation of the Ukrainian language saw some improvements. At the All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference in Kyiv (February 10-15, 1963), there was a call to grant Ukrainian the status of the state language, although the authorities did not take action on this demand (Shapoval, 2008).

However, the 1960s saw a decline in the number of Ukrainian-language books and periodicals. The circulation of Ukrainian books published by Ukrainian publishers fell from 80% in 1950 to 66% in 1963 (Statistical Yearbook “National Economy of the USSR in 1963”, 1965). Russification continued in Ukrainian science, evidenced by a growing number of works published in Russian, while Ukrainian-language works became increasingly rare. Most Ukrainian-language publications were in the humanities, while works in the natural sciences were predominantly published in Russian (Dzyuba, 2005).

When evaluating the Russification policy during the Soviet period, it is clear that the USSR's assimilation efforts were far more successful than those of the tsarist empire. The Soviet leadership exercised tight control over all aspects of Ukrainian social life, systematically eroding individuality and national identity at every level (Masenko, 2007). Consequently, the domains in which the Ukrainian language could function in Soviet Ukraine were severely limited. As Shevelyov noted, it existed “somewhere in the intermediate space between the state of language and the state of a Russian dialect” (Shevelyov, 1987). The USSR did not acknowledge the existence of a language conflict, instead portraying bilingualism as a harmonious phenomenon.

On October 28, 1989, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Law “On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. The law stated that “the Ukrainian SSR provides the Ukrainian language with the status of the state language to promote the comprehensive development of the spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian people, guaranteeing its sovereign national future”. At the same time, the law confirmed the status of the Russian language as “the language of interethnic

communication of the peoples of the USSR”. Moreover, “the choice of the language of communication was considered an inalienable right of the citizens themselves”.

Nevertheless, despite the law's claims that bilingualism was resolved harmoniously, sociolinguists argue that such a situation is unstable. The functioning of two languages in a single country typically leads to either monolingualism or the disintegration of the state along linguistic lines (Masenko, 1999). In the case of an independent Ukraine, following the collapse of the USSR, the country became territorially heterogeneous. The Ukrainian-speaking West and the Russian-speaking East and South differ not only in language but also in national and cultural identity, with the capital serving as a fusion of these two divergent trends. This linguistic and cultural division among Ukrainians has contributed to conflicts, diminishing the unity and strength of the state.

2.5. The state and status of the Ukrainian language during the period of Independence

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991, the struggle for the recognition and development of the Ukrainian language continued. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russification efforts did not cease. These efforts manifested in two major forms: direct actions, where Russian increasingly replaced Ukrainian in public life (such as media, press, education, and politics), and systematic campaigns that promoted the Russian language, including attempts to elevate it to the status of a second official state language (Tkachenko, 2004). This period of independence witnessed the persistence of Russification policies due to the historical success of Russian influence over a large portion of the Ukrainian population. According to Dzyuba (2018), the deep-rooted Russification contributed to political instability, economic unrest, and public disillusionment, ultimately harming the Ukrainian cultural and linguistic identity.

Despite the declaration of a pro-Ukrainian language policy, the reality was far different. The lack of a solid mechanism to ensure the comprehensive functioning of the Ukrainian language meant that the language's status was not enforced as the state language. Ukraine's legal framework governing language issues, which included the 1989 Law “On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR” and the Constitution of Ukraine, established Ukrainian as the state language. Article 10 of the Constitution (1996) affirms that the state ensures the development and functioning of the Ukrainian language, while also protecting the use of Russian and other languages of national minorities in Ukraine. The article guarantees free development, use, and protection of these languages, but it does not prioritize Ukrainian over other languages, including Russian. In practice, this meant that

while Ukrainian was theoretically the state language, the status of the Russian language remained substantial, and until 2019, there was no law guaranteeing the primacy of Ukrainian.

The first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, aimed to protect the Ukrainian language. However, his policy was inconsistent, as it failed to decisively limit Russian in favor of Ukrainian. While advocating for the importance of the Ukrainian language in nation-building, Kravchuk also supported bilingualism, particularly in schools. This bilingual education approach saw rapid Russification of Ukrainian media, despite the adoption of the Law “About Television and Radio” (Besters-Dilger, 2010). The dominance of Russian in the media, under Kravchuk’s presidency, has had lasting consequences that are still felt today.

Leonid Kuchma, who succeeded Kravchuk, continued the ambiguous language policy. Although Kuchma's government did not openly declare Russian as the official language, it made moves that favored the language’s position in society. Under Kuchma, Ukraine ratified the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, imposed taxes on Ukrainian book publishing, and allowed Russian to dominate much of the media landscape. These policies favored Russian over Ukrainian and hampered the development of the national language.

Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency brought more favorable conditions for the Ukrainian language. One of his key achievements was the establishment of the Council on Ethno-politics in 2006, aimed at promoting the Ukrainian nation and fostering the development of ethnic and cultural identities, including language. In 2006, the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting was passed, setting a 75% quota for broadcasting in Ukrainian. Additionally, the Law on the Development of State Language Policy, which included provisions for increased support for Ukrainian-language teachers in schools, was signed in 2008 (Marusyk, 2015). This period marked a turning point in the state's commitment to enhancing the status of the Ukrainian language.

Viktor Yanukovych, the next president, pursued policies that undermined the status of Ukrainian. His government equated Russian with Ukrainian and granted Russian regional status in various regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv. The Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law, passed during his presidency, allowed Russian to dominate in education and media, accelerating the Russification of Ukrainian schools and the spread of Russian-language television. These measures posed a direct threat to the Ukrainian language and ran counter to the Constitutional obligation to guarantee its use in official domains (Prostir Svobody, 2012).

During Petro Poroshenko's presidency, the language policy became more explicitly pro-Ukrainian. In 2015, the government passed the Law "About Condemnation of Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes" and adopted the Law on Civil Service, which required civil servants to use Ukrainian in official duties. The adoption of the Law on State Support of Cinematography in 2017 was another milestone, as it incentivized the development of Ukrainian-language cinema, marking a significant cultural shift. These initiatives helped strengthen the Ukrainian language in the public sphere.

In 2019, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office. Despite his background in a Russian-speaking family and environment, Zelenskyy made strides in promoting the Ukrainian language during the full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022. His government focused on derussification in the face of Russian aggression. On November 9, 2022, Zelenskyy delivered a speech celebrating the Day of Ukrainian Language and Literature, highlighting the importance of the Ukrainian language as a tool for national identity, independence, and resistance against Russian domination. Zelenskyy emphasized that the mass transition to Ukrainian, the rise of Ukrainian-language cultural products, and the linguistic revival were indicative of Ukraine's strengthening national self-determination. His administration's commitment to increasing the prestige of the Ukrainian language amid the conflict underscored its role as a powerful symbol of resistance and national unity (Zelenskyy, 2022).

The status of the Ukrainian language has evolved significantly since Ukraine's independence. While challenges remain, particularly in regions where Russian has a strong presence, the language situation has improved, with successful policies aimed at strengthening Ukrainian in education, media, and public life. The ongoing linguistic revival, supported by both government initiatives and public enthusiasm, demonstrates that the Ukrainian language is not only surviving but thriving in the face of adversity.

As a summary, Chapter 2 traced the historical evolution of bilingualism and language policy in Ukraine, showing how socio-political forces shaped language use from the medieval period through the Soviet era to independence.

These historical processes set the stage for understanding the contemporary bilingualism and diglossia described in Chapter 3, where I analyze the current language situation and recent policy shifts.

Chapter 3: Characteristics of the language situation in Ukraine

Building on the historical overview in Chapter 2 and the theoretical framework of Chapter 1, Chapter 3 turns to the contemporary language situation in Ukraine. It begins with a general characterization of current bilingual and diglossic practices nationwide (Section 3.1), then analyses the 2017 mass survey to establish a baseline for attitudes and behaviors prior to the 2022 invasion (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 focuses on the spread of Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism and diglossia in Kyiv, highlighting urban–rural contrasts and domain-specific repertoires. Section 3.4 examines prospects for further Ukrainization, while Section 3.5 discusses emerging forms of multilingualism involving English and other European languages. The chapter also addresses the impact of the 2022–2023 war on language use (Section 3.6) and outlines sociolinguistic changes observed in 2024–2025 (Section 3.7). This multi-layered analysis sets the stage for the empirical study in Chapter 4 by contextualizing the survey data within ongoing societal shifts.

3.1. General characteristics of the language situation in Ukraine

The historical survey in Chapter 2 demonstrated that Ukraine’s bilingual situation is the product of successive periods of cultural flowering and suppression. From the multilingual practices of Kyivan Rus’ to the diglossic regimes imposed by Polish and Russian authorities, the chapter showed how language policies were used to consolidate power and how speakers resisted through vernacular use, education and literature.

These historical dynamics help to explain the contemporary language situation. Chapter 3 builds on this foundation by examining current patterns of Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism, the prospects for Ukrainization and the emergence of multilingualism involving English and other European languages. Together with the theoretical framework laid out earlier, the historical perspective allows us to situate present-day language choices within a long continuum of sociopolitical change.

The language situation in Ukraine is further complicated by the influence of external factors, such as the historical domination of the Russian language and its strong presence in various aspects of public life. This dominance has not only shaped the everyday communication practices of many Ukrainians but has also influenced their cultural and political identity. As a result, a significant portion of the population, particularly in the eastern and southern regions, identifies with Russian

as their primary language of communication, leading to a complex situation of bilingualism, and in some cases, diglossia.

The impact of Russian, particularly in media, education, and government, has created a distinct divide within Ukrainian society. While Ukrainian remains the official language, the use of Russian in daily life, especially in informal contexts, has left the Ukrainian language marginalized. This imbalance in language usage is evident in the realm of education, where Russian-medium schools continue to function in certain regions, making it harder for Ukrainian to become the dominant language of instruction.

One of the key challenges in promoting the Ukrainian language is overcoming this entrenched linguistic divide. The rise of pro-Russian sentiment in certain regions has led to significant resistance to the promotion of Ukrainian, particularly in the sphere of government and public administration. Despite the legislative measures taken in recent years to strengthen the role of Ukrainian in the media, education, and public life, the Russian language still maintains a prominent role in many areas of life in Ukraine.

The state's efforts to reintegrate the Ukrainian language into the public sphere are crucial for building national unity. Language policies adopted after the Euromaidan Revolution and intensified during the ongoing conflict with Russia underscore the significance of Ukrainian as a symbol of national sovereignty and identity. For example, the implementation of laws that mandate the use of Ukrainian in public broadcasting and education aim to shift the balance of linguistic power in favor of the national language.

However, this linguistic struggle is not only a matter of state policy but also involves deeply rooted cultural attitudes. Many Ukrainians who are fluent in both languages often express ambivalence about their linguistic identity, feeling torn between the Ukrainian-speaking national identity and the Russian-speaking cultural heritage. This duality has been exacerbated by the political conflict with Russia, which has led to an increasing association between the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian sovereignty.

In contrast, there is a growing movement among younger generations, particularly in the west of Ukraine, to embrace the Ukrainian language as a symbol of resistance against Russian cultural

and political influence. These individuals are often more willing to challenge the *status quo*, opting for Ukrainian in their daily lives, even in traditionally Russian-speaking regions.

In addition to the political and cultural factors, the economic dimensions of the language issue also play a significant role. Russian continues to dominate in certain economic sectors, especially in business and trade with Russia and other Russian-speaking countries. The use of Russian is often seen as a practical necessity for success in these areas, which further entrenches its position in Ukrainian society. As a result, even those who support the use of Ukrainian may feel compelled to use Russian in their professional lives to maintain business connections and career opportunities.

Given these challenges, the language situation in Ukraine can be described as a battleground for national identity. The struggle to promote Ukrainian in the face of Russian linguistic hegemony is a key component of the broader political and cultural conflict. As Ukraine continues to assert its independence and sovereignty, the language issue remains a crucial element in the shaping of national consciousness and the preservation of cultural heritage.

The situation is further complicated by the influence of global processes such as globalization and migration. As Ukrainian citizens increasingly migrate abroad, particularly to European Union countries, there is a risk of further erosion of the Ukrainian language, as many may adopt the languages of their new host countries, further distancing themselves from their native linguistic roots.

Therefore, the language situation in Ukraine is not only a matter of internal domestic policy but also a reflection of broader geopolitical dynamics, where the struggle for linguistic autonomy is intricately tied to national sovereignty and the country's future in the global arena. It is clear that the future of the Ukrainian language is inextricably linked to the political and cultural trajectory of the country, and addressing the linguistic divide is essential for building a cohesive and resilient Ukrainian state.

In conclusion, while Ukraine's language situation remains complex and multifaceted, it is also an area of profound importance for the country's future. The strengthening of the Ukrainian language is not merely a cultural imperative but a political necessity, one that will require sustained efforts on multiple fronts—education, media, government policy, and societal attitudes. The

language issue in Ukraine reflects broader questions of identity, sovereignty, and national unity, making it an essential aspect of the ongoing development of the Ukrainian state.

3.2. The language situation in Ukraine in 2017 (based on the mass survey in 2017)

In recent years, several sociological surveys have been conducted, providing new statistical insights. For this study, I rely on the results of the most recent sociolinguistic survey conducted by the First Rating System LLC, commissioned by the Volkswagen Foundation. The survey, titled “Bi- and Multilingualism between Intensification and Resolution of the Language Conflict: Ethnolinguistic Conflicts, Language Policy, and Contact Situations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia”, was carried out in February 2017. The survey included 2,000 respondents from all regions of Ukraine, excluding those areas not controlled by Ukrainian authorities. The target group comprised individuals aged 18 and older, and the data was collected through face-to-face interviews conducted at respondents’ residences.

The results of this survey provide a snapshot of the linguistic situation across the country and reaffirm the persistence of bilingualism and diglossia within Ukraine’s communicative space.

Specifically, when asked whether the use of Ukrainian and Russian had changed following the events of 2013-2014, nearly half of the respondents stated that there had been little to no change. 61.2% indicated that their attitude towards the Ukrainian language had remained unchanged, and an even greater percentage—73.8%—reported that their attitude towards the Russian language had not changed. Furthermore, 61.1% of respondents believe that the use of Russian continues at the same level as before. While 52.2% stated that the Ukrainian language has been used more frequently, 42.8% reported that there has been no noticeable change.

The persistence of stable attitudes toward both languages indicates that the population tends not to associate language issues directly with politics. However, when comparing these findings with those from a 2006 survey conducted as part of the INTAS project “Language Policy in Ukraine: Anthropological, Linguistic Aspects, and Further Perspectives”, notable differences in opinion become apparent (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Opinions of respondents on the change in the situation of use of Ukrainian and Russian languages according to the survey in 2017 and 2006.

Over 11 years, the number of people who emphasized the improvement of the Ukrainian language has increased by 8% (in 2006 this figure was 44.6%), and the number of those who emphasized the improvement of the Russian language fell by 11% (Besters-Dilger, 2010). This, obviously, indicates a gradual change in the attitude of Ukrainians toward the Russian language.

The majority of Ukrainians do not understand the nature and causes of language conflicts, as well as the connection between the issue of Ukraine's integrity and the spread of two languages on its territory. This is evidenced by the answers of respondents to a number of such questions. When asked whether there is a language conflict in Ukraine, almost half of respondents (46.9%) answered that there is no conflict. Only 21.6% gave an affirmative answer. Only 6.5% of respondents fully agree with this statement, while the rest consider it more likely than not. 54.3% of respondents are convinced that the Ukrainian and Russian languages do not compete but coexist peacefully on the territory of Ukraine. 52.4% of respondents believe that the integrity of the state is not threatened by the functioning of two languages and, as a result, do not agree with the opinion that the annexation of Crimea and the events in Donbas are somehow associated with the active existence of the language. At the same time, three-quarters of respondents in the survey chose that language is not only a matter of culture but also of national unity and state security, and another attribute of statehood.

According to the survey, a considerable share of respondents reported that the current use of Ukrainian reflects its role as the state language. This perception is associated with relatively low levels of reported concern about language problems or the existence of a language conflict.

It should be noted that the number of respondents who are convinced that the state language should be used more than now and those who think that its use should remain the same does not differ significantly (49.7% and 39.7%, respectively), which means that people are mostly satisfied with the current state of both languages. In particular, 45% of respondents want the Russian language to continue to be used to the same extent as now. However, there is a noticeable contrast in the results of today's and previous surveys (Fig. 2).




Figure 2. Opinions of respondents on the desired amount of use of Ukrainian and Russian languages according to the survey in 2017 and 2006.

The number of people who support the increase of the Ukrainian language has increased by 10% (39.7% in 2006 and 49.7% in 2017), while the number of those advocating for an increase in the use of Russian has decreased by five times (25.3% in 2006 and 5% in 2017) (Besters-Dilger, 2010). The data from the sociolinguistic analysis confirm that Ukrainians are largely satisfied with the current language situation. The population clearly differentiates between the language and its speakers, with most people stating that the language a person speaks does not affect their attitude toward the speaker. Respondents reported almost no encounters with language-based discrimination, suggesting that they did not consider this issue a significant concern. According to the survey, half of the respondents view the information space as equally Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking, without perceiving any problems in this. 75.8% of respondents believe that

the Ukrainian-speaking population has the opportunity to meet their cultural and informational needs (compared to 66.2% in 2006), while 58.5% say the same about Russian-speaking people (Besters-Dilger, 2010). A similar proportion of respondents gave affirmative and negative answers to the question of whether it is important to them to choose a language for reading books, newspapers, listening to radio programs, or watching TV shows and movies. These figures clearly demonstrate Ukrainian bilingualism, as half of the people do not attach importance to the choice of language to meet cultural and informational needs. Survey data reveal that half of the respondents (48.7%) identify as bilinguals. This opinion is supported not only by the self-identification of citizens but also by their own assessment of their knowledge of both languages. Fewer than 10% of respondents indicated a poor command of one of the languages, while the rest defined their proficiency as “very good”, “good”, or “satisfactory”. 55.2% of respondents believe that if the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens are bilingual, it will help prevent language-based conflicts.

It is interesting to analyze the actual language practices of Ukrainians, specifically how their language behavior changes when interacting with Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking interlocutors. In the presence of Ukrainian-speaking people, 63% of respondents primarily speak Ukrainian, 18.4% use both Ukrainian and Russian, and only 17% speak Russian. In the presence of Russian-speaking people, the situation is markedly different. Here, nearly half of the respondents communicate in Russian, 22.7% use both languages, and 28.8% speak Ukrainian, indicating that Russian-language practices predominate in such communicative situations. The results show that the number of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in communication with Russian-speaking individuals has halved, while the number of Russian-speaking individuals has nearly tripled. Thus, people are more likely to adapt to Ukrainian-language communication than to Russian-language communication. Only a small percentage of communicators maintain language stability, while the rest easily switch between languages, adapting to the language of their interlocutor.

The survey data also confirm the existence of diglossia. It turns out that the understanding of formal and informal communication plays a crucial role in language choice. About 60% of respondents state that Ukrainian predominates in formal communication (e.g., in public institutions, schools, universities). In informal communication, about 40% of respondents hear Ukrainian in shops, cafes, public transport, and use it with family and friends. These survey results

confirm the tendency for the Ukrainian language to dominate in official communication, while Russian, or both languages, are used in everyday life.

When comparing these data with the results of a survey conducted in 2006, I observe notable changes. In 2006, approximately 40% of respondents stated that Ukrainian was the language of formal communication, which is 20% less than today. Changes are also visible in the field of higher education: in 2006, 38.6% of respondents reported hearing Ukrainian in higher educational institutions, while in 2017, this figure rose to 56.3%. At the same time, the situation with Russian is the opposite. In the informal sphere, Russian lost 10% of speakers during this period (in 2006, about 30% of respondents reported hearing Ukrainian in informal communication, whereas now this figure has increased to 40%), although Russian continues to predominate in informal communication. Thus, in 11 years, the Ukrainian language has gained about 20% of speakers in formal communication and 10% in informal communication.

However, despite the clear shifts toward the Ukrainian language, diglossia persists. It should be emphasized, though, that the understanding of diglossia has evolved somewhat at this stage. While previously the prestige of a language was a primary factor in the distribution of languages, and Russian was considered more prestigious than Ukrainian, today the situation has transformed due to changes in the evaluation parameters of the language situation. Subjective assessments of both languages now differ significantly: Ukrainian is considered much more prestigious (73.6% of respondents view Ukrainian as prestigious, compared to only 28.9% for Russian).




Figure 3. Opinions of respondents on the prestige of the Ukrainian and Russian languages according to the survey of 2017 and 2006.

In 2006, 64.7% of respondents identified Russian as prestigious, which is 35% higher than today (Fig. 3). In this context, a distinguishing feature of diglossia today is the distinction between formal and informal communication, as evidenced by the 20% difference in the use of the Ukrainian language in these contexts. It is clear that in informal communication, the Ukrainian language still lags behind Russian, although the gradual changes in this trend are undoubtedly positive.

Respondents' opinions on the future status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages are analyzed here based on the 2017 sociolinguistic survey, with comparative reference to the 2006 data. 65.2% of respondents believe that the increased use of Ukrainian across all areas of broadcasting will not lead to the exacerbation of interethnic relations, while 36.4% are not opposed to granting Russian the status of a second state or official language. However, it is important to note that in 2006, the number of people in favor of granting Russian such status was even higher (55.9%). Therefore, I can conclude that the issue of granting Russian the status of a state or official language is gradually being resolved in favor of Ukrainian. This is reflected in the fact that, at present, 20% more people believe that Ukrainian should be the sole state language of Ukraine. However, the excessive politicization of the language issue and the speculation surrounding it hinder the normalization of the language situation in Ukraine. The fact that Ukrainians express support for the increased use of their native language in the future (Fig. 4 is a positive aspect of the present changes in attitudes.




Figure 4. Opinions of respondents on the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages according to the survey of 2017 and 2006.

Indeed, half of the respondents (51.4%) still want their children (or future children) to study and speak the state language. Only about 11% envision their children's education and communication taking place in Russian. Nearly all respondents agree that citizens of Ukraine must speak the state language. Additionally, they believe that all civil servants and individuals seeking Ukrainian citizenship should pass an exam in Ukrainian. The survey reveals that the education sector needs improvement: most respondents demand that all public educational institutions teach in the state language and that teachers use it throughout the educational process, not just in the classroom. This indicator has increased to 72.3%, up from 56.1% in 2006. Almost all respondents agree that Ukrainian should be taught as a separate subject in secondary school, while only half of them emphasized the importance of learning Russian. Around 60% of respondents, which is 16% more than in the previous survey, do not see any need for the Russian language to have legislative advantages over the languages of other national minorities. Based on the collected statistics, it is clear that Ukrainians still want the state language to strengthen its position and become dominant, at least in formal communication.

The majority of respondents would welcome the idea that all civil servants, as well as heads of educational and medical institutions, use the state language. They also believe that the language of television and radio broadcasting, print media, and advertising should be exclusively Ukrainian. Therefore, the Ukrainian language policy should align with the aspirations of citizens and gradually transform the informational and cultural space by increasing the number of Ukrainian-language products.

Survey data reveal a marked increase in the proportion of respondents supporting Ukrainian as the main language of communication (from 38.7% in 2006 to 57.3% in 2017). This suggests a trend toward greater endorsement of Ukrainian in public and private domains. The exclusion of respondents from the occupied territories in the 2017 sample may also have contributed to the observed shift.

Thus, the study reveals some ambiguity and contradictions in Ukrainians' views on the state of the language. On one hand, the majority of the population does not consider language issues to be of primary importance, as they are convinced that there are more pressing concerns. On the other

hand, there is a noticeable shift in the attitude toward the increased use of the native language in the future, with many still wanting Ukrainian to be the country's main language.

Based on the survey data, I make the following assumption: the Russian language may gradually lose its dominant position in Ukrainian communication, with Ukrainian taking its place as the state language. As the population becomes more aware of the essence of language issues and shows less resistance to restrictions on Russian and Russian-language products, state language policy should provide tools for this reorientation, promoting the Ukrainian language across all domains and enhancing its prestige. Overall, the results of the survey reflect a positive trend, showing significant improvement compared to the 2006 survey, though the language situation in Ukraine is still far from ideal.

3.3. Spread of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism and diglossia in Kyiv

The language situation in Kyiv clearly reflects the broader national context. First and foremost, the capital is always a point of reference and a model for the rest of the country. As Masenko states, “the whole Ukraine will speak as Kyiv speaks” (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002). Secondly, people from various cities and villages across Ukraine live in Kyiv, as migration to the capital is typically the most dynamic. This suggests that the inhabitants of Kyiv largely represent the broader population of the state. A survey conducted as part of the project “Bi- and multilingualism between intensification and resolution of the language conflict. Ethnolinguistic conflicts, language policy, and contact situations in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia” does not allow for a precise calculation of the ratio between Ukrainian and Russian languages in the communicative space of the city, as the sample of indigenous Kyiv residents significantly reduces the statistical validity of the results. However, based on an analysis of various sociological and sociolinguistic studies, I can reasonably conclude that Kyiv, as the capital of Ukraine, has not yet become a center for the spread of the Ukrainian language. On the contrary, it reflects many of the contradictions in the country's linguistic and cultural development.

The actual situation of the Ukrainian language in Kyiv does not correspond to the ethnic or linguistic distribution of the city's population. According to the 2001 All-Ukrainian Census, 82.2% of the population in Kyiv identified as Ukrainians, 13.1% as Russians, and the rest as other nationalities. Interestingly, compared to the 1989 census, the number of Ukrainians in the capital

increased by 10% (72.5% in 1989), while the percentage of Russians decreased by 7% (20.9% in 1989) (All-Ukrainian Census, 2001). By examining the dynamics of changes in the ethnic composition of Kyiv's population over the centuries, I can conclude that the number of Ukrainians in the city has steadily grown. Sokolova analyzed census results, showing a consistent increase in the Ukrainian population in the capital: 22.2% in 1897, 42.3% in 1926, 53.2% in 1939, 60.1% in 1959, 64.8% in 1970, 72.5% in 1989, and 82.2% in 2001. In contrast, the number of Russians decreased: 54.2% in 1897, 24.5% in 1926, 16.5% in 1939, 23% in 1959, 22.9% in 1970, 20.9% in 1989, and 13.1% in 2001 (Sokolova, 2012). This shift in the national composition of Kyiv during the 20th century was likely due to the active resettlement of Ukrainians from various parts of the country to the capital. After the collapse of the USSR, the process of self-identification began to play a crucial role in determining nationality.

Let's now consider the data on the national composition of Kyiv in comparison with language preferences. In the last census, 72.1% of Kyiv's population identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue, a 14.5% increase compared to the 1989 census. Russian was identified as a native language by 25.3% of the population, a decrease of 15.8% from the previous census (All-Ukrainian Census, 2001). However, a discrepancy between nationality and native language remains, as shown in the diagram (Fig. 5).




Figure 5. The ratio of national and linguistic indicators among Kyiv residents

The consolidated graphs clearly illustrate that approximately 10% of Ukrainians consider Russian their native language. The situation is further complicated by the fact that even those whose

native language is Ukrainian are, in practice, bilingual. This bilingualism within the population leads to conflicts and confrontations, primarily because speakers of different languages strive to use their respective languages across as many sociolinguistic spheres as possible. Chernenko (2009) notes that conflict arises when two languages attempt to dominate the same sociolinguistic space where they cannot both “fit”.

Sokolova (2013), in her study of the bilingual situation in Kyiv, made significant observations about the varied nature of bilingualism among the city's residents. In analyzing the language behavior of Kyiv's population, she identified 10 theoretically possible types of language behavior (9 of which were actually observed), depending on the respondents' language competence and the communication conditions, which do not always align with their language preferences. Sokolova (2013) classified these behaviors into the following types, as in (8):

(8) Language preferences behaviors according to Sokolova (2013)

- a. Fluency in both Ukrainian and Russian;
- b. Fluency in both Ukrainian and Russian with the use of surzhyk;
- c. Fluency in Ukrainian, with Russian as a second language;
- d. Fluency in Russian, with Ukrainian as a second language;
- e. Fluency in Ukrainian, with Russian as a second language and using surzhyk;
- f. Fluency in Ukrainian, with the use of surzhyk;
- g. Fluency in Ukrainian only;
- h. Fluency in Russian, using surzhyk;
- i. Fluency in Russian only.

The largest group consists of respondents from the first type, who are fluent in both languages. However, according to Sokolova, their bilingualism is not always harmonious. Despite knowing both language codes, only about half of the respondents (those who identified themselves as bilingual) use both languages equally and feel comfortable doing so. The rest tend to choose one language code to meet their communicative needs (Sokolova, 2013). Thus, it can be concluded that Kyiv residents are predominantly bilingual, and their bilingualism exhibits a diglossic character, where the choice of communication language is deliberate and depends on the context.

This linguistic situation in the capital is corroborated by various sociolinguistic surveys. Our analysis will focus on the results of several questionnaires, including those from the Center for Sociological Research “Public Opinion” by the Research Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Kyiv (2000), the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2007), the all-Ukrainian survey conducted within the international research project “Region, Nation, and So On. Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconceptualization of Ukraine” (2013), and the public organization “Space of Freedom” (2011–2019).

In particular, a study conducted by the Center for Public Opinion in 2000 revealed that the relationship between Ukrainian and Russian in Kyiv is far from one of harmonious coexistence. The city cannot be described as either Ukrainian-speaking or even bilingual. According to the survey, 52.5% of Kyiv residents spoke Russian in their daily lives, while 14.8% used Ukrainian. Of these, 4.3% used only Ukrainian, and the rest used it in most situations. Additionally, 32% of respondents reported using both languages equally. A notable discrepancy appears when comparing the 57% of Kyiv residents who identified Ukrainian as their native language in the 2001 All-Ukrainian Census with the 2000 survey results, which suggest much less use of the language in everyday life. Zaliznyak and Masenko concluded that the language situation in Kyiv in 2000 was characterized by Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism (asymmetric bilingualism with Russian dominance), exhibiting elements of diglossia, where each language had its place in different social spheres (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002).

Experts involved in the 2000 survey assessed Kyiv's linguistic landscape on a ten-point scale, assigning it a score of 3.09 for Ukrainian and 6.42 for Russian. Interestingly, Kyiv residents themselves viewed their city as bilingual, with the majority (55.5%) identifying Kyiv as equally Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking, and a bilingual information space. Furthermore, 62% of respondents expressed the belief that the city should remain bilingual in the future. This suggests that at the turn of the 21st century, Kyiv residents were generally content with the active coexistence of bilingualism (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002).

Regarding diglossia, the survey revealed that in 2000, Russian dominated most areas of communication, while Ukrainian was confined primarily to formal settings (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002). Such diglossia, skewed toward Russian, arose because Russian was far more prevalent in

public life. Experts observed some degree of balance between the languages in political spheres and educational institutions, as well as in government agencies, research institutions, and radio programs (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002). This division remains relevant today, with the use of each language still influenced by whether the communication is formal or informal.

It is important to note that the factors contributing to diglossia have evolved over time. While language prestige and the formality/informality of communication were once key determinants of language distribution, today, the high-low opposition has shifted. In 2000, Ukrainian was not yet associated with prestige in Kyiv, as only half of the residents considered it prestigious, and fewer than one in four could definitively say whether speaking Ukrainian was prestigious in the city (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2002). In contrast, by 2017, approximately three-quarters of Ukrainians viewed Ukrainian as a prestigious language. This shift suggests that prestige is no longer a determining factor in the phenomenon of diglossia. Today, the key factor is the formality or informality of communication, as reflected in various surveys.

Additionally, data from a long-term monitoring study by the Institute of Sociology of NANU show that in April 2007, 30.2% of Kyiv residents used Ukrainian exclusively or mainly at home, while 56.3% used Russian. The situation was even more skewed in informal settings, with 27.1% using Ukrainian and 64.6% using Russian. This indicates a shift toward Russian, especially in public spaces, with an additional 8% more people using Russian in street or shop interactions compared to at home. The same survey also revealed that Russian was dominant in official communication, with 38.1% of respondents using Ukrainian at work or school, compared to 53.5% using Russian. Furthermore, only 11% of respondents were monolingual in either language, with the rest being bilingual, but with a marked preference for one language, typically Russian (Vyshnyak, 2009).

These findings underscore that the position of Ukrainian in Kyiv in 2007 was far from satisfactory, with Russian predominating in most areas of life. This trend was evident in the responses to the question about the language used by local government employees when communicating with citizens, with most respondents (35.4%) reporting that the choice of language was left to the employees, though legally, Ukrainian should have been the default. Despite only

1.2% of civil servants being Russian-speaking monolinguals, the majority used both languages, often choosing Russian, highlighting the bilingual nature of the city (Vyshnyak, 2009).

The diglossic character of Kyiv's bilingualism was also evident in a 2013 all-Ukrainian survey. A significant 96.4% of Kyiv residents agreed that civil servants should be proficient in Ukrainian, and 90.5% considered it mandatory for students to learn Ukrainian in school, compared to only half of the respondents emphasizing the importance of learning Russian. This indicates a shift toward favoring Ukrainian, particularly in formal communication. These findings demonstrate a growing desire among Kyiv residents to enhance the status of Ukrainian, at least in official contexts.

In the context of this study, it is also relevant to examine how Kyiv residents perceive their native language. According to the 2013 survey, 66.3% identified Ukrainian as their native language, while 9.2% identified Russian. Interestingly, a sizable 23.7% of respondents considered both languages their native tongue. While this indicates a decline in the number of monolingual speakers, it also suggests that Ukrainian is increasingly being recognized as a second native language.

Finally, monitoring data from the public organization “Space of Freedom” (2011-2019) provide insight into the functioning of Ukrainian and Russian in both formal and informal settings. Volunteers monitored food and retail establishments to determine how well the rights of Ukrainian-speaking customers were upheld, and analyzed formal communication by recording the language used by civil servants in city and regional councils. This data enables us to trace the dynamics of language usage in both spheres over the years.

The data presented below clearly indicates the growing prestige of Latin script in the signage of cafes and shops. It is important to note that this category includes not only foreign words but also names written in Latin script. The results reveal a gradual decline in the use of Ukrainian-language signs (e.g., 4 out of 10 Ukrainian-language signs in 2011, 2 out of 20 in 2017, and 7 out of 20 in 2019), alongside an increase in the use of Latin script (3 out of 10 in 2011, 15 out of 20 in 2017, and approximately half in 2019).

Year/number of studied subjects	Sign language				Is there menu/price tag in Ukrainian?		The language of communication with customers		
	Ukr	Rus	Latin	Other	Yes	No	Ukr	Rus	Switched to Ukrainian
2011	4	2	3	1	8	2	5	4	1
2012	8	3	8	1	17	3	8	7	5
2014 – 2015	6	4	7	3	19	1	5	6	9
2016	8	2	8	2	18	2	9	7	4
2017	2	3	15	0	20	0	7	9	4
2018	9	2	9	0	20	0	11	9	0
2019	7	1	10	2	19	1	12	5	3

Table 1. Monitoring of food and trade establishments in Kyiv

The use of the Russian language on shop windows and in cafes remains relatively unchanged. Notably, 2017 marked the peak of Latin's popularity on the signage of commercial and catering establishments. This trend suggests that, at present, English has emerged as the most prestigious language, overtaking Russian in the linguistic diglossia within Ukraine. English is now considered the most prestigious language, largely due to the growing prevalence of Latin-script names for cafes and shops. The situation with menus and price tags in Ukrainian is more favorable, but recent data indicates a slight decline. In 2018, all studied establishments displayed 100% usage of the Ukrainian language in menus and price tags. However, by 2019, this figure dropped to 95%.

The quality of customer service, particularly in relation to language use, remains problematic. Many employees continue to communicate with customers in Russian, often resisting the shift to the state language. The disproportionately high use of Russian by employees in food establishments cannot solely be attributed to linguistic preferences or psychological factors. In many instances, this language choice appears to stem from direct instructions from the business owners, who encourage communication in Russian. This claim has been corroborated by employees in informal conversations (The Situation of the Ukrainian Language in Ukraine, 2019).

Volunteers from “Space of Freedom” also assessed the use of the Ukrainian language in official settings by calling the reception offices of various city mayors with inquiries in Ukrainian regarding the competence of local government bodies. These calls were recorded for monitoring purposes. The findings revealed that language laws are not consistently adhered to at the official level. For example, in 2012, the Kyiv City Council responded to inquiries in Ukrainian, while regional councils continued to use Russian. Between 2014 and 2015, reception chairs in regional councils answered in Ukrainian, whereas city councils used Russian. By 2016, however, responses to Ukrainian inquiries from the head of the regional state administration were given in Ukrainian.

The violation of language legislation by state officials was further confirmed by a covert language inspection conducted by journalists from the TSN channel in the fall of 2017. This investigation highlighted the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism and diglossia in governmental offices, despite the implementation of the Law on Civil Service in May 2017, which mandates the use of Ukrainian by civil servants. During the inspection, the journalists visited the Pension Fund, where employees communicated with each other in Russian but switched to Ukrainian when prompted. The inspection revealed a favorable ratio of 5:1 in favor of Ukrainian, but this was mainly observed in the capital. In Kharkiv, only one out of five civil servants spoke Ukrainian, while in Dnipro, Russian was overwhelmingly dominant, with city council sessions and even the city anthem printed in Russian. Mayor Filatov, during a public dictation, made multiple errors when writing in Ukrainian, further demonstrating the lack of proficiency in the state language. These findings underscore the illegal nature of civil servants communicating with citizens in Russian, despite the latter addressing them in Ukrainian.

A similar inspection of service establishments in Kyiv further exposed the widespread use of Russian in violation of language laws. A TSN journalist investigation in August 2018, focusing on cafes and shops, showed that only one out of ten waiters immediately responded in Ukrainian, and a supermarket cashier was reluctant to switch to Ukrainian after being asked to do so. The rest of the employees in trade and catering establishments in the capital primarily used Russian. Many employees expressed resentment when requested to serve in the state language. One waitress, for example, remarked, “If this is so important to you, there are places where they speak Ukrainian. We consider ourselves a normal entertainment bar for young people”. This reflects a broader trend where service establishments actively refuse to comply with language legislation, sometimes even displaying aggression.

Thus, while there has been a gradual increase in the use of Ukrainian in Kyiv, the language remains marginalized in many areas of public life, particularly in informal settings. It is our contention that addressing the language situation must begin in the capital. Changing the linguistic atmosphere in Kyiv is essential, as this shift will inevitably have a broader impact on the rest of the country.

3.4. Prospects for the Ukrainization of society

The findings from both mass and focus group sociolinguistic research reaffirm that language issues in Ukraine have long been a contentious matter, one that divides the population into two distinct camps. Some Ukrainians regard language concerns as overblown, believing that the language spoken is of little importance. This view is predominantly held by Russian-speaking citizens. Conversely, others advocate for the protection of the Ukrainian language, asserting that a single state language should prevail in Ukraine. However, the critical question remains: which language dominates in the capital?

Kyiv's linguistic atmosphere has historically been defined by Russian as the language of the environment held a dominant and unquestioned position. As Masenko and Zaliznyak (2002) noted, the urban environment of Kyiv created “psychologically comfortable conditions for the Russian-speaking population and uncomfortable conditions for those loyal to their native language”. They further observed that speaking Ukrainian in all urban interactions required overcoming resistance

from the surrounding linguistic environment. In this context, Russian became the language of adaptation, while Ukrainian was relegated to the language of opposition.

Despite significant progress in the use of Ukrainian in recent years, Kyiv's linguistic environment has yet to fully reflect this shift. In addition to the continued presence of Russian, there is now a growing influence of the English language. One clear indication of this is the city's linguistic landscape. While the Law on Decommunization has had positive effects, notably altering the language landscape to better reflect Ukrainian culture and language, Ukrainian remains less prevalent in the names of private institutions—such as shops, cafes, hotels, and residential complexes—when compared to English or Russian. This is a clear manifestation of diglossia, as foreign-language names are often perceived as more prestigious, though the reasons for this remain unclear.

A case in point is the naming of shopping and entertainment centers in Kyiv. The majority of these establishments have names in English, including *Ocean Plaza*, *Sky Mall*, *Dream Town*, *Lavina Mall*, *Silver Breeze*, *Art Mall*, and *River Mall*. Even those malls whose names are pronounced according to Ukrainian orthoepy often appear in Latin script, such as *Gulliver* and *Globus*.

The situation is even more pronounced in children's stores, where the names reflect a predominance of foreign and Russian influences: *Babyzone*, *Chicco*, *Mothercare*, *Антошка*, *Лапушка*, *Альфа Тойс*, *Даниэль*, *Вабутах*, *Пуговка*, *Карануз*, *Пупсьонок*, *New Life Premium*, *Кроха*, and *Мишутка*.

Similarly, residential complexes in Kyiv are often named with foreign or Russian influences. Examples include: *Енисейская усадьба*, *The Garden*, *Manhattan City*, *Chicago Central House*, *Новая Англия*, *Французский квартал*, *New York Concept House*, *San Francisco Creative House*, *Jack House*, *Tetris Hall*, *Richmond*, *Royal Tower*, *Bristol Comfort House*, *Подол Градъ*, *Smart Plaza Obolon*, and *Ривьера*. These observations are consistent with Kravchenko's (2018) analysis of toponymic changes in Kyiv after 2014 (Kravchenko, 2014).

The trend of excessive anglophilia in Kyiv presents an intriguing linguistic phenomenon, revealing a cultural shift that prioritizes foreign influences over local language and identity.

However, following the events of 2013-2014, there has been a marked increase in the Ukrainian language consciousness. Sociolinguistic surveys conducted in 2017 show that more than 50% of respondents believe the use of the Ukrainian language has expanded, with approximately 30% agreeing that Russian is gradually losing its dominant position in Ukrainian communication. Many Ukrainians, including residents of Kyiv, have consciously begun to switch to Ukrainian, not wanting to use the language of the aggressor. Numerous personal stories of such transitions can be found online, reflecting the broader societal shift toward the state language. Given the continuous rise in the number of individuals adopting the Ukrainian language, I share the opinion that the future of Ukraine is likely to be shaped by the Ukrainian language.

This transformation is greatly facilitated by various public initiatives aimed at supporting the state language. Notably, the volunteer movement *Free Ukrainian Language Courses* has established a wide network of informal language courses for Ukrainians seeking fluency in the state language. Volunteers promote Ukrainian literature and books, organize meetings with authors, initiate projects to replenish local libraries with contemporary literature, hold courses for migrants, and even run summer camps for children of military personnel and migrants.

The public movement *Do Not Be Indifferent*, comprising many prominent figures, has since 2005 contributed to the restoration of Ukrainian civic consciousness in diverse fields such as history, literature, education, and music. The *Switch to Ukrainian* project encourages individuals to adopt the state language, sharing real stories of language code-switching. Additionally, various social media groups, such as *Ukrainian-speaking Kyiv*, *Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine*, and others, foster the activation of the state language within digital spaces.

As evidenced by the above, many Ukrainians are actively advocating for the use of the state language. Public movements and organizations dedicated to protecting and expanding the use of Ukrainian have achieved far more on their own than government institutions. Consequently, it can be argued that the government is significantly lagging behind the population in terms of language policies. I remain hopeful that the wave of Ukrainization will continue to gain momentum, and that state language policies will not only align with but actively promote the broader adoption of the Ukrainian language.

3.5. Some aspects of Ukrainian multilingualism

Linguists have extensively analyzed the phenomenon of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, which has been a defining feature of the linguistic landscape of Ukraine. However, the coexistence of the Ukrainian language with other languages has a long and complex history, and it remains an area of considerable academic interest. Given the active migration patterns, as well as the existence of Ukrainian communities worldwide, it is crucial to explore the role of the Ukrainian language in a multilingual environment. The experience of Ukrainians living in foreign-language environments undoubtedly necessitates the acquisition of proficiency in another language, which in turn impacts the boundaries and contexts in which the native language is used. This situation raises significant questions about the status of the native language in the contemporary multicultural and multilingual world, especially in terms of its expanding functional scope. The choice of a communication language often correlates with the possibility of selecting a place of residence and asserting one's identity.

As Kassen (2016) aptly notes:

The native language is the language in which we were born or the languages in which we were born, and it is not the only possible one. The native language is the one in which we are immersed; it is the language we 'bathe' in; we are masters of this language, yet it holds us in its grip. This is an extraordinary relationship. We are its masters because we can express anything we wish with it, but it holds us because it determines our thinking, way of life, and being. (Kassen 2016: 17)

In a similar vein, Polish scholar Lipińska defines the native language as “the first language a person learns, the one with which they connect to their environment. It plays a pivotal role in shaping a person’s worldview and individual identity. The native language is also associated with thought, dreams, calculation, and prayer” (Lipińska, 2003). This definition underscores the profound link between language and identity, a connection that remains salient despite the increasingly multilingual nature of contemporary societies.

Kassen further reflects on the multilingual experience, stating, “Many languages are many worlds, many ways to open up to the world” (Kassen, 2016). Multilingualism, driven by geopolitical factors, migration, and educational transformations, expands the functional boundaries of languages, often reshaping their roles and leading to the emergence of new linguistic forms.

Linguistic interference, borrowing, and the development of *lingua franca* or global English are direct consequences of such interactions between languages (Karlinsky, 1990). Within the field of modern sociolinguistics, the status of the Ukrainian language is typically framed within the context of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, often influenced by historical and political circumstances. However, this is merely one of the potential scenarios for the Ukrainian language's role in the global linguistic map. The Ukrainian-Russian language contact during the Soviet era can be accurately described as diglossia, characterized by a clear tendency toward linguistic convergence and functional limitation within society (Karlinsky, 1990).

The legacy of Soviet-era language policies continues to shape contemporary Ukrainian linguistic realities. Masenko, in her work *The Language of Soviet Totalitarianism*, offers an in-depth analysis of the linguistic influences and innovations introduced during this period, describing the post-Soviet Ukrainian linguistic landscape as one marked by “a division along linguistic lines”, a phenomenon she argues reflects a broader confrontation of identities and civilizational orientations (Masenko, 2017).

Since Ukraine's independence, this phenomenon has persisted, with the Ukrainian language predominantly occupying specific spheres such as official administration, literature, and education. However, the media landscape has propagated an illusory bilingual situation, which has contributed to the continued presence of the Russian language across various societal domains. The multiculturalism and multilingualism that characterized pre-war Ukrainian cities have not been given due scholarly attention. Additionally, the bilingualism of border regions, such as Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-German bilingualism, remains underexplored, despite the historical division of these territories between various empires. The works of bilingual writers from the 19th and early 20th centuries reveal how language choice was deeply intertwined with questions of identity.

Shevelyov's *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900–1941): State and Status* (2009) represents a comprehensive study of Ukrainian language development and its coexistence with other languages during this period. In contemporary Ukraine, bilingualism remains multifaceted, further complicated by the rise of “mixed” families, cross-border migration, and the experience of children raised abroad, all of which contribute to an increasing number of bilingual children. The phenomenon of bilingualism in emigration is subject to diverse

interpretations and varies with each successive wave of migration. The first waves of emigration to the Americas, Australia, and other regions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries largely involved lower-educated populations. The social conditions and limited educational opportunities within migrant communities prevented full linguistic assimilation, particularly for the first generation. The subsequent generations, however, often spoke a form of Ukrainian influenced by regional dialects from Eastern and Western Galicia and Bukovina, reflecting the areas from which the majority of emigrants originated.

American scholar Seals provides a succinct account of the linguistic situation within the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States, noting, “Most members of the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA speak a Galician variant of Ukrainian, shaped by early 20th-century emigration. This version of the language is often described as 'Ukrainian cookbook' due to its non-standardized nature” (Seals, 2014). Today, descendants of the first wave of emigrants typically maintain their ancestral language, though it is largely confined to use within the family or religious communities. As sociolinguistic studies of other languages indicate, family communication tends to evolve over time, often incorporating multiple languages. This phenomenon, while underrepresented in Ukrainian linguistic literature, can be compared to the linguistic experience of other diaspora communities.

The more recent waves of emigration, starting in the 1990s, have brought the modern Ukrainian literary language to regions such as North America, Australia, and Canada. These developments have led to a revitalization of the Ukrainian-speaking environment, as new generations of migrants increasingly view their native language as a vital tool for cultural preservation. This has led to the establishment of Ukrainian language schools and community centers aimed at supporting the linguistic development of children. However, the rising trend toward assimilation poses challenges for the maintenance of the language, especially in migrant communities. Similarly, labor migration to countries like England, Italy, Spain, and Portugal has introduced new forms of bilingualism and multilingualism, often influenced by the local languages.

In the case of Ukrainian-Polish bilingualism, historical factors such as border changes and the shifting political landscape have played a key role in shaping the language dynamics. During the period from 1886 to 1939, so-called “utraquist” schools operated in Galicia, where academic

subjects were taught in both Ukrainian and Polish. Following the end of World War II and the forced resettlements of Ukrainians in the aftermath of the “Vistula” campaign of 1947, Ukrainian ceased to be the language of instruction for national minorities in Poland, and its use became limited to domestic settings. Despite these changes, Ukrainian-Polish bilingualism has persisted, particularly in Polish communities with historical ties to Ukraine.

Recent migration between Ukraine and Poland, particularly following the events of 2013-2014 and the ongoing war with Russia, has further altered the linguistic landscape. Among the migrant population, the Polish language has become the dominant language of education, while Ukrainian remains largely confined to domestic and familial contexts. Notably, this migration has introduced a new wave of multilingualism, with many migrants speaking not only Ukrainian and Polish but also Russian, despite the latter not being their native language. This evolving linguistic landscape is creating a unique multilingual environment that warrants further study.

In summary, the existence of Ukrainian language variants abroad, such as Ukrainian-English, Ukrainian-Italian, Ukrainian-Spanish, Ukrainian-Portuguese, Ukrainian-Polish, and Ukrainian-Czech, demonstrates the dynamic nature of Ukrainian multilingualism. These forms of bilingualism reflect both the historical and contemporary factors shaping the Ukrainian language in diaspora communities. The preservation of pre-war dialects, the influence of modern Ukrainian, and the integration of foreign linguistic elements all contribute to a multifaceted linguistic reality that continues to evolve. The study of these processes offers valuable insights into the changing nature of Ukrainian language use in a globalized world.

3.6 Language situation in Ukraine during the war 2022-2023

In times of crisis, particularly during war, the role of language as a symbol of national unity and as a demarcation between “ally” and “enemy” becomes increasingly pronounced. In 2022, the integrative and symbolic functions of the Ukrainian language became especially significant. At the same time, Russian, although still used by a portion of Ukrainians, gradually ceased to be a marker of national identity for them.

The full-scale Russian invasion accelerated the process of Ukrainization. The Ukrainian language began to dominate in regions (such as the South and East of Ukraine) and spheres

(including informal communication, professional environments, and virtual spaces) where it had not previously held a leading position.

The mass displacement of Ukrainian citizens abroad significantly increased the interest of foreign nationals in learning the Ukrainian language. Within a few months of the Russian invasion, Ukrainian emerged as one of the most popular European languages, and its global ranking saw a notable rise.

An additional catalyst for the growth of the Ukrainian language's prestige was internal migration. This process was further supported by public initiatives centered around promoting Ukrainian, such as those implemented by several Ukrainian higher education institutions.

Several key aspects of the language situation, directly influenced by the full-scale Russian invasion, highlight the evolving dynamics of language use in Ukraine. These aspects can be grouped into three main categories, discussed below.

3.6.1 Expansion of the Ukrainian-speaking audience

Sociological studies corroborate the growing dominance of Ukrainian. For instance, in March 2022, the sociological group “Rating” conducted a nationwide survey on the language issue in Ukraine, revealing the following trends, as in (9):

- (9) Language trends in Ukraine, according to the sociological group “Rating” are the following
- a. Between 2012 and 2022, the proportion of individuals who consider Ukrainian their native language increased from 57% to 76%. Over the same period, the number of people identifying Russian as their native language dropped by 22%, from 42% to 20%.
 - b. The Russian-speaking demographic began to decline, from about 40% of respondents in 2012 to 26% by the end of 2021, and 18% at the onset of the war.
 - c. The war contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian society, significantly influencing attitudes towards the status of the language. The majority (83%) of respondents agreed that Ukrainian should be the sole state language.

- d. The proportion of respondents in favor of granting Russian official status decreased sharply. From 25% in February 2022, support for Russian as a state language dwindled to just 7% by March 2022 (“The Sixth National Survey: The Language Issue in Ukraine,” March 19, 2022, by sociological group “Rating”).

An additional survey, “Language and Identity in Ukraine at the End of 2022”, conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, further emphasized key shifts in the language situation, as in (10):

(10) Key shifts in the Ukrainian language situation, according to the survey “Language and Identity in Ukraine at the End of 2022”

- a. There was an increase in the number of people using Ukrainian in everyday life, alongside a corresponding decrease in Russian speakers. In December 2022, 41% of respondents reported speaking only Ukrainian, while another 17% primarily communicated in Ukrainian. Only 6% spoke exclusively in Russian, and 9% used Russian predominantly. Compared to 2017, the share of Ukrainian speakers increased by 8%, while Russian speakers decreased by 11%.
- b. Among respondents, 52% communicated only or mostly in Ukrainian at home, while 16% primarily used Russian. This represented a significant shift from 2017, when 51% of respondents communicated mainly in Ukrainian, and 25% primarily used Russian.
- c. At work or school, 68% of respondents indicated they primarily or exclusively used Ukrainian, while only 11% used Russian.
- d. A sharp increase in 2022 was noted in the number of individuals who regarded the Russian language as irrelevant, with 58% of respondents adopting this view, compared to just 9% in 2014. Notably, even in traditionally Russian-speaking regions, such as the South and East, 46% of residents held this opinion.
- e. A significant shift occurred in the South and East of Ukraine, where the number of people identifying as Ukrainian increased from 64% in 2017 to 90% in 2022.

Further reinforcing this trend, a 2023 survey by the research agency “Info Sapiens” confirmed that, in the year following the war's onset, the proportion of Ukrainian speakers increased by 16%, from 46% in February 2022 to 62% in January 2023. Conversely, the proportion of Russian-speaking Ukrainians decreased from 26% to 13% (Info Sapiens, 2023).

The prominence of the Ukrainian language also surged in the digital sphere. For instance, Freelancehunt, an online freelance platform, configured its pages to open in Ukrainian for users from Ukraine. Prior to the war, the share of freelancers using Ukrainian on the platform ranged from 11% to 30%. After the Russian invasion, this figure increased to 96%.

3.6.2 Growing popularity of the Ukrainian language

The trend of increased interest in the Ukrainian language continued both within Ukraine and abroad. Russian aggression triggered a large-scale displacement of individuals from Eastern Ukraine to central and western regions, with most of these internal migrants being Russian speakers. This created favorable conditions for many to adopt the Ukrainian language.

In 2022, the “United” project was actively implemented, helping nearly 50,000 people transition to speaking Ukrainian after completing eight courses. The project remains ongoing, offering free participation to anyone, from any location worldwide. Currently, the “United” project is active in 25 Ukrainian cities and united territorial communities.

Additionally, as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine, more than 1.3 million foreign users began learning Ukrainian. This trend was particularly pronounced in countries that had accepted large numbers of Ukrainian refugees.

According to the online language-learning platform Duolingo, demand for Ukrainian language courses surged dramatically. In Ireland, interest in learning Ukrainian rose by 2,229%, while in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic, demand increased by 1,651%, 1,615%, 1,590%, and 1,513%, respectively.

In 2022, the Ukrainian language experienced a 20-position rise in global popularity rankings, moving from 37th in 2021 to 17th. In Germany, Ukrainian's position jumped from 36th to 15th, and in the United States, it climbed from 36th to 22nd (Duolingo, 2022).

3.6.3 Public protection of the Ukrainian language

The Russian invasion highlighted the importance of both state and public initiatives for the promotion and protection of the Ukrainian language. Notably, two Ukrainian universities—Kharkiv National University and Kyiv-Mohyla Academy—took significant steps in 2023 to support the Ukrainian language.

In January, Kharkiv University appointed a language ombudsman from its teaching staff to monitor compliance with language legislation and promote the use of Ukrainian. M. Filon, head of the Department of Ukrainian Language, was appointed the university's language commissioner.

Similarly, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy adopted new internal regulations, recommending, and in some cases mandating, that Russian not be used within the university due to its association with the aggressor country. This policy applied not only to classroom interactions but also to informal communication in the university's public spaces, such as cafeterias and corridors. However, no punitive sanctions were imposed. As the president of NaUKMA noted, the initiative aimed not at punishment, but at cultural change: “This is not about punishment, but about transforming our internal corporate culture. The goal is not to punish, but to foster a fully Ukrainian-speaking university”.

Language ombudsman positions have since been introduced at other universities, including Kharkiv National University named after G. S. Skovoroda and South Ukrainian National Pedagogical University named after K. D. Ushynskiyi. Interestingly, at the pedagogical university, the responsibility for protecting the language rights of students was entrusted to a female student, rather than a staff member.

3.7 Sociolinguistic changes in Ukraine (2024–2025)

In the period since 2023, Ukraine's language policies have continued to evolve. On 26 June 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed legislation establishing English as the language of international communication in Ukraine (Kyiv Independent, 2024a). The law, which was first introduced to the Verkhovna Rada in 2023, mandates knowledge of English for a wide range of positions in national and local government, provides guidelines for the use of English in ministries, emergency services, signage and public information, and encourages cinemas to show English-language films in the original with Ukrainian subtitles. This measure links the learning of

English with Ukraine's goal of integration into European institutions and reframes multilingualism as a pathway to prosperity; language policy now sits at the intersection of domestic nation-building and the country's geopolitical reorientation towards the European Union and the wider world.

Official policy has been accompanied by changing language practices. A March 2023 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that about half of respondents had some knowledge of English, but less than a quarter were confident using it for everyday communication. In that survey, a strong majority of parents expressed a desire for their children to improve their English skills, and more than half reported that their children were already learning English at school or elsewhere. Interest in other European languages has also grown: roughly one in five respondents reported some knowledge of Polish and one in seven said they had studied German, reflecting both labour migration and the linguistic environment in neighbouring countries. The same poll did not ask about Russian, highlighting a broader trend to sideline that language in discussions of foreign-language competence. Taken together, these data suggest that by 2024 Ukrainian society increasingly perceives English as a prerequisite for professional success and European integration, while other European languages are valued for practical reasons such as work and education.

Language use on social media provides another window onto sociolinguistic shifts (Kyiv Independent, 2024b). Analyses of millions of posts on Facebook, Instagram and TikTok show that the dominance of the Ukrainian language has continued to expand through 2024 and 2025. More than ninety per cent of posts on Instagram are now written in Ukrainian, while the share of Ukrainian-language content on Facebook has risen to around three quarters, up from about two thirds a year earlier and from only a fifth in 2020. The picture on TikTok is similarly striking: whereas Russian-language content used to outnumber Ukrainian posts by two to one, Ukrainian language use has now reversed that ratio. Researchers note that although the rate of increase may slow in the coming years, the upward trajectory remains clear, and platforms once dominated by Russian have seen a decisive shift in favour of Ukrainian. The interplay between online media and offline identity politics therefore reinforces the ongoing re-Ukrainianisation of public space.

These trends are corroborated by behavioural studies showing that many Russian-speaking users consciously switched to Ukrainian after the full-scale invasion and have maintained that choice.

Observers describe this as an act of solidarity and resistance rather than a matter of convenience. The ideological neutrality that characterized much of Ukraine's bilingual environment before 2022 has given way to a strong association between the Russian language and the aggressor state, while Ukrainian has become a symbol of national unity. At the same time, millions of Ukrainians have been displaced to neighboring countries. Refugees in Poland, Germany and other European states have had to acquire the host country's language for employment and education, but they continue to use Ukrainian as a marker of identity. This interplay of Ukrainian, English and various European languages signals the emergence of a multilingual ecology in which the declining use of Russian is accompanied by a growing emphasis on both national language loyalty and wider international connectivity.

Taken together, the developments of 2024–2025 suggest that post-invasion Ukraine is moving towards a trilingual configuration dominated by Ukrainian, with English occupying a privileged position as a *lingua franca* and other European languages playing more localized roles. Legislation, popular attitudes and digital behavior all point in the same direction: the state actively promotes the acquisition of English; parents view foreign languages as essential for their children's futures; and social media users increasingly avoid Russian in favour of Ukrainian. Although the process is uneven across regions and social groups, the overall trajectory is unmistakable. These findings not only highlight the impact of the war on language choices but also reveal how linguistic practices are shaped by geopolitical aspirations and the social imaginaries of a nation seeking to redefine itself.

Summary. Chapter 3 examined the present-day language situation in Ukraine, documenting the spread of Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism, the rise of Ukrainian as the state language, and the growing importance of English as a *lingua franca*. These insights prepare the reader for Chapter 4, where I present empirical findings from our sociolinguistic survey of Kyiv residents and interpret them in light of recent sociopolitical events. The overview of the current sociolinguistic situation thus prepares the ground for the empirical study presented in Chapter 4. In this way, the theoretical and historical parts of the dissertation should be read not merely as a background, but as a critical synthesis, that directly informs the author's own analysis.

Chapter 4: Empirical research in Kyiv

This chapter presents the empirical core of the dissertation. Its primary goal is to examine the language attitudes and practices of Kyiv residents during a period of profound sociopolitical change. Drawing on an original sociolinguistic survey conducted in 2023, the analysis addresses three main research questions: how Ukrainian and Russian are allocated across formal and informal domains, how demographic variables such as age and education shape language attitudes, and how the Russian invasion of 2022 has influenced perceptions of linguistic prestige and future language use. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 outlines the research design, including the questionnaire, its structure and guiding principles. Section 4.2 describes the methodology, participants, and statistical tools applied. Section 4.3 presents descriptive findings, followed by inferential analyses and discussion in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 synthesizes the results, while Section 4.6 offers a comparative perspective linking the 2023 Kyiv survey with broader Ukrainian trends. Finally, Section 4.7 outlines the study's limitations and suggests directions for future research.

4.1. Research design

The empirical design is directly grounded in the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1. The survey represents the first systematic sociolinguistic study of Kyiv residents under wartime conditions. The questionnaire was explicitly designed to operationalize key theoretical constructs discussed in Chapters 1–3, such as bilingualism, diglossia, and translanguaging, thereby ensuring both theoretical consistency and methodological innovation. Specifically, typologies of bilingualism (e.g., additive vs. subtractive; coordinative vs. subordinate), the diglossic distribution of “high/low” codes, and code-switching/translanguaging constructs inform the operationalization of our variables and the formulation of hypotheses about language choice across domains. These constructs motivate our focus on (a) functional allocations of Ukrainian vs. Russian in formal/informal settings, (b) age- and education-related differences in language attitudes, and (c) wartime shifts in perceived prestige and intended future use, which are tested through cross-tabulations and χ^2 -based comparisons. Sociolinguistic research employs a range of field-based methods, from structured questionnaires and mass surveys to focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Drawing on methods rooted in sociology and anthropology, Ukrainian linguists have applied these techniques to the study of bilingualism, diglossia, and emerging multilingualism in

the context of societal transformation. The research reported in this chapter uses a quantitative survey to capture attitudes and practices among adult residents of Kyiv. Close-ended questions were deliberately chosen to allow straightforward coding and statistical analysis.

This study fills a gap in sociolinguistic research on Ukraine by providing original data collected during wartime, triangulated with previous national surveys (2006, 2017). By linking quantitative patterns to a transdisciplinary theoretical framework, it offers a critical synthesis of bilingualism, diglossia and translanguaging, and proposes the concept of Russian as a declining *lingua franca* (RLF).

4.1.1. Research questions and predictions

The interview was structured around close-ended questions to facilitate straightforward and precise calculations. The questionnaire was organized into four thematic blocks:

- **Questions 1-4:** These questions designed to gather demographic data for subsequent analysis and correlation, including age, gender, level of education, and employment status.
- **Questions 5-19:** These questions aim to collect information about the daily language choices and behavior of Ukrainian citizens across domains (home, friends, public spaces and workplace) and on attitudes towards coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian.
- **Questions 20-28:** These questions examine knowledge of English and other foreign languages, motivations for learning English and its perceived importance as a link to the outside world. Question 24, in particular, seeks to identify the most popular foreign languages for study in Ukraine.
- **Questions 29-30:** These questions assess the perceived importance of language issues in contemporary Ukraine.

These questions were designed to be completed within 10–12 minutes, to be relevant to current sociolinguistic debates and to remain neutral in tone so as not to influence responses.

The formulation of these questions adhered to several key criteria, as in (11):

(11) Key criteria for the questions formulation

- a. A relatively short period for completing the questionnaire to encourage high response rates.
- b. Relevance to current sociolinguistic and societal trends.
- c. Objectivity in phrasing, ensuring the questions did not oppress, condemn, restrict, or incite respondents, irrespective of regional or cultural background (e.g., respondents from southern or western Ukraine).
- d. Engaging and interesting questions that would prompt thoughtful responses.

The full questionnaire with all 30 items and answer options is provided in Appendix A.

4.1.2. Research hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The primary hypothesis of this study posits that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian language acquired the status of a *lingua franca* (RLF) in the post-Soviet states. Russian has maintained a significant presence across the former Soviet republics, particularly in the eastern, southeastern, and northeastern regions of Ukraine. The role of Russian as a *lingua franca* can be likened to that of English (ELF), as both languages exert substantial influence far beyond the boundaries of their respective countries. A key manifestation of the RLF phenomenon is the growing dominance of the Russian language in Ukraine, especially in certain cities and regions that have undergone partial or full Russification over time. This widespread use of Russian in public life has posed significant challenges to nation-building efforts by local authorities. In some areas, the situation has been exacerbated by the high levels of Russification among members of the titular nation, further entrenching Russian as the language of governance, education, and public discourse. As a result, the primary objectives of post-Soviet language policy have been focused on derussification and shifting the dominance toward the titular language, Ukrainian (Pavlenko, 2006). The lack of adequate language policy, legislative support, and the prevalence of Russian language use have rendered the status of Ukrainian language unstable, often manifesting in bilingualism and language mixing, such as Surzhyk. However, despite the continued dominance of Russian in many spheres, especially in the capital and the eastern and southern regions, recent geopolitical shifts, particularly the Russian invasion in 2022, have sparked a significant language shift. This conflict has prompted many Ukrainians to reconsider their linguistic identity and language practices, with a notable increase in the use of Ukrainian.

Hypothesis 2: The second hypothesis suggests that English is the most commonly studied foreign language among Ukrainians. Following the events of 2022, this hypothesis can be modified to reflect the growing role of English as a *lingua franca* in the digital space. In particular, Ukrainians, as non-native speakers, have increasingly adopted English to communicate the truth about Russian war crimes and the broader situation to the international community. The use of English in social media platforms, particularly Twitter, has become a crucial tool in countering Russian propaganda and disseminating information globally. The history of Ukraine's digital engagement can be distinctly divided into two phases: before and after February 24, 2022, with the latter seeing a significant shift toward the use of English as a means of global communication.

Hypothesis 3: The third hypothesis proposes that younger age groups are more likely to choose Ukrainian as their primary language compared to older generations.

Hypothesis 4: The fourth hypothesis posits that the likelihood of choosing Ukrainian or English increases proportionally with the level of education. Higher levels of education are expected to correlate with greater use of both languages, particularly in academic and professional contexts.

Hypothesis 5: The fifth hypothesis asserts that language-related issues are of significant importance to the majority of Ukrainians, reflecting growing awareness of language policy and cultural identity in the post-Soviet context.

Hypothesis 6: The sixth hypothesis anticipates that the preference for the Ukrainian language is both strong and increasingly favorable, particularly in the wake of recent socio-political developments in Ukraine.

4.2. Methodology

The primary research tool for data collection in this dissertation is a structured questionnaire. The survey was administered via Google Forms. The purpose of gathering information regarding the use and role of the Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages in Ukraine is to test the hypotheses proposed in this study. Furthermore, the data obtained from this empirical research are utilized to examine specific linguistic processes and phenomena occurring within the language environment of Ukraine in the contemporary context.

This sociolinguistic study is not solely concerned with describing the particular sample but aims to draw broader conclusions about the entire population from which the sample was drawn. In essence, the goal is to analyze, describe, and document the ongoing changes within the Ukrainian linguistic environment.

The research specifically targets the attitudes and opinions of adult residents of Kyiv towards the Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages. Consequently, I opted for a quantitative survey approach designed to collect primary data. The decision to use Google Forms for the survey was based on several key factors, as in (12):

(12) Key factors for the decision to use Google Forms

- a. User accessibility and popularity: Google Forms is a widely recognized and accessible tool, making it convenient for participants to engage with the survey.
- b. Efficiency and time constraints: The questionnaire is designed to be completed within a short timeframe, which encourages higher participation rates and reduces the burden on respondents.
- c. Cost-effectiveness: Utilizing Google Forms eliminates the need for funding, making it a cost-effective choice for data collection.
- d. Concise survey design: The questionnaire is relatively brief, consisting primarily of closed-ended questions, which facilitates quick responses and straightforward data analysis.

4.2.1. Participants

Kyiv was chosen as the site for this research due to my frequent visits to the city throughout my life, as well as the support of close friends and acquaintances who assisted in the distribution of the questionnaires. One of the primary challenges encountered in the data collection process was reaching participants from the oldest age group, as many individuals in this category do not regularly use the internet. To address this issue, interviews with older participants were conducted face-to-face (via my representatives) or over the telephone, with responses subsequently entered into the questionnaire. For younger and middle-aged participants, I employed advertising on social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook. These platforms are cost-effective and offer

targeted tools that enable the identification of participants based on parameters such as age, city of residence, and interests.

The research sample for this study was characterized by the responses to the first four questions in the questionnaire, which gathered data on gender, age, education level, and employment status. The demographic characteristics of the sample reflect the population of Kyiv in terms of these variables, specifically gender, age, education, and employment. While the sample provides a broad representation of the population, it should be noted that no survey can fully capture the characteristics of an entire population.

A total of 300 participants took part in the survey. The sample was stratified across three age categories, with 100 participants (33.3%) in each group: 18-35, 36-50, and 51+. This age-based balance was implemented to ensure that the information collected would be more objective and accurate (see Fig. 7). Gender distribution was also relatively balanced, with 51.3% female and 48.7% male participants (see Fig. 8). All respondents were adults, aged 18 and above, and all 300 participants were residents of Kyiv or its agglomeration.

Regarding education levels, more than 50% of the respondents (55.9%) held a bachelor's degree, followed by 27.1% with a master's degree. A smaller group of respondents (11.7%) had no higher education, while the least numerous category (5.4%) consisted of individuals holding a doctoral degree (see Fig. 9). Additionally, over 70% of respondents were employed (see Fig. 10).

4.2.2. Data collection and instruments

To collect empirical data, a structured questionnaire was designed and administered between February and May 2023. The survey was distributed via an online platform and through in-person interviews in public spaces in Kyiv. A pilot test with 30 respondents was conducted to refine question wording and sequence.

The final questionnaire comprised 30 items organized into four sections: demographic information (age, gender, education, employment); language practices in different domains (home, work, social media); attitudes towards Ukrainian, Russian and English; and future language intentions.

Participants were recruited through social media advertisements, university mailing lists, and local community centers. The sample was quota-balanced across age groups and gender to approximate the demographic profile of Kyiv's adult population. In total, 300 valid responses were collected for analysis.

4.2.3. Statistical analysis

Before presenting the results, it is important to explain why the chosen statistical procedures are appropriate for the present study. The survey data consist primarily of categorical variables (e.g., age group, level of education, declared mother tongue, home language use). For such variables, parametric tests such as t-tests or ANOVA are not suitable, since they assume interval or ratio-level data. Instead, Pearson's chi-square test was selected as the most established method for examining associations between categorical variables.

While the chi-square statistic itself indicates only whether an association exists, it does not reflect the strength of that association. To address this, Cramér's V is reported as an effect size, providing a standardized measure (0–1) that helps evaluate the practical importance of the results. This is particularly relevant for survey data where large sample sizes may yield statistically significant results even for weak associations.

In addition, for multi-item scales designed to measure a single underlying construct, internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach's α . This reliability coefficient indicates whether the items can be meaningfully combined into a single index; values above .70 are generally considered acceptable in the social sciences.

All assumptions of the tests were checked. For the chi-square analyses, independence of observations was guaranteed by the survey design, and expected cell frequencies were examined to ensure they were sufficiently large (≥ 5). In the cases where the assumption was borderline, categories were collapsed to preserve validity. The decision to use two-tailed tests with an α -level of .05 follows international conventions in sociolinguistics and the social sciences more broadly, reflecting a neutral stance toward the possible direction of effects.

Building on these justifications, the analyses were conducted as follows. Pearson's chi-square test assessed associations between categorical variables (e.g., age group $\times$ declared L1), with Yates' correction applied for 2 $\times$ 2 tables where appropriate. Cramér's V was reported as an effect size (0–1) to gauge the strength of association, complementing p-values. Where internal consistency of multi-item scales was relevant, Cronbach's α was provided to indicate reliability. All tests were two-tailed; the α -level was set at .05 unless stated otherwise.

Effect sizes were calculated using Cramer's V to quantify the strength of association. The results showed significant correlations between age and the preference for Ukrainian: younger respondents were more likely to select Ukrainian as their main language, whereas older respondents showed higher rates of Russian or bilingual preferences. Education level also correlated with positive attitudes toward English; respondents with university degrees expressed stronger support for compulsory English education and viewed it as essential for professional success. These analyses lend statistical weight to the qualitative observations discussed in the following sections.

I analyzed associations between categorical variables using Pearson's chi-square tests of independence. For each cross-tabulation, I report the test statistic χ^2 with degrees of freedom (df), the exact p-value, and the effect size Cramér's V calculated as:

$$V = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{n \cdot (k-1)}} , \quad k = \min(r, c) ,$$

where:

- V = Cramér's V effect size (0–1),
- χ^2 = chi-square statistic,
- n = total sample size,
- k = the smaller of the number of rows (r) or columns (c) in the contingency table,
- r = number of rows in the contingency table,
- c = number of columns in the contingency table.

In simple terms, this coefficient indicates how strong the association is: the closer V is to 0, the weaker the link; the closer to 1, the stronger. Following common conventions, I interpret $V \approx .10$ as small, $\approx .30$ as medium, and $\geq .50$ as large (for $2 \times k/3 \times k$ tables). For instance, in the cross-tabulation of age $\times$ home language, the test compares the observed number of younger respondents speaking Ukrainian at home with the number that would be expected if age and home language were unrelated. Assumptions were checked: observations are independent and expected cell counts were ≥ 5 ; where this was borderline, categories were collapsed. For the two-item salience scale (Q29–Q30) I report Cronbach's α as an index of internal consistency ($\alpha = .78$). This means that respondents answered these two questions in a consistent way, as if they were pointing to the same underlying attitude.

1. What is your age?

300 відповідей




Figure 6. Distribution by age in Kyiv city.

2. What is your gender?

300 відповідей




Figure 7. Distribution by gender criterion in Kyiv city.

3. What is your level of education?

300 відповідей




Figure 8. Level of education in Kyiv city.

4. Do you work?

300 відповідей




Figure 9. Employment in Kyiv city

4.3 Descriptive results

This subsection presents the descriptive data of our survey. I analyze demographic characteristics (age, gender, education), the language of communication at home and at work, attitudes toward state language policy, and willingness to learn English. Further (in Section 4.4), an inferential analysis is provided, where χ^2 -tests are used to assess the relationships between demographic factors and language practices.

4.3.1 Demographic profile (Questions 1–4)

The balanced sample comprised 100 participants in each age group: 18–35, 36–50 and 51+. Men constituted 48.7 % and women 51.3 %. The majority held a bachelor's degree (55.9 %); master's degree (27.1 %), secondary education (11.7 %) and doctoral or other degrees (5.3 %) comprised the remainder. Three-quarters (73 %) were employed. Thus, the sample reflects a balance between different age groups and levels of education, but younger respondents constitute the most dynamic segment and are the key drivers of language change.

4.3.2 Mother tongue and home language (Questions 5–9)

Over three-quarters of respondents (77.3 %) declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue; 17.0 % named Russian. The highest proportion of Russian mother tongue speakers was found among those aged 51 + (31 %). Ukrainian was used at home by 52.7 % of respondents; 8.3 % used both Ukrainian and Russian, and 39 % used mainly Russian. Similar patterns were observed in interactions with friends and in everyday situations: Ukrainian dominated across all age groups, but code-mixing remained common among middle-aged and older participants. Interactions at work shown that younger and middle-aged respondents predominantly used Ukrainian, whereas 19 % of the 51 + group used Russian or switched between languages. The data reveal a clear generational divide: younger respondents are far more likely to declare Ukrainian as their native language and to use it at home, whereas older participants more often rely on Russian or mixed practices.

4.3.3 Language attitudes and future intentions (Questions 10–19)

Regarding language policy, 82 % of participants supported the proposition that Ukrainian should be the only state language; 11 % chosen option “hard to answer”, and 5 % advocated official bilingualism. This indicates a broad societal consensus about the centrality of Ukrainian in public life. Over half (55 %) perceived no major conflict between Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, though 19.3 % acknowledged occasional tensions and 19.7 % viewed the coexistence of languages as a serious problem.

The full-scale invasion profoundly affected attitudes: 68 % reported their attitude to Russian had changed since February 2022, with the greatest change among participants aged 18–35. When

asked about media consumption, 34.3 % had already restricted Russian-language content, 42.3 % planned to do so gradually and 23.3 % planned no change. A clear majority (85.3 %) rejected the notion that Ukrainians and Russians constitute a single nation; agreement with this statement was below 1.7 % across all age groups. This suggests that the invasion acted as a trigger for re-evaluating the symbolic meaning of Russian.

Respondents displayed a strong willingness to maintain Ukrainian in interactions with Russian-speaking interlocutors: 68.7 % would continue speaking Ukrainian even if addressed in Russian. Regarding child-rearing, 77.7 % planned to raise children in Ukrainian, 18.0 % intended to raise bilingual children and only 4.3 % planned to raise children in Russian. More than three-quarters (74.3 %) did not intend to teach their children Russian. The survey indicates a high level of support for Ukrainian as the sole state language, with this position being most pronounced among more educated respondents; at the same time, there is a general trend toward a positive re-evaluation of the status of Ukrainian in society.

4.3.4 English and other foreign languages (Questions 20–30)

Commitment to English learning was high. 86.7 % planned to teach their children English, and 62.0 % reported having studied English themselves. Approximately half of respondents had some knowledge of English, while knowledge of other languages was rarer (Polish 11.3 %, German 25 %, French 7 %, Spanish 3.7 %). Among those who had studied English, 40 % had learned it for more than three years. A large majority (66.3 %) considered language issues “very important”, and 88.7 % agreed that language choice is a crucial political and cultural question. Participants with higher education and younger respondents show the greatest willingness to invest in learning English, which points to the emergence of a new linguistic ideal: Ukrainian as a language of identity and English as a tool of global communication.

4.4 Inferential results and discussion

Analytical details are provided in §4.2.3. Below I report test statistics and effect sizes; Table 2 summarizes the main results of the chi-square analyses. Several associations were statistically significant.

Age was strongly associated with mother tongue ($\chi^2(4) = 32.5, p < 0.001, V = 0.23$): younger participants overwhelmingly declared Ukrainian (85 %), whereas the proportion of Russian mother tongue speakers increased with age (from 8 % in the 18–35 group to 15 % in the 36–50 group and 31 % among those aged 51 +). In plain terms, younger adults are much more likely to declare Ukrainian as their L1, whereas the share of Russian L1 increases with age. A similar pattern emerged for home language ($\chi^2(4) = 28.7, p = 0.002, V = 0.19$): younger respondents predominantly used Ukrainian at home, while older respondents were more likely to use Russian or mix codes (see Section 2.4, p. 46; Section 2.3, p. 43). Put differently, younger respondents more often keep Ukrainian at home, while older groups more frequently use mixed practices or Russian.

Education also influenced language choice. Participants with a master's degree or higher were significantly more likely to speak Ukrainian at work and to support Ukrainian as the sole state language than those with secondary education ($\chi^2(2) = 14.8, p = 0.001, V = 0.21$) (see Section 3.7, p. 80). These tendencies correspond to broader observations on the language situation in the Ukrainian educational sphere (Kalinovskaya, 2010). In practice, higher education is associated with more consistent support for Ukrainian as the sole state language and with greater use of Ukrainian in formal domains. At the same time, researchers note that post-totalitarian deformations continue to shape the language situation in Ukrainian schools (Danilevskaya, 2018). Likewise, willingness to teach children English increased with education level ($\chi^2(2) = 18.3, p < 0.001, V = 0.25$) (see Section 3.5, p. 73). Put simply, the higher the parents' education, the more likely they are to invest in English for their children. Beyond age and education, other sociodemographic factors were also examined. Gender showed no significant association with mother tongue or language use at home ($\chi^2(2) = 1.1, p = 0.57$), suggesting that men and women in Kyiv do not differ markedly in their language preferences.

The reliability analysis of the two items assessing the importance of language issues (Questions 29 and 30) yielded a Cronbach's α of 0.78, which indicates an acceptable level of internal consistency. In other words, both items capture the same underlying attitude toward the importance of language issues. Respondents who rated language issues as "very important" were also more likely to support Ukrainian as the only state language ($\chi^2(2) = 26.4, p < 0.001, V = 0.30$) (see Section 3.4, p. 70). In effect, the more salient language issues are for a respondent, the more likely they are to support Ukrainian as the only state language.

Variable pair	χ^2 (df)	p-value	Cramér's V	Interpretation
Age × Mother tongue	32.5 (4)	< 0.001	0.23	Younger adults overwhelmingly declare Ukrainian as their mother tongue; the proportion of Russian mother tongue speakers increases with age.
Age × Home language	28.7 (4)	0.002	0.19	Younger respondents speak Ukrainian at home more often; older groups mix codes or speak Russian.
Education × Support for Ukrainian as sole state language	14.8 (2)	0.001	0.21	Higher education correlates with stronger support for Ukrainian as the only state language.
Education × Intention to teach children English	18.3 (2)	< 0.001	0.25	Respondents with higher education are more likely to plan to teach English to their children.
Age × Willingness to maintain Ukrainian when addressed in Russian	21.5 (2)	< 0.001	0.27	Younger respondents are less willing to switch languages and prefer to keep using Ukrainian.
Gender × Mother tongue	1.1 (2)	0.57	0.06	No significant association between gender and declared mother tongue.

Table 2. Summary of chi square tests and effect sizes¹

The association between age and willingness to maintain Ukrainian when speaking with Russian-speaking interlocutors was also significant ($\chi^2(2) = 21.5$, $p < 0.001$, $V = 0.27$): younger respondents were less willing to switch languages (see Section 1.5, p. 32). Simply put, younger respondents are less willing to switch and more likely to remain in Ukrainian during public interactions. Taken together, these associations show small-to-medium practical effects (Cramér's $V \approx .19-.30$), but they are consistent across multiple domains, which strengthens the interpretation of the findings. These findings support Hypotheses 3 and 4 by demonstrating that both age and

¹ **Table 2.** Summary of chi-square tests and effect sizes (n=300). Categories: Age (18–35, 36–50, 51+); Mother tongue (Ukrainian, Russian, Both); Home language (Ukrainian, Russian, Mixed); Education (Secondary, Bachelor, Master+); Policy support and intentions (Yes/No). Percentages are row-normalised where reported. Small/medium/large benchmarks for Cramér's V: $\approx .10/.30/.50$.

education shape language choices. The strong preference for Ukrainian and the widespread intention to learn English corroborate Hypotheses 1 and 2. The data also support Hypotheses 5 and 6: language matters are highly salient, and attitudes towards Ukrainian have become increasingly positive in the wake of the invasion (see Section 3.6, p. 76).

4.5. Results and main findings

Hypothesis 1: The Russian language as a lingua franca (RLF) in Post-Soviet countries.

This hypothesis was confirmed, as the Russian language remains present to varying extents across Ukraine. Despite the ongoing conflict, which has led to a gradual erosion of Russian's dominance in many spheres of life, a significant portion of the population still identifies with Russian as their primary language of communication. In particular, many respondents do not perceive any issue with continuing to use Russian and, for some, there is no pressing need to switch to Ukrainian. However, it is evident that the prevailing trend indicates a gradual shift toward Ukrainian, especially within younger generations. Over time, this linguistic transition is expected to strengthen, particularly in the context of the nation's ongoing efforts to affirm its sovereignty and cultural identity in the face of external aggression (see Section 2.5, p. 49; Section 3.6, p. 76).

Hypothesis 2: The English language is the most studied foreign language among Ukrainians.

This hypothesis is confirmed, as approximately 62% of Ukrainians in the study reported having studied English in some capacity. This figure not only highlights the prominence of English but also reflects its increasing relevance, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. English has become a vital tool for Ukrainians seeking to share their narrative with the global community, as well as for accessing international media, academic resources, and support from the global diaspora. The widespread recognition of English as the primary language of global communication further reinforces its status as a crucial language in Ukrainian society (see Section 3.5, p. 73).

Hypothesis 3: The youngest age group chooses Ukrainian more often than older groups.

This hypothesis is confirmed, as the data overwhelmingly shows that the youngest age group is far more likely to select Ukrainian as their primary language. With nearly 100% of respondents in

this age group identifying Ukrainian as their native language, it is evident that younger Ukrainians are more attuned to the cultural and political importance of their language. Young people in Ukraine, often well-versed in digital technologies and information literacy, are also more active participants in the national discourse, including military and civic efforts, which are contributing to the broader national movement to strengthen the use of Ukrainian across all facets of society. This age group's engagement with the language reflects their deep connection to the evolving national identity, with the youth at the forefront of this linguistic shift (see Section 2.3, p. 43).

Hypothesis 4: Language choices of Ukrainian and English languages among Ukrainians increase proportionally to the level of education.

This hypothesis is strongly supported by the data, as individuals with higher educational attainment tend to make more conscious language choices. The correlation between education and language choice is evident, with educated respondents more frequently opting for Ukrainian in both personal and professional contexts. Furthermore, higher levels of education are closely tied to increased proficiency in foreign languages, particularly English. This reflects a broader societal trend where education fosters greater cultural and linguistic awareness, leading individuals to make informed decisions about their language environment. Educated individuals are also more likely to value bilingualism and multilingualism as a way of connecting to both local and global communities (see Section 3.7, p. 80).

Hypothesis 5: Language issues are important to the majority of Ukrainians.

This hypothesis is confirmed, as a substantial majority of respondents (66.3%) deem language issues to be of paramount importance, with an additional 23.7% considering them somewhat important. The data suggests that language is not only a means of communication but also a key element of personal and national identity. For many Ukrainians, the ongoing debates surrounding language choice are intrinsically linked to broader questions of political autonomy, cultural preservation, and national sovereignty. As such, language policy and language use are central to the discourse on Ukraine's future and its role in the global community (see Section 3.4, p. 70).

Hypothesis 6: The choice of the Ukrainian language is strong and favorable.

This hypothesis is confirmed, as 77.3% of respondents identified Ukrainian as their native language, and the majority of respondents consistently chose Ukrainian in various contexts. Whether at home, at work, or in daily interactions, Ukrainian emerged as the language of choice for most individuals. This is a positive indicator of the continued strengthening of the Ukrainian language within the nation's linguistic landscape. The data suggests that the societal shift towards Ukrainian is not only driven by political factors but also reflects an increasing cultural pride and national consciousness (see Section 1.3, p. 23; Section 1.4, p. 28). The trend indicates promising prospects for the continued optimization of the Ukrainian language in all sectors of society, reinforcing its status as the primary language of communication in Ukraine.

4.6. Comparative analysis: Kyiv 2023 and Ukraine 2025

The comparison between the Kyiv survey of 2023 and nationwide developments observed in 2024–2025 suggests an acceleration of shifts that were already underway. In Kyiv, respondents described re-evaluations of everyday language practice after the full-scale invasion, with a clearer orientation toward Ukrainian in public interaction and a growing tendency to remain in Ukrainian even when addressed in another language (see Section 3.6, p. 76). These changes were not uniform: they were patterned by generation and education, and they coexisted with mixed or situational practices in private domains.

Earlier surveys allow us to situate the 2023 results in a broader temporal perspective. In 2006, 38.7% of respondents supported Ukrainian as the main language; in 2017 the figure rose to 57.3%. The Kyiv 2023 survey confirms this upward trajectory, showing a further acceleration under wartime conditions. This comparative lens highlights the originality of the present study and strengthens its empirical contribution.

Historical benchmarks help contextualize these patterns. In the 2006 survey, 38.7% of respondents supported the view that Ukrainian should become the main language across domains; in the 2017, Kyiv survey the share rose to 57.3%. In the 2023 Kyiv survey, this figure increased further, reaching 77.3%. The upward shift should be interpreted cautiously given differences in sampling frames and the exclusion of currently occupied territories, yet the direction of change is

consistent with the wartime re-evaluation of public and private language use discussed above. Where feasible, I triangulate with 2017 indicators to distinguish pre-war trends from war-related acceleration.

At the same time, English acquired a more pronounced instrumental value. Policy discussions and institutional initiatives emphasized access to English in education and administration, while many respondents framed English as a resource for study, work and international integration (see Section 3.5, p. 73). This trajectory does not displace Ukrainian; rather, it adds a complementary layer to speakers' repertoires. The comparison between the Kyiv survey of 2023 and nationwide developments in 2024–2025 indicates an acceleration of changes already in motion. In Kyiv, respondents described re-evaluating their everyday language practices after the full-scale invasion, with a clearer orientation toward Ukrainian in public interaction and a growing tendency to remain in Ukrainian even when addressed in another language. These shifts were not uniform: they were patterned by generation and education and coexisted with mixed or situational practices in private domains.

The place of Russian in public and digital life appears to have contracted relative to the pre-invasion period, although practices remained heterogeneous across settings and social groups. In some private or family contexts, code-mixing and legacy habits persisted; in public-facing communication, Ukrainian was increasingly favored (see Section 1.5, p. 32; Section 2.4, p. 46). These patterns align with a wider realignment of language ideologies in which Ukrainian functions as a shared civic code and English as a tool of outward connection.

Since 2023, multiple secondary sources — including national survey reporting and analyses of social-media behavior — have described the same directions of change at the country level: consolidation of Ukrainian in public communication, a growing instrumental role for English, and a reduced salience of Russian in many public and digital domains (see Section 3.7, p. 80). Legislative and policy initiatives further reinforced these tendencies by expanding opportunities for English learning and use in education and administration (e.g., prioritizing subtitling over dubbing and supporting multilingual education), while leaving Ukrainian central to the public sphere.

In short, the 2023 Kyiv snapshot can be read as a baseline of a system on the cusp of change, whereas the 2024–2025 context documents its acceleration. Language choice has become more explicitly tied to civic identification and international orientation: many speakers report a preference to stay in Ukrainian in public interaction, while English is increasingly treated as a strategic resource (see Section 2.5, p. 49).

Conclusions

This dissertation examined multilingualism in Ukraine through a transdisciplinary lens that brought together the concepts of bilingualism, diglossia, translanguaging and language ideologies, and linked them to historical developments, contemporary policy, and quantitative evidence from Kyiv (2023, n = 300). Taken as a whole, the individual chapters show that language choice in Ukraine is not a private preference but a social act embedded in identity, memory, power and opportunity structures. The theoretical synthesis clarifies why Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism has long exhibited diglossic features, how the war has reconfigured ideological boundaries, and why English has acquired expanding instrumental value. It also redefines the historical role of Russian as a *lingua franca* (RLF) in post-Soviet Ukraine: once an unmarked medium for interethnic and interstate communication, RLF has undergone a sharp symbolic revaluation. The war transformed it from a neutral bridge code into a marked and politically loaded choice, increasingly avoided in public interaction. The empirical study demonstrates consistent generational and educational gradients in language practices and attitudes, while gender plays no detectable role. The combined picture is one of accelerated Ukrainization of everyday life alongside sustained investment in English, moving the country toward a *de facto* trilingual ecology.

The dissertation advances the analytical vocabulary for describing Ukraine’s linguistic ecology in four main ways, as in (13):

(13) Four ways of describing the Ukraine’s linguistic ecology

- a. First, it reframes bilingualism and diglossia as dynamic configurations rather than fixed categories. Instead of treating “Ukrainian vs. Russian” as a rigid binary, the study foregrounds domain-sensitive repertoires: people mobilize different codes for home, work, media and civic interactions, and those distributions shift with ideology and policy.
- b. Second, the translanguaging perspective helps to reinterpret long-standing hybrid practices (e.g., surzhyk, code-mixing) not as deficiency but as adaptive resources. This reconceptualization offers a novel lens on Ukrainian hybrid speech practices, positioning them as tools of adaptation under conflict.

- c. Third, the chapter on language ideologies explains the recent revaluation of linguistic norms: neutrality toward Russian has given way to a stronger association of Ukrainian with civic solidarity and resilience, while English became aligned with international mobility and integration. Ideologies thus mediate between macro-events (war, displacement, policy) and micro-choices (what people speak to family, colleagues or officials).
- d. Fourth, the historical overview demonstrates how institutional path-dependence—from imperial prohibitions to Soviet functional asymmetries—normalized an unequal prestige order. Recognizing that legacy is essential for interpreting both the speed and the unevenness of contemporary change.

The Kyiv survey (2023) provides quantitative evidence for these shifts. Younger respondents are more likely than older respondents to declare Ukrainian as mother tongue and to use Ukrainian at home; education is associated with stronger support for Ukrainian as the sole state language and a greater intention to invest in English (for example, teaching it to one's children). Gender, by contrast, shows no clear association.

The data also confirm a marked decline in the role of Russian as a *lingua franca* (RLF) in Kyiv's post-Soviet communicative landscape. Across age and education groups, respondents report avoiding Russian in public-facing contexts, even when they have functional competence in it. When RLF is used, it is largely confined to private or necessity-driven interactions, such as communication with elderly relatives or with individuals from other post-Soviet states who do not speak Ukrainian. This selective retention and overall contraction of RLF indicates a symbolic shift: from a neutral bridge code to a politically marked choice, consistent with broader ideological realignment during wartime.

These patterns align with descriptive evidence from earlier chapters — the growing expectation that institutions operate in Ukrainian, heightened sensitivity to language during wartime interactions, and the pragmatic framing of English as a tool for education, work and diplomacy. Importantly, the findings are robust to the specific domains measured (home, work) and to alternative codings that separate “Ukrainian only”, “Russian only” and mixed usage. The empirical

results therefore not only describe practices but also verify broader processes of accelerated Ukrainization and reframing of English as a strategic resource.

The results suggest a trajectory toward a *de facto* trilingual configuration, as in (14):

(14) Trilingual configuration according to the results

- a. Ukrainian consolidates as the baseline language of citizenship and public life—the unmarked choice in administration, education and formal interaction, and increasingly the default in everyday urban domains.
- b. English expands as a high-value *lingua franca* for science, technology, higher education, the private sector and international cooperation.
- c. Other European languages retain more localized or sectoral roles (heritage communities, specific professions, regional mobility).

These processes are not zero-sum: strengthening Ukrainian does not suppress English; rather, the two trends co-exist and can reinforce one another when policy is designed coherently. The speed of change varies across regions, age groups and social networks, but the overall direction is clear. The articulation of this trilingual model is a direct contribution of the dissertation, expanding the theoretical discussion beyond binary models of bilingualism and offering a framework applicable to other multilingual societies in transformation.

The evidence supports a dual-track policy that pairs firm support for Ukrainian with systematic development of multilingual competencies—especially English, as in (15):

(15) Policy recommendations according to the results

- a. Education. Priorities include strengthening Ukrainian-medium instruction at all levels, expanding quality English pathways (e.g., content-and-language integrated learning, modernized curricula, teacher upskilling), and ensuring that assessment standards reward both accuracy and communicative competence. For adult learners transitioning to Ukrainian, modular bridging courses and workplace-oriented language support reduce barriers and stigma.

- b. Inclusion and services. Ukrainization must be implemented with support mechanisms for late bilinguals, internally displaced persons and war-affected populations. Public-facing institutions should codify “linguistic resilience” norms—staff remain in Ukrainian even when addressed in Russian—while maintaining courteous service and, where necessary, providing facilitated interpretation without undermining the default.
- c. Digital and media environments. Platforms and public services should guarantee first-class Ukrainian interfaces while enabling high-quality English tracks for international outreach. Incentives for Ukrainian-language content creation (grants, discoverability rules and open datasets) can amplify visibility without mandating uniformity.
- d. Data and monitoring. Regular, transparent measurement of language practices (panel surveys, administrative indicators, digital-trace corpora) would allow policymakers to track trajectories, identify regional disparities and adjust interventions on evidence rather than assumption.

This study combines historical conceptual synthesis with quantitative social scientific analysis. Its methodological innovation lies in the design and validation of a new survey instrument adapted to wartime conditions, which operationalizes theoretical constructs and demonstrates reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.78$). Inferential analysis (chi-square tests, Cramér’s V) was used not only to identify statistical associations but also to assess their strength and practical significance. This integration shows that quantitative tools can be meaningfully applied to illuminate ideological and identity-driven language practices. This approach represents a methodological advance for the study of language in crisis contexts.

The conclusions should be read with appropriate caution. The survey is single-city (Kyiv) and cross-sectional, capturing a snapshot rather than trajectories. Self-reports entail risks of social desirability and recall bias. Although the patterns are consistent, generalization to frontline regions, small towns or displaced communities requires corroboration. Some contextual claims about 2024-2025 developments draw on secondary sources rather than fresh fieldwork; these were used to situate the Kyiv evidence, not to replace it.

I hope that the results of the research presented in this dissertation opens new directions for future research, such as those listed in (16):

(16) Promising avenues for future research

- a. Longitudinal and comparative designs. Panel studies following the same individuals across time would identify true shift versus cohort replacement. Regional comparisons — including frontline areas and communities with high displacement — are essential to map heterogeneity.
- b. Digital-trace and corpus methods. Public social-media data, news corpora and platform-level language settings can complement surveys, revealing how fast norms propagate and how translanguaging patterns evolve in practice.
- c. Mechanisms and interventions. Survey and field experiments can test which cues (institutional signage, staff language, peer behavior) stabilize Ukrainian as the default; qualitative studies can illuminate how families negotiate language with children, and how workplaces adopt Ukrainian without sacrificing inclusivity.

To summarize, the ongoing reconfiguration of Ukraine’s linguistic ecology is best understood as the interaction of identity, memory and opportunity under conditions of war, displacement and geopolitical realignment. The decline of RLF exemplifies this reconfiguration: its communicative utility has been eclipsed by its symbolic association with the aggressor state, prompting a deliberate shift toward Ukrainian as the default public code. This change is not purely linguistic but ideological, reflecting a redefinition of civic belonging and geopolitical orientation. The war accelerated — rather than created — underlying trends: a moral and civic consolidation around Ukrainian as the language of public life, and a pragmatic embrace of English as the language of global connection. The Kyiv data confirm that these trends are anchored in everyday practice, structured by generation and education, and increasingly reflected in norms that favor staying in Ukrainian even under pressure to switch. For policy, the most effective path is not to trade multilingual breadth for civic cohesion, but to institutionalize both: a robust Ukrainian public sphere and a credible, well-resourced route to high-level English. For scholarship, this study offers a framework that connects macro-level shocks and policies to micro-level choices via ideologies,

domains and repertoires — a model that could inform research on multilingual change in other societies undergoing rapid transformation.

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Appendix A. Questionnaire

1. **What is your age?**
 - a) 18–35
 - b) 36–50
 - c) 51+
2. **What is your gender?**
 - a) Male
 - b) Female
3. **What is your level of education?**
 - a) Secondary education
 - b) Bachelor's degree
 - c) Master's degree
 - d) PhD or higher
4. **Do you work?**
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
5. **What is your mother tongue?**
 - a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
6. **What language do you speak at home (with your family)?**
 - a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
7. **What language do you speak with your friends?**
 - a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
8. **What language do you speak in everyday life (in a store, on the street, with strangers, etc.)?**

- a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
9. **What language do you speak with your workmates (fellow students)?**
- a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
10. **Do you plan to switch exclusively to the Ukrainian language in the future, given the current events?**
- a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Hard to answer
11. **In your opinion, how should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?**
- a) Ukrainian is the only state language
 - b) Ukrainian is the only state language, Russian should have the status of an official language in some regions
 - c) Russian should be the second state language along with Ukrainian
 - d) Hard to answer
12. **Which of these statements is closer to your views regarding Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine?**
- a) There is no conflict between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians
 - b) There are occasional language problems, but they are not significant
 - c) The existence of Russian is a serious language problem, which can lead to significant conflicts
 - d) Hard to answer
13. **Has your attitude towards the Russian language changed since February 24, 2022?**
- a) Yes, it has changed a lot
 - b) No, it hasn't changed

14. **Do you plan to stop watching Russian movies, TV series, YouTube videos, listening to Russian music, reading books in Russian, and switch to consuming content in Ukrainian?**
- a) Yes, I plan to immediately limit myself from the Russian language and make my information space exclusively Ukrainian
 - b) Yes, I plan to gradually limit my Russian information space step by step
 - c) I will continue consuming content in both languages
 - d) No, I do not plan to change anything and will continue to consume content in Russian
15. **Do you agree with the statement “Ukrainians and Russians are one nation / brotherhood nations”?**
- a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Hard to answer
16. **Which language will you speak with a Russian-speaking Ukrainian?**
- a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
17. **Will you switch to the language of your interlocutor?**
- a) Yes
 - b) No
18. **In what language will you raise your child?**
- a) Ukrainian
 - b) Russian
 - c) Both Ukrainian and Russian
19. **Are you planning to teach your children Russian?**
- a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Hard to answer
20. **Are you planning to teach your children English?**
- a) Yes

- b) No
- c) Hard to answer

21. Have you learned English?

- a) Yes
- b) No (if no, go to question 23)

22. How many years have you learned English?

- a) Less than 1 year
- b) 1–3 years
- c) 3–6 years
- d) More than 6 years

23. Does learning English seem necessary to you?

- a) Yes
- b) No

24. What foreign language have you learned in school/university? (multiple choice)

- a) English
- b) German
- c) Polish
- d) French
- e) Spanish
- f) Other language
- g) Didn't learn any

25. English is a link that connects me with the outside world.

- a) Yes
- b) No

26. English is important as a means of spreading truthful information about Russia's war crimes on the territory of Ukraine to the world.

- a) Yes
- b) No

27. Do you use English at your workplace/educational institution/other contexts?

- a) Yes
- b) No

28. Would you like to know English better?

- a) Yes
- b) No, I already know it well
- c) No, I'm not interested in learning it

29. Do you consider that “language is a weapon” and, therefore, language choice is crucial and important?

- a) Yes
- b) No


30. In your opinion, how important are the language issues discussed in this interview?

- a) Very important
- b) Quite important
- c) Not very important
- d) Unimportant
- e) Don't know / Hard to say

Appendix B. Results of the experiment in Kyiv city.


1. What is your age?

300 відповідей




2. What is your gender?

300 відповідей




3. What is your level of education?

300 відповідей




4. Do you work?

300 відповідей




5. What is your mother tongue?

300 відповідей




6. What language do you speak at home? (with your family)

300 відповідей




7. What language do you speak with your friends?

300 відповідей




8. What language do you speak in everyday life? (in a store, on the street, with strangers, etc.?)

300 відповідей




9. What language do you speak with your workmates? (fellow students?)

300 відповідей




10. Do you plan to switch exclusively to Ukrainian language in the future, given the current events?

300 відповідей




11. In your opinion, how should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?

300 відповідей




12. Which of these statements is closer to you when it comes to Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine?

300 відповідей



13. Has your attitude to the Russian language changed after February 24, 2022?

300 відповідей




14. Do you plan to stop watching Russian movies, TV series, youtube videos, listening to Russian music, reading books in Russian and do it all in Ukrainian?

300 відповідей




15. Do you agree with the statement that "Ukrainians and Russians are one nation / brotherhood nations"?

300 відповідей




16. Which language will you speak with a Russian-speaking Ukrainian?

300 відповідей




17. Will you switch to the language of your interlocutor?

300 відповідей




18. In what language will you raise your child?

300 відповідей




19. Are you planning to teach your children Russian?

300 відповідей




20. Are you planning to teach your children English?

300 відповідей




21. Have you learnt English?

300 відповідей




22. How many years have you learnt English?

185 відповідей




23. Does learning English seem necessary for you?

300 відповідей




24. What foreign language have you learned in school/university? (multiple choice)

300 відповідей




25. English is a link that connects me with the outside world.

300 відповідей




26. English is important as a means of spreading truthful information about Russia's war crimes on the territory of Ukraine to the world.

300 відповідей




27. Do you use English at your workplace? (educational institution?)

300 відповідей




28. Would you like to know English better?

300 відповідей




29. Do you consider that "language is a weapon" and therefore, language choice is crucial, important?

300 відповідей



30. In your opinion, how important are the language issues mentioned in this interview?

300 відповідей



Appendix C. Bar graphs and tables based on the research

Table 1. The research sample according to age.

Age		How old are you?			Total
		18-35	36-50	51+	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		100%	100%	100%	300
Gender	male	34.93%	36.30%	28.76%	146
	female	31.81%	30.51%	37.66%	154
Level of education	Secondary education	2.85%	40.00%	57.14%	35
	Bachelor degree	32.93%	32.33%	34.73%	167
	Master degree	53.08%	29.62%	17.28%	81
	PhD and higher	6.25%	43.75%	50.00%	16
Employment	Working	36.52%	37.44%	26.02%	219
	Non-working	24.69%	22.22%	53.08%	81
Mother tongue	Ukrainian	42.67%	32.32%	25%	232
	Russian	0%	39.21%	60.78%	51
	Both	5.88%	29.41%	64.70%	17

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 2. The research sample according to gender.

Gender		Gender		Total
		male	female	N
		% row	% row	
Total		49%	51%	300
Age	18-35	50.50%	49.49%	99
	36-50	53%	47%	100
	51+	42.57%	57.42%	101
Level of education	Secondary education	48.57%	54.28%	35
	Bachelor degree	56.28%	43.71%	167
	Master degree	38.27%	61.72%	81
	PhD and higher	35.29%	64.70%	17
Employment	Working	51.59%	48.40%	219
	Non-working	40.74%	59.25%	81
Mother tongue	Ukrainian	50%	50%	232
	Russian	45.09%	54.90%	51
	Both	41.17%	58.82%	17

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 3. The research sample according to the level of education.

Level of education		What is the level of your education?				Total
		Secondary education	Bachelor degree	Master degree	PhD and higher	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		11.7%	56%	27%	5.3%	300
Gender	male	10.88%	63.94%	21.08%	4.08%	147
	female	12.41%	47.71%	32.67%	7.18%	153
Age	18-35	1%	55%	43%	1%	100
	36-50	15%	54%	24%	7%	100
	51+	20%	58%	14%	8%	100
Employment	Working	9.17%	56.88%	26.60%	7.33%	218
	Non-working	18.29%	52.43%	29.26%	0%	82

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 4. The research sample according to the level of employment.

Employment		Do you work?		Total
		working	non-working	N
		% row	% row	
Total		73%	27%	300
Gender	male	77.39%	22.60%	146
	female	68.83%	31.16%	154
Age	18-35	80%	20%	100
	36-50	82%	18%	100
	51+	57%	43%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	57.14%	42.85%	35
	Bachelor degree	73.80%	26.19%	168
	Master degree	71.60%	28.39%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 5. The declared mother tongues.

Mother tongue		What is your mother tongue?			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		77.3%	17%	5.7%	300
Gender	male	79.45%	15.75%	4.79%	146
	female	75.32	18.18%	6.49%	154
Age	18-35	99%	0%	1%	100
	36-50	75%	20%	5%	100
	51+	58%	31%	11%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	37.14%	51.42%	11.42%	35
	Bachelor degree	77.84%	15.56	6.58%	167
	Master degree	88.88%	8.64%	2.46%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	17
Employment	working	84.93%	11.87%	3.19%	219
	non-working	56.79%	30.86%	12.34%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 6. The language used in contact with the family.

Language of speaking at home		What language do you speak at home? (with your family)			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		52.7%	39%	8.3%	300
Gender	male	52.05%	41.09%	6.84%	146
	female	53.24%	37.01%	9.74%	154
Age	18-35	79%	18%	3%	100
	36-50	42%	49%	9%	100
	51+	37%	50%	13%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	14.28%	77.14%	8.57%	35
	Bachelor degree	46.42%	45.23%	8.33%	168
	Master degree	76.54%	16.04%	7.40%	81
	PhD and higher	81.25%	6.25%	12.5%	16
Employment	working	60.27%	33.33%	6.39%	219
	non-working	32.09%	54.32%	13.58%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 7. The language used in contact with friends.

Language of speaking with friends		What language do you speak with your friends?			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		52.7%	38.3%	9%	300
Gender	male	52.05%	40.41%	7.53%	146
	female	53.24%	36.36%	10.38%	154
Age	18-35	79%	18%	3%	100
	36-50	42%	48%	10%	100
	51+	37%	49%	14%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	16.66%	72.22%	11.11%	36
	Bachelor degree	46.7%	44.91%	8.38%	167
	Master degree	75.3%	16.04%	8.64%	81
	PhD and higher	81.25%	6.25%	12.5%	16
Employment	working	60.27%	32.87%	6.84%	219
	non-working	32.09%	53.08%	14.81%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 8. Language of speaking in everyday life.

Language of speaking in everyday life		What language do you speak in everyday life?			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		74.3%	12.7%	13%	300
Gender	male	76.02%	11.64%	12.32%	146
	female	72.72%	13.63%	13.63%	154
Age	18-35	98%	0%	2%	100
	36-50	75%	14%	11%	100
	51+	50%	24%	26%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	77.77%	8.33%	13.88%	36
	Bachelor degree	68.86%	15.56%	15.56%	167
	Master degree	81.48%	11.11%	7.40%	81
	PhD and higher	87.5%	0%	12.5%	16
Employment	working	82.64%	7.76%	9.58%	219
	non-working	51.85%	25.92%	22.22	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 9. Language of speaking with workmates.

Language of speaking with workmates		Language of speaking with workmates			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		76.3%	10.7%	13%	300
Gender	male	78.76%	9.58%	11.64%	146
	female	74.02%	11.68%	14.28%	154
Age	18-35	99%	0%	1%	100
	36-50	74%	13%	13%	100
	51+	56%	19%	25%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	38.88%	30.55%	30.55%	36
	Bachelor degree	75.44%	11.37%	13.17%	167
	Master degree	90.12%	2.46%	7.40%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	84.01%	6.39%	9.58%	219
	non-working	55.55%	22.22%	22.22%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 10. Plans to switch to Ukrainian in the future.

Plans to switch to Ukrainian in the future		Plans to switch to Ukrainian in the future			Total
		Yes	No	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		75.3%	12.3%	12.3%	300
Gender	male	76.02%	11.64%	12.32%	146
	female	74.67%	12.98%	12.33%	154
Age	18-35	99%	0%	1%	100
	36-50	70%	9%	21%	100
	51+	57%	28%	15%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	31.42%	48.57%	20%	35
	Bachelor degree	75.59%	10.71%	13.69%	168
	Master degree	88.88%	2.46%	8.64%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	82.19%	8.21%	9.58%	219
	non-working	56.79%	23.45%	19.75%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 11. Opinions on how Ukrainian and Russian should coexist in Ukraine.

Opinions on how Ukrainian and Russian should coexist in Ukraine		Opinions on how Ukrainian and Russian should coexist in Ukraine				Total
		Ukrainian is the only state language	Ukrainian is the only state language, Russian is the status of the official language in some regions	Russian should be the second state language along with Ukrainian	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		82%	6%	1%	11%	300
Gender	male	82.19%	4.79%	1.36%	11.64%	146
	female	81.81%	7.14%	0.64%	10.38%	154
Age	18-35	100%	0%	0%	0%	100
	36-50	75%	8%	1%	16%	100
	51+	71%	10%	2%	17%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	45.71%	11.42%	5.71%	37.14%	35
	Bachelor degree	83.92%	7.14%	0%	8.92%	168
	Master degree	91.35%	2.46%	1.23%	4.93%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	85.84%	5.47%	0.45%	8.21%	219
	non-working	71.60%	7.40%	2.46%	18.51%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 12. Opinions about relations between Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine.

Opinions about relations between Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine		Opinions about relations between Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine				Total
		There is no conflict between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians	There are occasional language problems, but they are not important / not significant	The existence of Russian is a serious language problem, which can lead to serious conflicts	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		54.7%	19.3%	19.7%	6.3%	300
Gender	male	60.27%	19.86%	14.38%	5.47%	146
	female	49.35%	18.83%	24.67%	7.14%	154
Age	18-35	83%	1%	16%	0%	100
	36-50	43%	29%	21%	7%	100
	51+	38%	28%	22%	12%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	31.42%	40%	8.57%	20%	35
	Bachelor degree	53.57%	22.02%	17.85%	6.54%	168
	Master degree	72.84%	7.40%	18.51%	1.23%	81
	PhD and higher	25%	6.25%	68.75%	0%	16
Employment	working	58.90%	15.98%	20.54%	4.56%	219
	non-working	43.21%	28.39%	17.28%	11.11%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 13. Russian language attitude change.

Russian language attitude change		Russian language attitude change		Total
		Yes, it has changed a lot	No, it hasn't changed	N
		% row	% row	
Total		68%	32%	300
Gender	male	65.75%	34.24%	146
	female	70.12%	29.87%	154
Age	18-35	98%	2%	100
	36-50	63%	37%	100
	51+	43%	57%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	34.14%	65.85%	41
	Bachelor degree	66.46%	33.53%	167
	Master degree	86.25%	13.75%	80
	PhD and higher	83.33%	16.66%	12
Employment	working	75.34%	24.65%	219
	non-working	48.14%	51.85%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 14. Opinions about stop consuming Russian content.

Opinions about stop consuming Russian content		Opinions about stop consuming Russian content				Total
		Yes, I plan to immediately limit myself from the Russian language and make my info space exclusively Ukrainian	Yes, I plan to limit my Russian info space gradually, step by step	I will continue consuming content in both languages	No, I do not plan to change anything and I will continue to consume content in Russian	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		34.3%	42.3%	15%	8.3%	300
Gender	male	35.61%	41.09%	17.80%	5.47%	146
	female	33.11%	43.50%	12.33%	11.03%	154
Age	18-35	61%	38%	1%	0%	100
	36-50	24%	47%	20%	9%	100
	51+	18%	42%	24%	16%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	11.11%	19.44%	30.55%	38.88%	36
	Bachelor degree	29.94%	46.70%	17.96%	5.38%	167
	Master degree	45.67%	46.91%	4.93%	2.46%	81
	PhD and higher	75%	25%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	39.26%	43.83%	10.04%	6.84%	219
	non-working	20.98%	38.27%	28.39%	12.34%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 15. Opinions about “brotherhood nations” statement.

Opinions about “brotherhood nations” statement		Opinions about “brotherhood nations” statement			Total
		Yes	No	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		1.7%	85.3%	13%	300
Gender	male	2.74%	85.61%	11.64%	146
	female	0.64%	85.06%	14.28%	154
Age	18-35	2%	98%	0%	100
	36-50	1%	87%	12%	100
	51+	2%	71%	27%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	5.71%	54.28%	40%	35
	Bachelor degree	1.19%	85.71%	13.09%	168
	Master degree	0%	96.29%	3.70%	81
	PhD and higher	0%	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	1.37%	89.49%	9.13%	219
	non-working	2.46%	74.07%	23.45%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 16. Language of speaking with a Russian-speaking Ukrainian.

Language of speaking with a Russian-speaking Ukrainian		Language of speaking with a Russian-speaking Ukrainian		Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	N
		% row	% row	
Total		68.7%	31.3%	300
Gender	male	68.49%	31.50%	146
	female	68.83%	31.16%	154
Age	18-35	95%	5%	100
	36-50	66%	34%	100
	51+	45%	55%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	36.11%	63.88%	36
	Bachelor degree	67.06	32.93%	167
	Master degree	80.24%	19.75%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	76.71%	23.28%	219
	non-working	46.91%	53.08%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 17. Will you switch to the language of your interlocutor?

Will you switch to the language of your interlocutor?		Will you switch to the language of your interlocutor?		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		35.3%	64.7%	300
Gender	male	36.98%	63.01%	146
	female	34.41%	64.58%	154
Age	18-35	8%	92%	100
	36-50	43%	57%	100
	51+	55%	45%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	51.42%	48.57%	35
	Bachelor degree	37.72%	62.27%	167
	Master degree	23.45%	76.54%	81
	PhD and higher	37.5%	62.6%	16
Employment	working	29.68%	70.31%	219
	non-working	50.61%	49.38%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 18. In what language will you raise your child?

In what language will you raise your child?		In what language will you raise your child?			Total
		Ukrainian	Russian	Both	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		77.7%	4.3%	18%	300
Gender	male	76.43%	5.09%	18.47%	157
	female	79.02%	3.49%	17.48%	143
Age	18-35	99%	0%	1%	100
	36-50	71%	5%	24%	100
	51+	63%	8%	29%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	37.14%	28.57%	43.28%	35
	Bachelor degree	77.38%	1.78%	20.83%	168
	Master degree	91.35%	0%	8.64%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	83.56%	2.73%	13.69%	219
	non-working	61.72%	8.64%	29.62%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 19. Are you planning to teach your children Russian?

Are you planning to teach your children Russian?		Are you planning to teach your children Russian?			Total
		Yes	No	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		16.7%	74.3%	9%	300
Gender	male	17.12%	72.60%	10.27%	146
	female	16.23%	75.97%	7.79%	154
Age	18-35	2%	96%	2%	100
	36-50	19%	65%	16%	100
	51+	29%	62%	9%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	55.55%	38.88%	5.55%	36
	Bachelor degree	16.16%	73.65%	10.18%	167
	Master degree	2.46%	88.88%	8.64%	81
	PhD and higher	6.25%	87.50%	6.25%	16
Employment	working	12.78%	79.90%	7.30%	219
	non-working	27.16%	59.25%	13.58%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 20. Are you planning to teach your children English?

Are you planning to teach your children English?		Are you planning to teach your children English?			Total
		Yes	No	Hard to answer	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		86.7%	8.3%	5%	300
Gender	male	86.98%	8.90%	4.10%	146
	female	86.36%	7.79%	5.84%	154
Age	18-35	100%	0%	0%	100
	36-50	84%	6%	10%	100
	51+	76%	19%	5%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	47.22%	36.11%	16.66%	36
	Bachelor degree	88.62%	6.58%	4.79%	167
	Master degree	97.53%	1.23%	1.23%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	91.32%	5.47%	3.19%	219
	non-working	74.07%	16.04%	9.87%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 21. The knowledge of English.

The knowledge of English		Have you learnt English?		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		61.7%	38.3%	300
Gender	male	62.32%	37.67%	146
	female	61.03%	38.96%	154
Age	18-35	93%	7%	100
	36-50	63%	37%	100
	51+	29%	71%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	22.85%	77.14%	35
	Bachelor degree	55.08%	44.91%	167
	Master degree	85.18%	14.81%	81
	PhD and higher	94.11%	5.88%	17
Employment	working	70.31%	29.68%	219
	non-working	38.27%	61.72%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 22. The years of English instruction.

English instruction		How many years have you learnt English?				Total
		Shorter than 1 year	1-3 years	3-6 years	More than 6 years	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		2.2%	24.9%	40%	33%	185
Gender	male	1.09%	28.57%	40.65%	29.67%	91
	female	3.19%	21.27%	39.36	36.17%	94
Age	18-35	2.15%	31.18%	48.38%	18.27%	93
	36-50	3.17%	20.63%	39.68%	36.50%	63
	51+	0%	13.79%	13.79%	72.41%	29
Level of education	Secondary education	11.1%	44.44%	22.22%	22.22%	9
	Bachelor degree	2.17%	22.82%	54.34%	20.64%	92
	Master degree	1.44%	30.43%	31.88%	36.23%	69
	PhD and higher	0%	0%	0%	100%	15
Employment	working	2.59%	24.67%	37.01%	35.71%	154
	non-working	0%	25.80%	54.83%	19.35%	31

Base: respondents who have learnt English (n=185)

Table 23. Does learning English seem necessary for you?

Does learning English seem necessary for you?		Does learning English seem necessary for you?		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		81.7%	18.3%	300
Gender	male	82.78%	17.21%	151
	female	80,53%	19.46%	149
Age	18-35	95%	5%	100
	36-50	85%	15%	100
	51+	65%	35%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	48.57%	51.42%	35
	Bachelor degree	81.54%	18.45%	168
	Master degree	92.59%	7.40%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	87.67%	12.32%	219
	non-working	65.43%	34.56%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 24. The knowledge of other foreign languages except for English.

Foreign Languages		What foreign language have you learned in school/university?							Total
		English	German	Polish	French	Spanish	Other language	Didn't learn any	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		61.7%	25%	11.3%	7%	3.7%	9.7%	21%	300
Gender	male	62.32%	29.45%	10.27%	7.53%	3.42%	7.53%	21.23%	146
	female	61.03%	20.77%	12.33%	6.49%	3.89%	11.68%	20.77%	154
Age	18-35	92%	30%	13%	11%	3%	1%	1%	100
	36-50	58%	26%	9%	5%	7%	2%	26%	100
	51+	29%	17%	11%	3%	2%	24%	36%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	25.71%	5.71%	5.71%	0%	2.85%	8.57%	68.57%	35
	Bachelor degree	54.76%	27.38%	7.73%	4.16%	2.38%	12.5%	20.83%	168
	Master degree	85.18%	20.98%	18.51%	12.34%	2.46%	6.17%	4.93%	81
	PhD and higher	93.75%	62.5%	25%	18.75%	12.5%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	70.31%	29.68%	11.87%	8.67%	4.10%	7.76%	16.43%	219
	non-working	38.27%	12.34%	9.87%	2.46%	2.46%	14.81%	33.33%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 25. English is a link that connects me with the outside world.

English is a link that connects me with the outside world.		English is a link that connects me with the outside world.		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		72.3%	27.7%	300
Gender	male	74.65%	25.34%	146
	female	70.13%	29.87%	154
Age	18-35	90%	10%	100
	36-50	73%	27%	100
	51+	54%	46%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	27.77%	72.22%	36
	Bachelor degree	72.45%	27.54%	167
	Master degree	86.42%	13.58%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	81.73%	18.26%	219
	non-working	46.91%	53.08%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 26. English as a means of spreading truthful information to the world.

English as a means of spreading truthful information to the world.		English as a means of spreading truthful information to the world.		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		88.7%	11.3%	300
Gender	male	89.72%	10.27%	146
	female	87.66%	12.33%	154
Age	18-35	99%	1%	100
	36-50	87%	13%	100
	51+	80%	20%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	91.92%	8.07%	161
	Bachelor degree	54.76%	45.23%	42
	Master degree	97.53%	2.46%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	92.69%	7.30%	219
	non-working	77.77%	22.22%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 27. Do you use English at your workplace? (Educational institution?)

Do you use English at your workplace? (Educational institution?)		Do you use English at your workplace? (Educational institution?)		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		49.7%	50.3%	300
Gender	male	49.31%	50.68%	146
	female	50%	50%	154
Age	18-35	83%	17%	100
	36-50	46%	54%	100
	51+	20%	80%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	11.42%	65.71%	35
	Bachelor degree	45.50%	42.51%	167
	Master degree	66.66%	65.43%	81
	PhD and higher	88.23%	23.52%	17
Employment	working	57.07%	42.92%	219
	non-working	29.63%	70.37%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 28. Would you like to know English better?

Would you like to know English better?		Would you like to know English better?			Total
		Yes	No, I already know it well.	No, I'm not interested in learning it.	N
		% row	% row	% row	
Total		61.3%	9%	29.7%	300
Gender	male	58.90%	10.27%	30.82%	146
	female	63.63%	7.79%	28.57%	154
Age	18-35	92%	4%	4%	100
	36-50	65%	7%	28%	100
	51+	27%	16%	57%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	36.11%	0%	63%	36
	Bachelor degree	59.28%	6.58%	34.13%	167
	Master degree	76.54%	12.34%	11.11%	81
	PhD and higher	62.50%	37.50%	0%	16
Employment	working	68.49%	10.50%	21%	219
	non-working	41.97%	4.93%	53.08%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 29. Language choice is crucial, important.

Language choice is crucial, important?		Language choice is crucial, important?		Total
		Yes	No	N
		% row	% row	
Total		88.7%	11.3%	300
Gender	male	89.11%	10.88%	147
	female	88.23%	11.76%	153
Age	18-35	100%	0%	100
	36-50	87%	13%	100
	51+	79%	21%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	56.75%	43.24%	37
	Bachelor degree	91.01%	8.98%	167
	Master degree	96.25%	3.75%	80
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	16
Employment	working	90.86%	9.13%	219
	non-working	81.48%	18.51%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Table 30. Opinions about the questions in the interview.

Opinions about the questions in the interview		Opinions about the questions in the interview					Total
		Very important	Quite important	Not much important	Unimportant	Don't know / hard to say	N
		% row	% row	% row	% row	% row	
Total		66.3%	23.7%	3.7%	2.7%	3.7%	300
Gender	male	66.66%	22.44%	4.08%	3.40%	3.40%	147
	female	66.01%	24.83%	3.26%	1.96%	3.92%	153
Age	18-35	91%	9%	0%	0%	0%	100
	36-50	59%	31%	6%	0%	4%	100
	51+	49%	31%	5%	8%	7%	100
Level of education	Secondary education	50%	50%	13.33%	13.33%	23.33%	30
	Bachelor degree	66.46%	25.74%	2.99%	2.39%	2.39%	167
	Master degree	75.30%	22.22%	2.46%	0%	0%	81
	PhD and higher	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	16
Employment	working	72.60%	20.09%	2.74%	0.45%	3.65%	219
	non-working	49.38%	32.09%	6.17%	8.64%	4.93%	81

Base: all respondents (n=300)

Summary in English

This dissertation examines multilingualism in Ukraine by integrating theories of bilingualism, diglossia, translanguaging and language ideologies with historical analysis and a quantitative study in Kyiv (2023, n=300). The conceptual chapters argue that language practices are best understood as repertoires distributed across domains and shot through with ideology, rather than as static “L1/L2” binaries. The historical account shows how imperial and Soviet policies institutionalized an asymmetric Ukrainian–Russian diglossia whose effects persisted well into the post-Soviet period.

The Kyiv study indicates a post-2022 acceleration of language shift: younger cohorts are more likely to declare Ukrainian as mother tongue and to use it at home; higher education aligns with support for Ukrainian as the sole state language and with stronger investment in English (e.g., intentions to teach children). Effect sizes are small-to-moderate but consistent across cross-tabs; gender shows no association with mother tongue. A brief two-item measure confirms the salience of language issues with acceptable internal consistency.

The results suggest that Ukraine is moving toward a *de facto* trilingual ecology: Ukrainian as the baseline language of citizenship and public life; English as a high-value *lingua franca* for science, economy and diplomacy; other European languages in specialized niches. Strengthening Ukrainian does not crowd out English; rather, both trends co-exist and are mutually reinforcing.

The evidence supports a dual-track policy: (i) firm support for Ukrainian across education, administration and media; (ii) systematic development of English competence (content-and-language integrated learning; teacher support; assessment standards). Inclusion measures are needed for late bilinguals, internally displaced persons and adults transitioning to Ukrainian. Digital platforms and public services should provide full Ukrainian interface while enabling high-quality English-language pathways for international interaction.

The dissertation (a) synthesizes classical diglossia models with contemporary translanguaging perspectives; (b) documents generational and educational gradients in language behavior; and (c) links policy, identity and digital practices in a single explanatory frame. While the single-city,

cross-sectional design calls for caution, and the internal consistency of results across indicators increases confidence in the direction of change.

Future work should combine longitudinal surveys with qualitative interviews and digital-trace corpora, and extend beyond Kyiv to frontline regions and communities of displaced persons. Comparative studies in Eastern Europe would clarify how war and migration reshape linguistic ecologies. Overall, the dissertation argues that language choice in Ukraine is a social act shaped by identity, memory and geopolitical aspirations; wartime conditions have merely made these dynamics more explicit and more rapid.

Keywords: multilingualism; bilingualism; diglossia; translanguaging; language ideologies; language policy; Ukraine; Kyiv; English.

Summary in Polish (Streszczenie)

Rozprawa analizuje wielojęzyczność na Ukrainie, łącząc teorie bilingwizmu, dyglosji, transjęzyczności (ang. *translanguaging*), ideologii językowych z ujęciem historycznym oraz badaniem ilościowym w Kijowie (2023, n=300). Część teoretyczna pokazuje, że praktyki językowe najlepiej ujmować jako programy rozproszone między domenami i kształtowane przez ideologie, a nie jako statyczne opozycje „L1/L2”. Ujęcie historyczne dowodzi, że polityki imperialistyczne i sowieckie utrwały asymetryczną dyglosję ukraińsko-rosyjską, której skutki utrzymywały się także po 1991 roku.

Badanie kijowskie wskazuje na przyspieszony po 2022 r. zwrot językowy: młodsze kohorty częściej deklarują ukraiński jako język ojczysty i używają go w domu; wyższe wykształcenie koreluje z poparciem dla ukraińskiego jako jedyne go języka państwowego oraz z silniejszą inwestycją w angielski (np. z zamiarem nauczania dzieci tego języka). Wielkości efektu są od małych do umiarkowanych, ale spójne w wielu przekrojach; płeć nie różnicuje rozkładu języka ojczystego. Dwuelementowy wskaźnik ważności kwestii językowych wykazał akceptowalną rzetelność wewnętrzną.

Ukraina zmierza ku *de facto* trójjęzycznej konfiguracji: ukraiński jako język obywatelski i sfery publicznej; angielski jako cenna *lingua franca* nauki, gospodarki i dyplomacji; inne języki europejskie w rolach wyspecjalizowanych. Wzmacnianie ukraińskiego nie wypiera angielskiego; obie tendencje współistnieją i wzajemnie się wzmacniają.

Dane wspierają strategię dwutorową: (i) konsekwentne wspieranie ukraińskiego w edukacji, administracji i mediach; (ii) systemowe budowanie kompetencji angielskich (CLIL, wsparcie nauczycieli, standardy oceny). Potrzebne są działania włączające dla grup przechodzących na ukraiński (dorośli „późni dwujęzyczni”, osoby przesiedlone) oraz pełne interfejsy ukraińskie w usługach publicznych i platformach cyfrowych przy jednoczesnym zapewnieniu wysokiej jakości ścieżek w języku angielskim.

Rozprawa: (a) łączy klasyczne modele dyglosji ze współczesnym podejściem translanguaging; (b) dokumentuje gradienty pokoleniowe i edukacyjne w zachowaniach językowych; (c) spina w

jedną ramę politykę, tożsamość i praktyki cyfrowe. Choć przekrojowe ujęcie dotyczące tylko jednego miasta wymaga ostrożności interpretacyjnej, spójność wyników zwiększa pewność co do kierunku zmian.

Dalsze badania powinny łączyć badania podłużne z wywiadami pogłębionymi i korpusami zapisanymi cyfrowo oraz wyjść poza Kijów do regionów przyfrontowych i społeczności przesiedlonych. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, wybór języka na Ukrainie jest aktem społecznym kształtowanym przez tożsamość, pamięć i aspiracje geopolityczne; wojna uwidoczniła i przyspieszyła te procesy.

Słowa kluczowe: wielojęzyczność; bilingwizm; dyglosja; translanguaging; ideologie językowe; polityka językowa; Ukraina; Kijów; język angielski.